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1
General
1.1
Policy Framework
Partly
due to a number of incidents toward the end of the previous season and the
start of the season under review it was decided to update the Policy
Framework on Combating Football Hooliganism and Violence, which had been
determined in 1997.
The new
Policy Framework is a joint product of the organisations represented in
the interdisciplinary steering group on combating football hooliganism and
violence.
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The most crucial
new points in the Policy Framework are: |
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Updating of the
tasks and responsibilities of the various chain-partners; |
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An expansi0n of
the number of key chain partners; |
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A written
description of the (operational) policy objectives and policy approach
for 2003 and 2004; |
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Inclusion of a
number of tolerance levels and |
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The establishement
of an audit team tasked with investigating facts around (prevention of)
far-reaching incidents of football hooliganism in the Netherlands. |
1.2
Investigations
Two
important investigation reports appeared this season.
“Rotterdam
hooligans, growth, opportunistic structures, prevention” was published
in January 2003. This report was carried out by the COT, commissioned by
the Programme Bureau Security of the City of Rotterdam.
The other report, “The ball or the man. Profiles
of suspects in football-related violent crime” was conducted by the
IVA Tilburg and commissioned by the Ministry of Health Welfare & Sports (VWS)
and published in April 2003.
The
aspect of “new recruits” is central in both cases. The COT focused on
Feyenoord supporters while the IVA sought to sketch a general picture.
In the
view of the CIV both investigations were practically focused and offer
levers for the local players to take dedicated action.
We have a
number of remarks on each report.
1.3
COT
Investigation
The COT
report focuses exclusively on hooliganism by Feyenoord supporters and
their so-called new recruits.
The
study looks at:
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The hard-core
hooligans. Apparently, for some supporters hooliganism is a way of life.
The researchers endeavoured to describe this lifestyle; |
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New recruits to
hooligan groupings. This differentiates between temporary and
sustainable recruiting; |
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The opportunistic
structures, in particular the sustainable, variable and immediate
elements here. Aspects to consider here include hooliganism track
record, the culture, own environment and the stadium. The report also
sets out the influences of, e.g. the opposing parties, the policy and
the composition of risk-supporters; |
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The researchers
also dedicate a chapter to possible strategies and interventions to
avoid or curb football violence. |
1.4
“The ball or the man”
report
Central
to the set-up of the Tilburg IVA was collection of information on persons
arrested for violent offences at football matches in the first half of the
2002 – 2003 season.
The
researchers looked at:
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Current personal situation; |
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Level
of education; |
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Alcohol and/or substance abuse; |
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Family/parental problems; |
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Criminal records; |
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“Aggression” level; |
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Personal outlook on the future; |
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Involvement in football and |
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Attitude to the offence committed. |
The most
important conclusion yielded by the report is that with a large section of
the hooligans violence around football has a clear link with risks of
threatening behaviour or violence in other circumstances, such as “going
out on the town”. The study confirms that – rather than being good
citizens carried away by the game and/or alcohol and drugs and so
transformed into hooligans – a significant number of those responsible are
repeat offenders when it comes to threatening behaviour and violence. This
despite the fact that every season 75% of persons arrested at football
matches are first offenders.
The
researchers take the view that football related violence is still too
often approached from the angle of events during and around matches.
Hence, given the background of those committing the violence, the study’s
central recommendation is for a more individual approach targeting the
perpetrator.
This
recommendation follows on from one of the policy objectives in the 2003
Policy Framework, i.e. a perpetrator-targeted approach. The starting point
here is that, as far as possible, rather than exclusively focusing on
disturbances around football matches, all partners in the chain also
examine in how far notorious hooligans are also guilty of offences,
elsewhere, and at other times.
The
Central Gelderland police region started this approach as from the season
under review, with the focus on Vitesse “supporters”. The Arnhem project
“Hooligans in the spotlight” focuses on the clusters and individuals
within the groups who play an important role in sparking violence, who act
as provocateurs, but who are smart enough to stay in the background when
the riot erupts. These are the so-called “directors”. This approach aims
to prevent violence by certain groupings by creating a dam between the
directors of the violence and the hangers-on who are often involved in
riots and scuffles. However, the supervision is not confined to the day of
the game and in and around the stadium. Police officers dedicated to
certain areas, together with operating police units also carry out
surveillance of these same “directors” in residential areas and in the
“pubbing and clubbing scene”. The philosophy of the Arnhem police is that
unacceptable behaviour around the football field reduces acceptable
standards in housing estates, around nightlife, and vice-versa.
According to the Arnhem police, up to September 2003 their approach has
drawn just over 30 leaders from anonymity and that, in cooperation with
the chain partners, including the youth service, they have been sent on
their way in an appropriate manner.
Judging
by the initial results two more police regions have decided to adopt the
approach as from the start of next season. The results of the Arnhem
approach will be examined to determine longer-term impact.
In the
view of the CIV this approach could be highly effective with a preventive
impact on other risk- and regular supporters. These are often people who
can avoid arrest at football matches while still playing a major role in
major or smaller incidents. Indeed, it is a fact that just over 75% of
supporters who are detained are first offenders in a football context.
However,
it is also important that this approach is maintained for a longer period.
In three years a similar approach in Antwerp has reduced police deployment
at football matches by one-third.
1.5
Administrative detention
Discussion prior to the EC 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands covered
legal potential for police action, including preventive detention, in
dealing with large groups of supporters. Extensive debate, also in the
Dutch parliament, eventually yielded “Administrative detention”.
Some
four seasons later it appears that this means of approach for combating
football hooliganism has not actually been applied in practice. The CIV is
not in a position to judge whether this formula could have indeed been
used for certain incidents; possibly it was regarded as “too complicated”.
However, the CIV has established that emergency decrees or emergency
orders were invoked on several occasions in dealing with incidents in the
past several seasons. In most cases emergency decrees or orders compromise
part of the municipal or other emergency plan.
1.6
Practice programme
Prior
to the new season, during the period late June to early August there is an
intensive programme of practice games, which most clubs play in the
Netherlands and abroad.
For
some years now, in the run-up to the practice period the CIV has collected
as much information as possible on scheduled practice games. This was
prompted by a significant number of problems around some of these games
and the fact that various police regions/districts had not been informed
of these fixtures.
In
principle the practice games against amateur clubs were played at the
amateurs’ grounds. As a result the local police – often with little or no
specialised football experience – find it difficult to make an accurate
risk assessment. On top of this most accommodations fail to meet the
stringent demands made on facilities for professional football clubs (BVOs).
Hence, there is no separation of supporters and insufficient barriers
around the field – so that pitch invasions are quite easy. On top of this,
alcohol is usually on sale, this being an important source of income for
many amateur clubs. As far as the CIV is aware the lack of experience etc
has not impacted on public order.
In the
run-up to the season under review the CIV collected information on more
than 300 practice games. The final list was sent to all football
coordinators in the Netherlands and if fixtures were against foreign
clubs, to colleague organisations in Belgium, the United Kingdom and
Germany. The football coordinators were asked to inform any regional
colleagues who could expect a visit by a professional football club that
such a fixture existed and secondly to back them up with expertise and
particular support around safety organisation. This has proved very
effective.
The CIV
notes a clear difference between the composition of the regular
competition programme and the practice programme. The regular competition
programme is preceded by intensive consultation and harmonization – unlike
the practice games. More than once the local police force – even for the
professional football club’s home stadium – was unaware of a fixture.
In the
past most games have been problem-free, and this situation is sure to
continue. However, some games did require attention to security/safety
measures.
Given
rivalry between some Dutch, Belgian, German and British clubs the CIB also
focuses on the international acquisition of information on these clubs.
Among
other things this showed that rival English supporters had already made
arrangements for a confrontation in Amsterdam, before leaving home, and
that this would involve more than a friendly beer. Hence the Amsterdam-Amstelland
had to make extra deployments.
Furthermore, some games required such a high level of police deployment
that it is fair to ask whether such high levels of policing can be
justified in the vacation period, for a practice game.
The CIV
takes the view that there have been no or only low levels of problems
thanks to good sharing of information and, in particular, adequate support
by the police from the visiting professional football club’s home town.
Experiences over the past several years prompt the CIV to consider a
number of issues:
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For
several years the CIV has been making a total overview of practice games
of professional clubs. However, it is questionable whether this is
actually a CIV task – partly in view of the large volume of work
generated in this period; |
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In
regard to the debate around deployment the police could apply the
following principle: |
“When a
practice game between a professional and an amateur club requires the
deployment of riot-equipped units, mounted police and dog units and/or an
overly large number of police officers, permission for said game will be
refused.”
Obviously, the above also applies to practice games during the winter
break.
1.7
National Football
Hooliganism Data Base (VVS)
There
is a growing importance to sharing information, in particular with local
partners who are closely involved in combating football hooliganism, such
as the police, public prosecution department (OM), clubs and KNVB. For
several partners the information stored in the VVS (national Football
Hooliganism Data Base) is increasingly important as a source enabling
effective exercise of tasking.
On page
8 of the report noted under point 1.2.2 researchers recommended as
follows: 'To start with the CIV’s ability to collect and register
information on persons committing violence should be very substantially
increased. Furthermore information should be shared between the CIV and
the local, authorities in the perpetrators' home towns.”
The CIV
takes the view that it is not its task to collect supplementary
information on supporters who have been arrested. This registration is a
regional/local responsibility. Implementation of the second recommendation
is in a preliminary stage. This means that all regional police info-desks
would be linked to the VVS and so obtain information on the specific
football-related behaviour of given individuals. Matching this information
with other offences is important for the type of approach used in Arnhem.
Meanwhile, the VVS is gradually becoming accessible on a nationwide basis.
In principle all police regions can access the general library section. To
date the closed section is only available to parties on a need-to-use
basis. The principle of need-to-know or nice-to-know is applied here.
Apart
for government bodies, like the police and OM, the CIV notes that other
partners also use or seek to use information from the VVS. Hence the KNVB
and some five clubs are already connected up. The KNVB in particular uses
the VVS to implement their policy on stadium bans. The KNVB’s ongoing
increasing need for more information reflects pressure from – among other
things – appeals against stadium bans. Hence the KNVB requests and
receives from the OM detailed information on criminal offences to help
enable imposition of stadium bans.
However, the CIV regrets that information on matches and supporter
behaviour etc that is at the disposal of other partners, e.g. the clubs
and the KNVB, is not included in the VVS. For more than 3 years the CIV
has called for the clubs to be linked to the VVS and for the inclusion of
their match reports to the KNVB. Unfortunately this has not been realised
to date.
Apparently views among the clubs on the VVS differ. This even includes the
very principle of making reports available to the CIV). However, the
outcome of this situation is that only the government, police and OM make
available information on matches and arrested supporters to certain
partners in the chain. Apart from information on stadium bans, which are
formally a matter for the KNVB, the VVS does not share any other match or
other information with partners in the chain.
The
model covenant states under “Shared Policy” that adequate provision of
information is crucial for the effective combating of football
hooliganism. Specifically this means charting the most notorious
hooligans. There is a joint approach involving the club, police and OM.
Actions taken, with due regard to existing data storage regulations,
include:
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Sharing of information between chain partners also as a basis for
developing policy; |
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All
relevant information is passed to the CIV as soon as possible. |
To
summarise, the CIV/government make more facilities available. Among other
things this enables compliance with several recommendations as made in the
report and the model covenant. Hence, it is desirable that other chain
partners increase their input.
1.8
Football Hooliganism
Hotline
Awareness
of the Football Hooliganism Hotline is still very limited. Calls to the
0900-1433 number for anonymous or named reports around football violence
are at most sporadic. Unfortunately a new campaign to lever awareness of
the number failed to realise its objective. Hence, the interior ministry
in consultation with the CIV decided to terminate the number at the end of
2003.
Agreements have been made with “Meld Misdaad Anoniem” (Report Crime
Anonymously) hotline that any football reports it receives will be passed
to the CIV. The CIV will then check on the right police force/organisation
to deal with the report. The number of “Meld Misdaad Anoniem” is
0800-7000.
1.9
Website CIV
There
appears to be wide interest in combating football hooliganism with a large
number of hits on the CIV website for the newly published annual report.
However, there are a striking number of e-mails from students with general
enquiries for dissertations, papers and reports. This season the CIV
received and replied to 223 e-mails with enquires, via the website.
1.10
Hein Roethof Prize
Within
the overall issue of dealing with football hooliganism it is certainly
worth mentioning the social/ preventive project “Heroes round the fields”
(Helden rond de velden) from and at Cambuur Leeuwarden. This
supporters’ project was awarded the Hein Roethof prize, set up by the
Ministry of Justice. Cambuur football club, the police and Leeuwarden
municipality cooperated closely on intensive supervision of young problem
supporters. Cambuur’s female fan coach proved a particularly successful
element in this approach. Success was also evidenced by the substantial
drop in arrests of Cambuur supporters.
The CIV
and other parties ensured widespread awareness of the project, including
among football coordinators. Hopefully key elements of this approach
can/will be adopted by other clubs/municipalities.
1.11
International
collaboration
1.11.1
International information
sharing
The CIV notes a strong
improvement in the international sharing of information during the season
under review. Time and time again it is clear that a meaningful bilateral
exchange of information is crucial in taking the right security measures
around a match. Rapid, but above all good quality and reliable information
plays an important role in, for example, weighing up the number of police
to be deployed.
It is
also important to accurately chart the travel pattern so that countries en
route can be briefed on the characteristics of supporters who are in
transit. It would not be the first time supporters transiting a country
cause trouble on the way to the match.
The CIV
provides international information exchange around games involving the
Dutch national eleven, which is scheduled to play a number of qualifying
matches for the EC 2004 in Portugal. In addition, information is also
distributed on Dutch clubs due to play in European competitions.
1.11.2
Champions League meeting
In
regard to information sharing around the Champions League the CIV has been
coordinating an international exchange for three years now. The second
Champions League Meeting - organised by the CIV – was held at the start of
the season on 10 September 2002. Once again, invitees were one
representative of the national information centre and two representatives
of the local police from the participating countries and/or clubs.
There
were 63 participants from 11 European countries.
Alongside
sharing information on participating clubs and the actual programme, the
meeting once again underlined the importance of full information sharing.
At the end of the day it was decided that, given its success-rate and in
particular the crucial value of excellent information sharing, the CIV
would organise this meeting for the third time in 2003.
The CIV
now collects and distributes all information around all matches played in
this competition. The CIV now has a meaningful picture of supporter
behaviour for the various European clubs at away games.
Speed and
quality of information are vital to actually utilise shared information. A
student from Erasmus University, Rotterdam was commissioned by the CIV to
conduct a study into these two aspects as part of an MA course. The study
looked at experiences in the first round of the Champions League
competition in seasons 2001-2002 and 2002-2003.
The study
concluded that the speed of information-exchange during the second season
examined has improved on the first. It also stated that more work was
needed to enhance the quality side and mostly the comprehensiveness of the
information. A very positive conclusion was that out of the 144 games in
season 2002 – 2003 the CIV exchanged and/or collected information on 122.
Apparently there is now awareness within the EU level of the importance of
good information sharing.
1.11.3
International police
support
International cooperation between police organisations within the various
European countries was particularly visible around the international games
mentioned above. The “Dutch Police Team” was deployed on several occasions
around fixtures involving the national football squad. The “Dutch Police
Team” comprises a group of highly experienced police spotters. These
officers travel to away games with “their” supporters or attend home
games, on almost a weekly basis. This builds up in-depth knowledge of
their own supporters, and enables them to collaborate effectively with
these supporters, as “neighbourhood cop” for the stadium.
Police
officers connected to a given club also escorted supporters to most games
abroad. The host police and the supporters both came to appreciate the
added value of the escort. When problems or questions arose it was
comforting for the supporters to be spoken to in Dutch by Dutch police
officers. Meanwhile, in their spotter’s role, the Dutch officers could
also provide support for their foreign colleagues, while explaining the
behaviour of the supporters.
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