

# Policing football in Europe Experiences from peer review evaluation teams

Otto Adang & Elaine Brown



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# **Policing football in Europe**

## **Experiences from peer review evaluation teams**

Otto Adang & Elaine Brown

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This is a publication of the Research programme “Managing dangerous situations” of the Police Academy of the Netherlands

The internationally oriented research programme “Managing dangerous situations” focuses on the interaction between police and civilians in a variety of potentially dangerous conflict situations. It includes research on use-of-force issues (e.g. the use of fire-arms and pepper spray), football hooliganism, crisis communication and hostage negotiation, riots, public order management and crowd management. The research programme analyses how individuals regulate their position in cooperation and in competition with others by means of their communicative and interactive behaviours. The aim of the research programme is to gain insight into the regulation of conflicts and social tension and to contribute to a better management of potentially dangerous situations.

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Adang, O.M.J (2007) The best police in the world: learning at all cost. In: *Politiekundige verkenningen 2006- 2007* (H. Jonkmans & R. van der Wal, eds.) Politieacademie, Apeldoorn, p 33-48

Stott, C., O.M.J. Adang, A. Livingstone & M. Schreiber (2007) Variability in the collective behaviour of England fans at Euro2004: Intergroup relations, identity content and social change. *European Journal of social psychology*, Volume 37, Issue 1 , Pages 75 – 100

Adang, O.M.J., R. J. Kaminski, M. Q. Howell & J. Mensink (2006) Assessing the Performance of Pepper Spray in Use-of-force Encounters: The Dutch Experience. *Policing An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* Volume: 29 Issue: 2 Page: 282 – 305

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Reicher, S., C. Stott, P. Cronin & O. Adang (2004) An integrated approach to crowd psychology and public order policing. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Pages: 558-572 Volume 27 Issue 4

Adang, O.M.J. & J. Mensink (2004) Pepper spray: An unreasonable response to suspect verbal resistance. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol 27, No. 2, 2004, pp. 206-219

Stott, C. J. & Adang, O.M.J. (2004) 'Disorderly' conduct: social psychology and the control of football 'hooliganism' at 'Euro2004'. *The Psychologist*, June, p 318-319

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Salter, F.K., K.B. Kruck & O.M.J. Adang (1998) Urban rioters and tribal warriors: the madding crowd, rationality and justice. In: *Research in public policy analysis and management*, volume 9 (S.S. Nagel, ed.). Jai Press, Stanford

# Foreword

At a European level, on several occasions, the EU Police Cooperation Working Party (PCWP) identified the need for continuous evaluation and review of measures taken by Member States to counter football-related violence.<sup>1</sup> At the April 26, 2005 meeting the Dutch delegation proposed to the PCWP internationally composed police peer review evaluation teams to contribute towards successful public order management in the context of international football matches.<sup>2</sup> The evaluation of large-scale police operations is often restricted to instances of severe disorder and hampered by the tension between judgment, scapegoating and blame on the one hand and drawing lessons for the future on the other. The peer review evaluation teams are different: their point of departure is for evaluation to be a means to identify good practice and to improve professionalism, rather than an instrument for sanctioning or self-justification. The initiative was based on years of research on public order policing and experiences with evaluation (e.g. during the Euro 2000 and 2004 football championships). The idea of a peer review evaluation team is to involve experienced police officers from several countries in the evaluation of large-scale police operations, not to investigate afterwards, but to observe police operations in real time. Creating no blame, but to exchange and to learn, creating a win-win situation in which both requesting police forces and participating reviewers gain something and more general lessons can be drawn as well.

Based on this view, the EU Police Cooperation Working Party agreed to start a 3-year pilot with internationally composed peer review evaluation teams to conduct, on a voluntary basis, intercollegiate reviews of public order management in the context of international football matches. The pilot lasted from september 2005 to september 2008 and was coordinated by the Dutch National Football Information Point CIV and the Police Academy of the Netherlands. The Euro 2008 football championships held in Austria and Switzerland fell in this period and in the course of 2007, five of the eight cities hosting matches during Euro 2008 requested a review. On February 19 2008, a meeting was organised in Switzerland with commanders from the four Swiss host cities to discuss the results of the peer reviews held in Switzerland, with specific emphasis on any point of attention relevant for Euro 2008.

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1 The Irish Presidency included "arrangements for mutual assessments of police cooperation at football matches" in the Work Programme 2004-2005 (doc. 7017/1/04 ENFOPOL 23 REV 1)

2 The Netherlands delegation was invited to take the lead in setting up a this pilot project starting with the international football season 2005/06 (8244/05, Enfopol 42)

In the course of the pilot, two interim reports and one final report was brought out on behalf of the EU Police Cooperation Working Party. On several occasions presentations were given about the pilot, especially

- at the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 Champions League meetings organised by the Dutch NFIP
- at the Conference on Tackling Football Disorder with an International Dimension London, (as organised by the UK presidency and the UK Football Policing Unit), London, United Kingdom, December 2005
- at the Gdansk Talks 2007: Security at Sport Events in the United Europe held in Gdynia, Poland, November 2007
- at the high-level conference Towards an EU strategy against violence in sport, Brussels, Belgium, November 2007

At the high level conference in Brussels, the recommendation was made to set up EU wide training of Operational Police Commanders, spotters, football intelligence officers and NFIP officers and to incorporate the peer review system into this training. In the meantime, initiatives have been taken to set up peer review systems at a national level in different countries (notably Sweden and the United Kingdom). These developments highlighted the need to communicate the peer review experiences more widely and the need for documentation that could be used in education and training.

This book attempts to do just that and is the reflection of the peer review experiences during the three years that the pilot lasted. It begins by presenting the rationale behind the peer reviews. It next details the peer review methodology that was used during the pilot. Following that, nine reports are included in full: three related to Champions League matches, three to matches between different national teams and three to increased risk local derby matches. In the next chapter, an overview of the outcome of the peer reviews in the form of good practices and points of attention identified by the review teams is given. In the final chapter, a summary of relevant issues in theory, practice and education for public order management is given, taking account of lessons learnt during the Euro 2000 and Euro 2004 championships and Champions League matches between 2001 – 2003.



In this way, we hope this book contributes to the goal of the peer review system in making a significant contribution to organisational learning by facilitating the identification of good practices, the exchange of experiences and the continuous development of professional norms.

We would like to thank Henk Groenevelt, Manon Bodoux, Sandra van den Beukel and Gauke Haagsma from the Dutch CIV and Theo Bakker, Wim van Oorschot and Martina Schreiber from the Police Academy of the Netherlands for their support during the pilot. We are grateful to the Dutch Interior Ministry (especially Gerard van Rienen and Nico Rop), the UK Home Office (especially David Bohannon) and the Police Academy of the Netherlands for making the pilot financially possible. And of course we are very grateful to all hosts and reviewers for their active participation, their open mindedness, their team work and their permission to use the anonymised review reports for this publication. The following commanders participated in the reviews: Paul van der Aa (NL), Werner Cazaerck (B), Guillaume Crivelli (F), Christian Cudré Mauroux (CH), Peter Dahl (DK), Lorenzo Fages (E), Pedro Franco (P), Manfred Komericky (Au), Alfredo Lorenzo (E), Massimo Zanni (It), Paulo Pereira (P), Heinz- Jurgen Pusch (D), Kenny Scott (UK), Rudi Schellingen (B), Stavros Stavrou (Cyprus), Bob Strong (UK), Hakan Wall (S), Richard Woolford (UK) and Ronald Zwarter (NL).

Otto Adang & Elaine Brown, august 2008



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# Chapter 1: Utilisation-focused evaluation of large-scale police operations<sup>3</sup>

## Introduction

Large scale public order police operations are a regular occurrence in almost every country, both in the context of sporting events and protest demonstrations. Historically, investigations on the use of force by police have been conducted mainly by commissions or researchers in response to a specific incident or series of publicized events. Over the years, a number of these after-the-fact enquiries or evaluations have been conducted all over the world (in the USA e.g. Kerner Commission, 1968; Eisenhower Commission, 1969; Scranton Commission, 1970; in the UK e.g. Popplewell, 1986; Scarman, 1981; Taylor 1990; in the Netherlands e.g. Nationale Ombudsman, 1993; COT, 1993, 1999; Enschedé, 1967).

On occasion, people responsible for the management of public order were sacked (e.g. after the riots during the G8 conference in Genoa in 2001) or had to resign after the conclusions of such an enquiry were presented, thus emphasising the potential for 'in the job trouble' (Waddington, 1998) resulting from public disorder. As a result, evaluations of public order policing often take place as a consequence of high profile incidents. However, it is not only when things go wrong and incidents occur that lessons may be learnt (Adang, 1992).

To avoid similar mistakes in the future, it is of course important to learn from previous experiences and the findings of the different enquiries or evaluations contain many lessons and recommendations. Della Porta and Reiter (1998) point out that the police learn by analysing their failures: changes and learning processes of the police are initiated by an analysis of problematic public order interventions. However, Das (1984) noted that most training courses in *riot control* in the US did not take into account lessons learned from past police riot control actions. Jefferson (1990) observed the operation of special patrol groups who deal with escalating public order incidents in the UK and noted that "critical reflection upon specific incidents was missing". In the Netherlands, Dijkhuis (1982) and Adang (1990) drew attention to the lack of systematic evaluations following public order incidents, a point which was corroborated by several police working groups as well (references in Adang, 1990). In another context, Smith & Elliot (2007) identified the lack of effective organisational learning in the wake of crisis events (citing football stadia disasters as an example).

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3 Based on: Utilisation-focused evaluation of large-scale police operations (O.M.J. Adang, 2006), In: Politiekundige verkenningen 2005-2006 (W. Stol & R. v.d. Wal, eds.), Apeldoorn, Politieacademie

To summarise, evaluations of public order policing often take place under pressure, are restricted to high-profile incidents and are focused on judging the past rather than learning for the future whereas the methodology used and the criteria that are applied are often not transparent. In addition, recommendations which follow are often not used in practice. To overcome some of these shortcomings, Adang (1994) proposed the introduction of evaluation teams to evaluate large scale police operations. The idea was to involve experienced police officers from other forces in the evaluation of large scale police operations. These officers would not have to investigate events after the fact, but would be involved in observing police operations in real time. In this way, the evaluation would not have to focus on incidents, but instead on the professional handling of public events. Having experienced police officers observe police deployment and the interaction of the police with the public was thought to have several advantages. The police force conducting the operation would be able to receive well-informed, independent feed-back in a safe way. Officers involved in the evaluation teams would have the opportunity to gain additional experience and insight by observing how another force deals with the management of public order. By involving trainers too, this enables any lessons learned to be included in future training more easily. First experiments were carried out in 1994 and 1996 in the Netherlands (Adang & van Dam, 1996; Adang, 1997). On the basis of these experiences, a model for the evaluation of large scale police operations in general was developed (Adang, 2000) and applied in practice during the Euro 2000 football championships held in Belgium and the Netherlands (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). Below, both the early experiments and the application of the model during Euro 2000 will be summarised and put in light of the peer review development.<sup>4</sup>

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4 I would like to thank Gert van Beek, Arjan Blaazer, Alrita Borst, Theo Brekelmans, Chris van Dam, Rita Eerkes, Ronald Lucardie, Hans Nieuwstraten, Machiel Oelof, Ger van Opstal, Jaap Siemons, A. Timmerman and Cees Verschuur who were all involved in the early experiments with evaluation teams. Christine Cuvelier, Eddy Hendrickx, Johan Heijnemans, Johan Leynen, Benny Maes, Hans Regterschot, Dominique van Ryckeghem and Jan Tuinder were involved in the testing of the observation instruments before Euro 2000. In all, over 50 people were involved in the gathering of data during Euro 2000 itself. We would like to thank them all, especially Marcel Bruinsma, Malcolm George, Andreas Göhring, Franky Mervielde, Ken Scott and Thierry Terraube. The general model mentioned in this chapter was developed for the binational police project Euro 2000 with financial support of the OISIN-programme of the European Commission. Any views in this chapter are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the European Commission.

## Experiment 1: The Hague, 1994

On November 5, 1994 a large demonstration by students took place in The Hague. It was a demonstration with past history. A year earlier, a similar demonstration had led to a violent confrontation between the police and protesters, and much negative publicity for the police. Three reports were published that were critical of the police operation (Adang & Standaar, 1993; COT, 1993; Nationale Ombudsman, 1993). The police in the Hague subsequently reconsidered its public order management practices and developed a "Plan for the policing of public manifestations". The demonstration of November 1994 was therefore a special one: it was felt the police had to prove it could handle such a big event properly, both students and politicians needed to regain confidence in the police. As a result of that pressure, it was decided to pay extra attention to the evaluation of the event. The goal of the evaluation was to give a factual account of what had happened, to draw lessons for the future and facilitate internal and external accountability. Irrespective of the outcome of the event, it was agreed beforehand that every commanding officer should make an evaluation report.

At the pre-planning stage, an evaluation coordinator was appointed. During the event, police video teams recorded the operation at his request. In addition, he recruited four teams of observers. Each team was composed of one police officer from the Hague and one external observer. Two external observers were provided by the public order institute of the Police Academy (a national training institute); two others were provided by the organisers of the demonstration. Each observation team had complete freedom of movement. During a preparatory meeting, the teams agreed to record factual events, rather than their personal interpretations and judgments. It was stressed that the main aim of the evaluation was to promote learning and not to punish individuals. The observers also agreed that their role as observers precluded them from intervening, verbally or otherwise, in the course of events.

All commanding officers were made familiar with the evaluation procedure, the observation teams and the use of external observers. Commanding officers were given the opportunity to propose specific points to be included in the evaluation. Some of them made use of this opportunity. The observation teams started their work at the day of the demonstration during the briefings of units.

They continued their work throughout the day until the demonstrators (some 30.000) had left the Hague. All observations were recorded directly on portable audio-recorders or on paper. After the end of the observations, the observers gathered and reported their impressions to the evaluation coordinator.

Three days later, each team sent a written observation report to the evaluation coordinator. The evaluation coordinator compiled all reports (both from the observation teams and the commanding officers) into an evaluation report for the Overall Commander of the operation. All observers were enthusiastic and very positive about their participation and the way in which they were able to observe events. The police officers from the Hague who took part in the observation teams, some of whom had many years of experience with large-scale police operations, reported it as quite a special experience. For them, it was a new and refreshing way to look at (the effects of) a police operation.



## Experiment 2: Rotterdam, 1996

In 1996 several individuals, involved in large scale police operations in one way or another, gathered to discuss ways to implement evaluation teams more widely. In several brainstorming sessions, conditions were formulated which would make it possible for such a team to function. A high risk football match was chosen as an opportunity to test the concept further. Observers were recruited and a plan was put in writing. This plan was discussed with the Overall Commander of the operation. Two weeks prior to the match a training session was held. Observers were instructed on the proper way to conduct structured observations in general and during large scale police operations in particular. The observers assisted in writing down an observation plan, which was put to the Overall Commander. On the day of the match, six observers (divided into three teams) conducted observations according to the plan. They recorded their observations directly. Five of the observers were police officers: three from the Hague, two from Rotterdam (the first author was the sixth observer). As soon as the fans had dispersed after the match, the observers met and exchanged their impressions. Five days later, all observers had written observation reports. Together, the observers put together a chronology of observed events and an inventory of evaluation points. These were handed over to the Overall Commander. He indicated that the feed-back of the evaluation teams contained valuable information. He later used the evaluation report of the evaluation team to compile his own report.

Without exception, the observers experienced their activities as an “eye-opener”. They reported that, when acting as a commanding officer within their own force, most of their attention necessarily had to go to their own organizations and units. From the perspective of a reviewer they could focus on other aspects and saw other things, especially related to the interaction between the police and the public. In addition, seeing how colleagues in another force manage public order helped to reflect on one’s own approach. The evaluation team formulated several points that they considered vital for the proper functioning of the teams. Clear arrangements and clear goals were considered important as well as a clear commitment and involvement of the police force concerned. A good training and instruction of observers is essential. At the core of the concept is the fact that the feedback is being given by colleagues.

## Euro 2000

Based on the results of the experiments, a general model was developed at the request of the Belgian- Dutch binational police project preparing for the Euro 2000 football championships because it felt the need to preserve experiences for the benefit of all police forces that might be involved in the organisation of future events (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). The binational police project specifically wanted to use feedback from colleagues in this respect. As key elements of the model, several points of departure were formulated.

### 1. Responsibility

Every organisation is responsible for its own evaluation, and ultimately this responsibility lies with the competent authority. Within each organisation, every commanding officer needs to evaluate the performance of the units under his command and to identify lessons to be learned for future actions. Every police organisation should have minimum standards for the evaluation of public order policing by those directly involved in the operation. If others (colleagues, trainers, researchers, members from the public) are involved it has to be clear under whose responsibility the evaluation will be done and how it will be reported.

True to the principle that each organisation is responsible for its own evaluation, for Euro 2000 a distinction was made between local evaluation in the venue cities and a bi-national evaluation process. As a result, in four (out of eight) Euro 2000 venue cities, police forces supplemented their usual debriefing procedures by forming a local evaluation team. The bi-national evaluation process was done in cooperation with local police forces.

### 2. Aim of the evaluation

The point of departure of any evaluation should be its aim, which should be determined in advance. Formulating the aim is essential to focus the evaluation. If the aim is not clearly formulated (as often occurs), it is not possible to focus the process of data gathering and it will be more difficult to draw meaningful conclusions. Generally, an evaluation with learning as its aim does not focus at the appraisal of individual officers or their actions but at providing insight into the relevant processes and decisions and their effects.

The bi-national evaluation process focused on aspects that had been arranged by the bi-national police project, viz; which were international police co-operation, central information management and the uniform police behavioural

profile. Local evaluation teams made their own plans in consultation with the local Overall Commander. They provided feedback to him within 24h, thus enabling the local police organisation to make adjustments. In one city the local evaluation team and the bi-national observers worked closely together in this respect.

### 3. Structure of the evaluation

The structure of the evaluation should be determined – in consultation with those responsible for the operation – by the stated aim of the evaluation and the intended use of the evaluation results. It should also be clear that the review among colleagues does not replace regular briefings, debriefings and accountability processes. For Euro 2000, it was decided in consultation with the bi-national police project to use observers to conduct systematic and structured observations on match days, to attend briefings and to hold ad hoc interviews with police officers, stewards or fans. Observations were conducted using previously developed observation procedures: one for observing the interaction between police and fans in the venue cities, one for observing site security management and another for observing information management at police information centers. Co-ordinators saw to it that data were collected in a uniform and accurate way. Within 24 h following each observation day, the teams summarised their observations and recorded them in individual diaries and computer files. In addition, an international monitoring team was deployed to gather data independently.

#### 4. Involvement of colleagues

Involving colleagues from outside police forces in the evaluation of large-scale police operations potentially has several advantages. The possibility that commanders receive well-informed, feedback in a safe way is increased, as is the chance that the results of the evaluation will be used. Also, officers involved in the evaluation teams have the opportunity to gain much additional experience. Ideally, participants in the evaluation have several years of experience in large-scale operations, and have followed a specific training preparing them methodologically for a review among colleagues. However, others may also be deployed on the basis of specific expertise as necessary.

For Euro 2000, police officers were involved in several ways. Local evaluation teams were composed of police officers from the force concerned, as well as from outside police forces (in three venue cities). The bi-national evaluation process included an international monitoring team composed of four experienced police officers from Germany, France and the United Kingdom that visited all eight venue cities. In addition, in each venue city, a bi-national evaluation team of four observers was present. All evaluators had received dedicated training well before the start of the tournament. The feed-back of police officers from other countries who were deployed operationally as spotters was used as well in the bi-national evaluation process. They completed questionnaires on police conduct and were interviewed afterwards.

#### 5. Plan the evaluation

To be effective, an evaluation should be properly planned, just as other aspects of the police operation. To properly plan an evaluation, an evaluation coordinator should be appointed who draws up an evaluation plan and co-ordinates the activities of the evaluation team. The evaluation coordinator determines the areas of evaluation in consultation with the Overall Commander. The evaluation plan should always include the starting time of the evaluation activities and the time at which the report should be ready, the aim of the evaluation including specific points to be evaluated as well as the criteria the evaluation must meet. The evaluation plan also states the organisation of the evaluation, identifies internal and external persons involved in the evaluation and evaluation instruments to be deployed. Facilities and means needed are made explicit as well as costs related to the evaluation. Evaluation activities to be carried out should be specified. In drawing conclusions, the evaluation should use clearly identified and preferably generally accepted criteria wherever applicable such as:

- International legislation and regulations: European Treaty of Human Rights, New York Treaty, etc.;
- National legislation and regulations (e.g.: Constitution, Police law, Instruction on the use of force, Law on public demonstrations, Municipal law, Football law);
- National / interregional police agreements (in the Netherlands e.g.: frame of reference crisis and conflict management, final attainment levels training, professional code, Quality model);
- Regional / local models and instructions.

Well before the start of Euro 2000, an evaluation plan was written according to the above principles, observers were selected and trained and the appropriate logistical as well as organisational preparations were made. The evaluation plan was communicated to all concerned, including police forces and competent authorities from the venue cities. The European Union “Handbook for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches” (as it was called when first adopted in 1999), in the remainder of this book referred to as the EU handbook, was used as starting point for already identified good practice.

## Use of the Euro 2000 evaluation

In retrospect, the observers felt they had learnt a lot by looking at police operations in a different police force, or even in a different country. A clear recognition that each organisation had its own responsibility as far as evaluation is concerned proved to be crucial. Consistent application of the principles of the model combined with a timely identification of evaluation points and evaluation instruments allowed for a climate in which the observers were welcome to do their work. All involved knew about the aims of the evaluation and knew that data would be gathered and divulged in a responsible way. Local police forces have benefited from the feed-back they received from the evaluation teams, as is indicated by the adjustments they made in response. After Euro 2000, several police forces in the Netherlands are making "evaluation teams" an integral part of their operational plans for large scale police operations. A working group on football disorder (2001) in the United Kingdom concluded in a report submitted to Parliament that the evaluation yielded valuable results. Also, the results of the evaluation report were used to make amendments to the EU handbook (the version as adopted in 2006 is called: *'Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved'*). Based on the experiences gained with the above-mentioned evaluations, in 2004 and 2005, CEPOL organised two successful seminars for senior police officers (*Evaluation and review of large scale police operations, "Learning by doing"*) which included practical observation exercises. These seminars involved the participation of approximately 50 senior police officers.

In addition, both the results of the Euro 2000 evaluation and the evaluation model itself were used by Portuguese national police PSP in their preparations for Euro 2004 (Leitão, 2005). At the request of the PSP, an evaluation similar to the Euro 2000 evaluation was carried out during Euro 2004 (Adang & Stott, 2004; Stott & Adang, 2005), the results of which were used to make further additions to the EU handbook. The results were also used to further develop PSP training within Portugal and to highlight police strategies and tactics that contribute to prevent incidents from occurring or escalating, strategy and tactics that were to play a role in the policing of the World Cup in Germany in 2006 and Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland.

## Conclusion

It is important to emphasise that the model presented here is aimed at increasing the learning capacity of police organisations and can work only if applied with the cooperation of the police organisations involved. In this respect it differs from other initiatives to “monitor” police activities from the outside (see e.g. Bryan & Jarman, 1999), although on occasion a combination of “inside” and “outside” monitoring could prove mutually beneficial. This is true especially because public order management involves many other organisations besides the police and it should be worthwhile in future to also perform evaluations in conjunction with these partners. It should also be worthwhile to apply the model for the police evaluation of public order management presented in this book more widely (not just in the context of football matches), and to involve many more officers that have a task in public order management.

This has several advantages:

- The peer review between experienced officers from several countries with different perspectives will deepen the discussion;
- The police force conducting the operation would be able to receive well-informed, independent feedback in a safe way;
- Officers involved in the evaluation teams have the opportunity to gain a lot of additional experience by observing the choices other forces make in the management of public order.

The model fits very well with the idea of *utilization-focused* evaluations (Patton, 1997). According to this approach the focus of an evaluation should be on intended use of the results of the evaluation by intended users. An evaluation then starts with identifying users and clarifying potential use. A good evaluation involves users at all stages and fulfils a need. A good evaluation will also have a relevant scope, a justified design. It will analyse reliable data and draws impartial conclusions fitting the data. A good evaluation does not stand alone, but forms part of a cyclical process of continuous learning.

For purposes of organisational learning, it would be in the interest of the police to evaluate all instances of public order policing to be able to identify good practice and to exchange these with other police forces, as there are considerable variations in the frequency, variety and severity of the public disorder that different police forces are called on to manage.

To achieve that aim, it is important for the police to develop its own evaluation capacity and not to be dependent on occasional external evaluations, where accountability issues and scapegoating often take precedence over learning for the future. Outside the police, most organizations have found – sooner or later – that the nurturing of knowledge-based *communities of practice* (e.g. Wenger, 1999) is a sine qua non to enabling significant knowledge sharing to take place. Such communities are typically based on the affinity created by common interests or experience, where practitioners face a common set of problems in a particular knowledge area, and have an interest in finding, or improving the effectiveness of, solutions to those problems. In the long term, evaluation teams could assist in the creation of communities of practice of public order professionals, by applying a utilisation-focused approach and crossing organisational boundaries between different police forces.



# Chapter 2: Methodology of peer review evaluation teams

## A new initiative: international evaluation teams

According to the proposal to the police cooperation working party in 2005, international peer review evaluation teams should involve experienced police officers from several countries to observe police operations in real time, providing feedback with a focus on continuous learning and adaptation. Members of a peer review evaluation team had to meet the following requirements:

- be knowledgeable about the principles of public order management and have experience with the policing of football matches;
- have an open mind and an attitude aimed at learning rather than judging;
- be willing to work with the methodology of observation and evaluation
- have a good knowledge of English (both oral and written)
- be available for two peer reviews per year (at a maximum of 4 days per review), with their own country/ force funding travel expenses

The pilot was being conducted under several conditions. The most important condition was that the peer review evaluation team would be deployed only at the request of the country/ force where the match was to be played. The peer review evaluation team would always take into account the most recent version of the EU handbook on international police cooperation in connection with football matches. The operational costs for the deployment of the evaluation teams was to be borne by the country/ force requesting the review, travel costs to the country concerned would be borne by the sending country/ force. The host country/ force and the peer review team would agree beforehand the way in which the teams would function and would be supported. The evaluation team would produce a feedback report for the country/ force that requested the review. For the period of duration of the pilot the Dutch National Football Information Point CIV acted as coordination point to deal with requests for reviews and to compose peer review teams in response to a request. During the pilot phase, the team would be accompanied by the first author in order to ensure methodological validity.

## Composing a pool of reviewers

Through the NFIPs, member states were requested to nominate one senior police officer (preferably an active commander) for possible participation in the evaluation team according to specified criteria. In addition, some team members

were approached on a personal basis, after which approval from their force was sought.

Some NFIPs did not propose members. Two countries indicated that they were not interested in participating or unable to participate (Greece and Latvia), other countries indicated that it was difficult to propose members who met all the criteria, especially the combination of proficiency in English and actual involvement or experience in the policing of football matches at command-level. In the course of the pilot, both participants and requesting forces stressed the importance that the pool of experts should include active commanders. Experience showed that active recruitment of participants was required. Gradually, a pool of experts could be composed and twenty-one experts from thirteen different countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) participated in the reviews. In addition methodological and administrative support was provided by four individuals from three different countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

## Carrying out peer reviews

At the April 2005 police cooperation working party meeting in which the peer review proposal was adopted, the following countries explicitly lent their support to the Dutch proposal: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom. Therefore it was expected at least these countries might host an evaluation team.

Unfortunately, only the United Kingdom and the Netherlands volunteered and experience showed that active communication from the pilot coordinators with potential hosts was required to initiate requests. In the end, during the pilot requests were received from (forces from) nine different countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Looking forward to Euro 2008, peer reviews were requested from host cities in Switzerland (all four host cities) and Austria (one host city). As a result, a total of thirteen reviews were carried out between September 2005 and December 2007. Six of the reviews did not involve international matches, but matches in the national league considered to pose increased risk. Some of these national matches did have internationally relevant aspects anyway, either because of the presence of fans from other countries or because the match was played in a Euro 2008 host city. In all, 11 of the 13 matches were considered to be matches with increased risk.

## Developing and evaluating the procedure for peer review

For the actual functioning of the peer review evaluation teams the procedure from the initial proposal was followed, with requesting forces providing accommodation, accompaniment etc. According to this procedure, a country/ force wishing to receive a peer review evaluation team sends a request to the Dutch NFIP (CIV), preferably one month in advance. The request should include the following: place and date of the match, contact person with contact details, any specific questions or requests that need to be addressed in the peer review. The CIV and the Police Academy of the Netherlands then compose a peer review team of four police officers, one coordinator/ researcher and one research assistant. The team will be a mix of officers from countries with a lot of experience with international football matches (at least two) and officers with less experience with international football matches. The coordinator will contact the requesting country/ force to make arrangements about the functioning of the team and the issues that need to be addressed. Team-members make their own travel arrangements, in consultation with the coordinator.

The team would arrive the day before the match to make an evaluation plan, gather data on the day of the match and discuss their findings amongst each other on the day after the match. The requesting country/ police organisation should assign the evaluation team accompanying police officers with sufficient language knowledge and proficiency of sufficient rank, and with knowledge of the policing of football matches. The requesting country/police organisation should ensure that the evaluation team is provided all access necessary to make observations and conduct interviews. The requesting country/ force should ensure the physical safety of the team members, but it was emphasised that peer review members should NOT be given VIP-treatment. The operational costs for the deployment of the evaluation team would be borne by the requesting country/ police force

Experience in the course of the pilot showed that:

- active communication with hosts was required to identify evaluation points and to maximise the utilisation-focused approach;
- provision of knowledgeable guides and drivers by local host proved essential for a good functioning of the team and for allowing the team to split up;
- preparation of the evaluation plan should start as early as possible after the request for a review has been received;

- the procedure generally proved to be adequate. Some modifications/ improvements were suggested (and implemented) by both hosts and participants. These included:
  - Arrival of participants should be before 12.00h on the day before the match is to take place to finalise the joint evaluation
  - Departure of participants should be after 17.00h on the day after the match has taken place (and preferably on the morning of the day after that) to allow enough time to exchange and discuss experiences
  - Rather than individual reports being drawn up, a draft report should be produced by the coordinator based on notes taken during the meeting of participants on the day after the match.

## Methodology

The general goal of all peer reviews was to identify good practice and any points deserving of attention in the future, both for the requesting police force and for other European police forces. For international matches, the evaluation team would take the EU handbook as a starting point. The EU handbook contains a number of good practices for police forces related to *information management*, the *preparation of international matches*, the *cooperation between police forces of different countries* and the *cooperation between police forces and stewards*. In the latest version of the EU Handbook strategic principles for police *tactical performance for public order management and the application of dynamic risk assessment* were included. The strategic principles include: maintaining a balance between deployment and actual levels of risk, proactive way of communicating with fans and facilitation within limits. For matches in the national competition for which a review was requested, the review team would pay attention to the principals laid down in the handbook, especially those related to *dynamic risk assessment and tactical performance for public order management*.

According to the principles of utilisation-focused evaluation, the host police force was asked time what issues would be relevant for the evaluation team to look at. In two cases (one of which is included below), the peer review evaluation team was asked to focus only on the evaluation points derived from the EU Handbook. With regard to the Euro 2008 international football tournament hosted by Switzerland and Austria, the respective host cities from these countries specifically asked the evaluation team to give feedback relevant to preparations for the hosting of the tournament.

The methodology used was similar for all the peer reviews. On the day before the match, the team usually including six persons would arrive in the city where the match was to be played. On this first day, the team would be briefed on the planned operation by the host, consult any available documentation and acquaint itself with the stadium, stadium environments and the city (especially "hot spots"). Based on this information, the team would then develop its evaluation plan, identifying what data would need to be gathered, in what way and by whom (tasks would be divided between pairs of team members).

On day 2, the day of the match, data would be gathered according to the evaluation plan, taking care that the peer review did not interfere with the

operation. Usually, this included interviewing police officers from different levels, fans (both home and away), security responsible and stewards. It always included observations of fan – police interactions. Team members would usually (but not always) be accompanied by local police officers. Team members would always be free to go where they wished and the evaluation plan required them to go.

Day 3 would be devoted fully to sharing of observations among team members and discussion of experiences according to a fixed format to ensure an objective approach as possible and to ensure that the evaluation questions would be answered. The exchange/ discussion would be recorded on tape and a draft report would be prepared on the spot and projected on the wall, where it was presented in written form for team members to add to and agree on.

In the weeks that followed, the second author would complete the draft report making use of taped discussions and interviews and background documentation. The first author would then check and finalise the draft, send it out to team members for comments and to the host to correct any factual mistakes. After this process, the final version of the report would be sent to the host. The reports would not contain names of individuals, but only refer to *functions*. The report would become the property of the requesting police force.

Each report was subdivided into the following sections:

1. Goal of the evaluation
2. Methodology
3. Context of the event
4. Overview of Events
5. Observations related to evaluation points
6. Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention

# Chapter 3

## Peer review in practice: nine reviews

In this part, anonymised versions of nine of the thirteen peer review reports are presented. Each section of this chapter is based on an actual report and is subdivided into the following sections:

- Evaluation points requested by host police force
- Methodology used and material gathered
- Context in which the match takes place
- Overview of events and main decisions
- Observations related to evaluation points
- Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention

Any smaller differences in the build-up and style of the reports reflect the development in the writing of reports which has taken place during the course of the pilot; and differences between the teams responsible for the report.

For the anonymised version of the reports, a common terminology has been adopted, such that cities in which the match took place are being described as “home town”, police in that city is “home town police”. The match is always between “home fans” and “away fans” with away fans originating from “away town” or “away country” or and sometimes being accompanied by “away town/ country police”.

Of the nine reports presented below, three relate to matches in a national competition, three reports are on Champions League matches and three reports relate to matches between national teams.

1. A local derby with a history of sectarianism
2. A high risk national competition match under the eyes of the media
3. A national competition match between old rivals
4. A Champions League match with limited international cooperation
5. A Champions league match attended by migrants supporting the away team
6. A Champions League match with sensitive relations between police and fans
7. A Euro 2008 qualifying match: high risk or not?
8. Operation Smile. A friendly international match prior to Euro 2008
9. Using the 3D-philosophy. Looking forwards to Euro 2008





### 3.1 A local derby with a history of sectarianism

The match reviewed was a local derby with a long-standing rivalry between the fans of both clubs. This rivalry is linked to sectarian issues. The match is categorised as high risk and is considered as volatile, in the last fifteen years violent incidents in and around the stadium have been quite rare.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The host indicated that they would welcome comments on the following:

- police interaction with fans
- police co-operation with stewards
- police deployment strategy
- the sectarian behaviour of supporters
- the overall integrity of the policing operation and how well it met its objectives.

#### **Methodology used and material gathered**

The team decided to conduct observations and hold interviews in relation to:

- Pre-match briefings
- Deployment in the environs of the stadium
- Deployment inside the stadium
- Deployment in relation to identified "hot spots"

#### *Briefings attended*

- Operations meeting at stadium involving the two clubs and the police
- Police briefing at stadium involving all police supervisors
- Steward supervisors briefing at stadium
- Briefing for the intelligence operation/ spotting operation
- Briefing of senior officers prior to attending at the stadium

#### *Interviews held*

- Safety/security officers for home
- Safety/security officers for away
- Accompanying officers
- Match commander
- Spotters
- Officers

### *Observations*

- Deployment in environs of stadium (10.00hrs to 12.30hrs and 14.00hrs to 15.30hrs)
- Inside the stadium (12.30hrs to 14.00hrs)
- In relation to hot spots (10.00hrs to 17.00hrs)
- Observation of match commander (10.00hrs to 17.00hrs)

### *Documentation consulted*

- Maps with identified hot spots
- Spotter operation operational order
- Operational order
- Press clippings
- PowerPoint briefing to team
- Information from Football banning orders conference
- Operational order anti-disorder (city)
- Home stewards handbook
- Specific duties of stewards
- Home pre-match briefing
- Supervisors pre-match briefing
- General safety certificate issued to home football club
- Emergency evacuation procedure
- Event management plan

### **Context in which the match takes place**

#### *The Match*

The match was scheduled to take place on a Saturday, with a 12.30hrs kick-off time. Home vs. away is considered a "high risk" match by all concerned, because of the long-standing rivalry between the fans of both clubs. This rivalry is linked to sectarian issues. Although the match is categorised as high risk and is considered as volatile, violent incidents are actually quite rare since the 1980s (there was a major pitch invasion after the 1998 cup final), although away fans frequently damage seats (last game 160 seats were damaged, which was less than usual). Home stadium is a modern stadium and in compliance with all regulations and with all facilities necessary to help achieve safety.

The match itself was also significant. Before the match, home led away in the league by 10 points and the away manager was under extreme pressure which was not helped by relatively poor results in the Champions League. It was expected the home supporters would not miss the opportunity to goad the opposition.

Due to this the atmosphere was expected to be tense. The crowd capacity would be 60,000 with 7,300 away and the rest home. The match would be broadcast live world-wide and throughout the host city, fans could be expected to watch the game in pubs.

### *Fans*

Home has 50,000 season ticket holders (for a total stadium capacity of 60,000), which was indicated to the team contributed to good fan behaviour, as a season ticket is both a prized possession and a status symbol.

Fans of both teams do not only originate from the town itself, but from all over the country and also from a neighbouring country. Spectators attending the match can arrive by train, by car or by bus. For away fans a segregated area was designated in the vicinity of the stadium where they could arrive by bus and walk towards the stadium. Away fans would receive tickets for a segregated area in the southeast corner of the stadium. No away stewards would travel with their fans.

### *Recent events*

Just a week before the match, the same two teams played one another on for the cup. 40 people were arrested (26 people were detained for sectarian offences, 1 for racist abuse, 12 for breach of the peace and 11 for being drunk and disorderly). According to local press the 26 arrests for sectarian offences constituted "A record number of arrests for sectarianism at the cup clash". (Other headlines included "Sectarian shame", "A blitz on the bigots"). In 2003, legislation entered into force that made specific provision for offences aggravated by religious prejudice.

Following the statement by the match commander that more away than home fans had been guilty of sectarian behaviour, heated discussions were conducted on fan's websites (echoed in the local press) alleging that "officers [were] told to concentrate on petty sectarian offences because of a political agenda" and accusing police of focusing one-sidedly on away fans.

### *Specific risks*

The main risks identified were the following:

- pitch invasion;
- sectarian behaviour;
- crowd safety, overcrowding

Because the match would be broadcast live world-wide, any incident happening inside the stadium would likely have a large exposure. Usually however, there are no problems in the stadium. Violent incidents mostly occur after the match in the city, when individual fans from different communities may provoke or confront one another.

It is important to note that hooliganism and sectarianism provide two different, and unconnected, types of risk. For this match, hooliganism was not seen as a major concern (the team found there was an absence of intelligence).

In the city centre, an anti-war rally was to take place. The geographical commander of the city centre would handle this. In theory, fans going to the city centre after the match could meet with this rally.

#### *Police operation*

In total, 600 officers were to be deployed, including a number of officers from other home town police divisions (mutual aid). Specific elements of the operation included (in addition to standard uniform deployment of officers both within and outside the stadium):

- Spotter operation specifically aimed at identifying, locating and monitoring so-called 'hooligan' elements of both teams, if applicable prevent or disrupt violence between them and gather evidence.
- Anti-sectarian operation, aimed at monitoring the behaviour of fans of both teams to deter acts of disorder, vandalism and overt racist and sectarian behaviour. In taking anti-sectarian measures, specific attention was drawn to the need to look for initiators.
- Both spotters and officers involved in the anti-sectarian operation were deployed in uniform.

The police operation was clearly divided into the following phases:

- Pre match anti-disorder, focusing on hot spots
- Stadium deployment inclusive of crowd flow; segregation; anti-sectarian/ racist initiative (focused on both home and away fans)
- Post-match cordons
- Post-match anti-disorder: hotspots
- Division operation thereafter

In the operational order, the following aims and objectives were mentioned:

- Facilitate safe arrival and departure of spectators
- Ensure that the match passes off peacefully and that any incident is dealt with professionally
- Minimise disruption to the local community

Important to the success of the operation was the achievement of a 500-m circle of segregation around the stadium, the absence of pitch invasions during the match (critical moments) and the effectiveness of segregation within the stadium (sterile area).

### **Overview of events and main decisions**

10.00hrs Policemen and stewards fill most of the positions around the stadium.

11.30hrs the first organised buses with away fans arrived at the provided areas. The arriving fans were disciplined, only a few were visibly very drunk.

11.45hrs the first bigger bulks of away fans crossed the street (facilitated by police officers) separating the parking area and moved toward the pre-barricades of the stewards. Stewards lined up in rows of three and checked tickets. The controlling stewards were backed up by the presence of policemen, who did not have to intervene.

Shortly before the beginning of the game (12.15hrs to 12.20hrs) a group of some 30 away fans approached the stadium on foot, walking through an area filled with home fans. Mutual provocations occurred. Police officers took up position in between the two fan blocks, which were on opposite sides of the pavement and safeguarded the situation. Away fans accompanied by the police went on to their section of the stadium.

In the wider vicinity of the stadium, officers on foot patrolled the area, but pre-match there was little drinking taking place and no noticeable fan group activity.

Between 12.30hrs and 14.15hrs the match took place (a clear win for home team). Within the stadium there was obvious segregation between home and away fans with lines composed of stewards and police officers positioned between the two fan groups. The team observed several arrests.

After the match, fans left the stadium immediately and dispersed. Away fans left in an orderly fashion and made their way to the provided buses. No fans were

held up inside the stadium. Cordons of police officers (some of them assisted by mounted police or backed by dog handlers) separated home from away fans. On no occasion was there any pressure on these cordons. Dispersal from the stadium was complete at 15.00hrs.

The departure of the buses was delayed slightly because the volume of traffic caused traffic jams. The fans responded to this situation very calmly as well

Close to the hot-spots drunken fan groups were noticed. They did not cause any violent activities, though. The police was mostly present with double-patrols. In visible closeness police cars with a crew were parked.

In the course of the day, no critical decisions needed to be taken, events passed in a more-or-less routine fashion.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Police interaction with fans*

In spite of the "high risk" categorisation of the match, all police deployment was in normal uniform. Basically the atmosphere was relaxed. In particular the police present, including the mounted police, were calm and serene and acted professionally, both inside and outside the stadium. If instructions were needed they were given in a clear and precise manner but never in an aggressive way. The fans seemed to be well aware of the routine, and seemed to accept police presence and police measures as self-evident and never exerted any pressure on police cordons. As a result few instances of interaction between fans and police were observed, neither was there need for direct interaction.

#### *Police co-operation with stewards*

The team was impressed with the partnership exhibited and the level and quality of co-operation between police and club and between police and stewards. This was also evident during the general briefing of the club's security administrator, where the police commander was invited to give a speech and clearly motivated stewards by explaining that both the police and the security service were important for the success of the project and by clearly indicating that police would protect stewards at all times.

The co-operation between club and police is also facilitated by the professional set-up of the club's security system, which includes:

- An event management plan
- A contingency plan detailing the response to 16 contingencies (e.g. pa-system/ CCTV failure)
- A protocol document between club and home town police
- An operation-folder for the stewards created for every match
- Training of safety officers and stewards

Inside the stadium, police and the stewards were continually very busy, they tried to keep order by talking to the fans but also by using non-verbal measures as pulling up the forces in front of the sections at certain moments (e.g. just before half-time, just before the end of the match). The stewards intervened calmly and admonished the troublemakers. In case there were obvious problems with the interventions the policemen supported the stewards quickly.

After the match, when team members tried to pass a cordon that was already in place, they were correctly stopped and only allowed to continue after showing their accreditations.

### *Police Deployment strategy*

The team made several observations related to police deployment:

- The most striking was of course the consistent deployment of officers in normal uniform in spite of the high risk categorisation of the match
- The specific attention for identified "hot spots" by using a mobile patrol
- A policy was put into practice of going into pubs to contact landlords and assess the situation. Also, agreements were in place with pubs whereby pubs monitored access and prevented overcrowding
- The active use of video (both by video teams and CCTV-vehicle)
- Specific deployment in relation to anti-sectarian behaviour
- The facilitation of away fans by providing a separate parking space for away buses

The team had the impression that there was less proactive attention for the potential presence of away fans not travelling by bus (as indicated also by the "surprise" arrival of away fans).

### *Sectarian behaviour of supporters*

The team was informed about the history of sectarian behaviour in general and specifically in relation to matches between home and away, and about measures aimed at reducing this behaviour. It was clear that sectarian behaviour was a major concern. The home town police are actively involved in measures to deal with anti-sectarian behaviour and distinguish between education work (with a police initiative to issue friendship wrist bands, several school projects), enforcement (enhanced by recent legislation) and exclusion (with the advent of football banning orders).

It is recognised that for such an approach to be successful, partners within the police (the division where away is located, neighbouring police forces) and outside the police (e.g. clubs, youth work) should be involved as well.

In direct relation to matches, two measures stand out:

- Strict segregation inside the stadium and in the immediate surroundings of the stadium (with low risk home fans closest to the away support);
- Dedicated anti-sectarian teams are deployed to help arrest the worst offenders and hope for a ripple effect to take place.

It is felt that home fans are responding positively to anti-sectarian initiatives and police measures. With away fans, this seemed to be less so: they apparently have no songs that are not offensive and when away play at home Ground, their behaviour tends to be worse than at home, because they are less easily identified.

### *Overall integrity of the policing operation and how well it meets its objectives*

The policing operation met its objectives very well and there was never any sign of trouble. Paramount to the integrity and the success of the operation seemed to be the following

- a clear and consistent approach, where everyone seemed to be well aware of their role and orders are executed almost immediately
- the leadership shown by the police commander: he shows his presence, clearly knows everyone, motivates both officers and steward supervisors, conducts well-structured briefings, contributes to a good atmosphere and does not create undue stress

Fans were facilitated rather than controlled (which was also evidenced by the fact that there was never any pressure on cordons) and when necessary, active



communication took place. The use of officers in normal uniform fitted with a graded deployment. Of necessity (because of the long standing sectarian rivalries), there is an important historical element in preparing for a match of this type, but there were clear indications that a distinction was being made between different types of risk as could be relevant for this specific occasion.

The briefing structure contributed to the overall integrity of the operation. The spotter briefing was less effective, and the team was surprised that for such a high-risk match as this a commander was put in place which performed this role for the first time on the day.

Debriefs were held immediately on the day of the match and not left until the following week.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

#### *Interaction with fans*

Perhaps because of the in several ways routine nature of events (this match is played at least two times per year) there is little direct interaction between officers and fans. The direct interaction that is visible is of a friendly and where necessary firm nature (e.g. when arresting fans). The active deployment of police in relation to hot spots (including entering public houses and contacting landlords) allowed for early identification of potential risks and early intervention if necessary. Arrangements with public houses are also effective in preventing problems: e.g. no overcrowding, no drinking in the streets.

#### *Police cooperation with Stewards*

The co-operation between police and club and police officers and stewards is very advanced. The one criticism that could be levelled at it is that the police seem to be in control of everything, and that sometimes police and stewards seem to be interchangeable and fulfil similar tasks (e.g. admission controls).

#### *Deployment Strategy*

The deployment strategy used by home town police seems to be eminently suited to this event. Police officers are well trained, well equipped and very motivated. Unlike policemen from many other countries they perform their task for this match categorised as high risk without helmet and solid body protection. The behaviour of the fans indicates that they accept the strategy and that they

are used to it. The strategy does not interfere with fans unnecessarily and rather facilitates their safe attendance of the match.

#### *Sectarian behaviour of supporters*

The categorisation of the match as high risk is entirely due to the sectarian rivalry between fans. In this respect games between the teams concerned are quite unique. Segregation is clearly effective and fans voluntarily adjust to it, at times giving the impression of a natural segregation occurring, where police only have to show the way. At the same time, segregation in itself does not solve anything in the long term. It is therefore commendable that initiatives are undertaken to prevent sectarian behaviour, e.g. educational measures. The team found the active involvement of the police in educational measures positive, and wondered at the same time why of all partners involved, it seemed necessary for the police to take the initiative most often.

On a more general level the unique nature of this specific match, led the team to discuss the pros and cons of segregation between opposing fan groups (as is done habitually all over Europe) and the need to find a balance between maintaining order in the short term (while at the same time contributing to the need for continued segregation in the long term) and promoting mutual acceptance, peaceful mingling or long term solutions for ancient rivalries.

#### *Overall integrity of the policing operation and how well it met its objectives*

The operation clearly met its objectives and achieved its goals. This international team also felt that existing legal regulations ease the job of the police (in particular the hard threats of punishment on attacking a policeman and considerable punishments for exceeding the barriers in the stadium definitely). The organisation and the officers involved from the home police clearly were experienced. This was not necessarily true of officers being deployed from other divisions.

The team identified the following as **good practices**:

- Consistent friendly but firm community policing approach in a situation categorised as high risk
- The co-operation between police and club with involvement of silver in the steward supervisors briefing
- The identification of hot spots based on previous experiences and complaints by the public
- The flexible deployment in relation to hot spots

- The active deployment in relation to pubs
- The police involvement in preventive activities (sectarianism)
- The specific attention for crowd safety



## 3.2 A high-risk national competition under the eyes of the media

The national competition match was classified as a high risk event due the past history between the two fan groups. In the recent past there had been a (non-football related) riot in the city in which the police operation and police means of dealing with public order was openly criticised and the ability of the police to deal with public order incidents and large crowds had been publically questioned. There was expected to be a considerable presence of media at the event.

### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the following evaluation points:

- Security around the stadium
- Proper and polite intervention of the police officers
- Co-operation of police and security services stadium
- Access control and fan separation

Based on principles contained in the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Cooperation between police forces
- Tactical performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

### **Methodology used and material gathered**

#### *Briefings attended*

- Consultation /situation meeting briefing
- Issue of orders
- Issue of orders for other forces
- Briefing for spotters
- Briefing for security and stewarding
- General police debriefing

### *Interviews held*

- Head of the intelligence
- Spotter for host police force
- Spotter for away police force
- Police commander of the stadium
- 2 intervention police officers
- Stadium security manager
- Deputy stadium security manager
- 3 away club fan councillors members
- 2 stewards of the home stadium
- 4 home fans
- 7 away fans
- Police Commander for the operation
- Commander of the train station area
- Commander of intervention unit for the city police
- 3 intervention unit officers for the city police (2 officers and one group leader)
- City police liaison officer for visiting police forces intervention units
- Police commander of the City police
- Head of home club security
- 6 accompanying officers (each pair of the review team was accompanied by a city police officer and a regional police officer)

### *Observations conducted*

- Control room in the city before the match
- Stadium control room during and after the match
- Surrounding stadium area before and after the match
- Inside the stadium area
- City centre train station before the match
- Arrival of the special train and the transfer of away fans to the stadium
- The travel of the away fans from the stadium to the train station (after the match)
- After the match both away and home fans perspectives of the police cordon
- Observation of the stadium security manager during the match.
- Specific attention paid to the body searches of both fan groups inside the stadium
- Specific attention paid to the entrance of the away fans prior to the match

## **Context in which the match takes place**

### *The match*

The match was a national league competition game, to be played on a Sunday at 16.00hrs. The match was classified as a high risk event due the past history between the two fan groups. The home team at the time of the review held the 2nd place in the national league and away team were positioned 3rd. The stadium held a 32,000 seating capacity. The expected attendance for the event was 18,000 – 20,000. The reported actual attendance was 19,000 with a reported 1,100 visiting away fans attending the fixture. Tickets were sold on the day of the match, which were available to both the home and away fans. The ticket office opened at 14.15hrs. Alcohol was made available for fans to purchase inside the stadium grounds.

### *Home fans*

The home fans were reported to have approximately 100 fans posing a high risk to public order. The headquarters of the risk group was reported to have been closed down by the police, with no other information on a new headquarters to date. It was also reported recently a young groups of radicals have also formed a section of the fan population, although the actual number are currently unknown. Fans were expected to arrive and leave the stadium by public transport. Arrival by travel buses was thought to be unlikely.

### *Away fans*

The away fans were thought to have a population of 200 to 300 fans posing a high risk to public order. The away fans were thought to act very quickly intensely and aggressively to all provocations, against the scene or the police. The firing of pyrotechnical devices was expected. There was also speculation that the away fans would attempt to force entry into the stadium.

Due to the location of the stadium in relation to a railway station situated approximately 200 to 300m from the stadium, a special train was arranged to carry the away fans directly to the stadium before the event and back to their home city following the match. The special train was escorted by four away fan counsellors and railway police who provided regular intelligence reports on fan activity from the train.

*Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

The game was classified as high risk match for the reason that there have been numerous incidents between the fan groups of the two teams when these teams have played in the past.

The match was played on the opening day of carnival in the host city centre, but police stated there was no reason to expect any consequential effects of this event upon the policing of the football match.

In the recent past there had been a riot in the host home town in which the police operation and police means of dealing with public order was openly criticised and the ability of the police to deal with public order incidences and large crowds had been publically questioned. Generally, there is a growing media interest in police functioning and there was expected to be a considerable presence of media at the event.

*Police organisation/ operation*

The operational responsibility was officially that of the city police force. The operation was supported by the regional police forces and other support organisations (e.g. other regional police forces Railway police, FIO sanitary police (first aid) and professional fire services).

The police made use of the so-called 3D philosophy or concept, with the Ds standing for dialogue, de-escalation and direct action respectively. The philosophy is understood to be a graded approach to increasing levels of disorder. The increasing levels of D correspond to behavioural approaches adopted by the officers involved in managing the situation. The outward appearance of officers also plays a role in communication of the police approach.

The host force understood there to be implications for the involvement of visiting officers from the surrounding regions working together with the home town police force. Therefore the operation was perceived as a good opportunity for real time training on the job.

The city police force were trailing a new GPS tracking system in which the geographical locations of all the units were transmitted to the control room to enable the command team full visual understanding of positions without having to ask.



There were functionally two operational areas; the city area and stadium area. The operational areas around the stadium, including the nearby railway station, were divided into 8 geographical sectors. Two control rooms were to be used on the day of the match: one in the stadium and another in the city.

In the city control room radios and screens specific for the normal day to day police work enabled instructions for ordinary work and public order instructions relating to the football event to be coordinated from one area. The Gold commander was positioned in the city control room.

The control room situated in the stadium grounds coordinated police operations around the stadium area, which is removed from the city.

Safety and security within the stadium was the responsibility of the Stadium security services. In total there were 240 security members working for the event. Ten away club stewards were to accompany the away fans to aid with crowd management within the stadium.

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

14.30hrs the gates were opened and fans could begin to enter the stadium.

14.38hrs the special train arrived from the away city. The walk by the away fans from the train station to the stadium was observed. During the walk of the fans from the train station to the stadium the police segregated the two fan groups involved in the event. On the concord outside the away fans entrance fans were not segregated. The away fans then entered the stadium. Five away fans were observed being removed from the queue. Immediately before the match began the away fans displayed a large banner and large flags.

### *During the match*

16.00hrs kick off

17.52hrs Game ends 1 – 1

### *After the match*

The fans evacuated the stadium quickly. The away fans walked from the stadium to the train station. There was a large police operation to keep the fans segregated. Away fans were observed to rip the red and white police tape which was erected to guide fans to the train station. There were minor verbal confrontations from

away fans directed towards the police. Due to the police cordon fans from both fan groups were restricted from getting to their vehicles for a period of time until the police cordon was removed. Small missiles (bottles and plastic cups) were also thrown by the away fans in the direction of the police cordon.

18.20hrs the special train departed, returning to the away fans home city. The emergency break was pulled by fans before the train left causing a slight delay to departure. After the train departed the police cordons were removed and the segregation operation ceased. There were no reported incidents following the event in the city centre.

#### *Prominent decisions taken during the operation*

There was a decision taken to make tight police segregation lines outside the gas station after the match, this was to prevent fans mixing.

There was also a decision taken after the match to put on extra resources into a police cordon line which shortly after was removed.

Decisions were made through the duration of the event to arrest 9 people in total.

#### **Observations related to evaluation points**

##### *Security around the stadium before the match*

On arrival of the special train from the away city, alighting the train the fans were not met by any officers or instructed in any way where to go. There were no signs at the train station or the surrounding area to guide the fans as to appropriate entrances to the stadium. From the train station to the crossroads in front of the gas station there were no police officers, therefore the first contact the visiting fans had with police representatives were the lines of intervention officers at the bus stop and the gas station. The officers were stationary, in lines with riot shields and rubber bullet guns. The officers were not wearing helmets. The position of the officers on either side of the street acted to guide the fans directly to the visiting entrance to the stadium. There was one group of intervention officers positioned in front of the gas station although fans were freely permitted to enter if they chose to do so.

Shortly following the arrival of the special train which carried away fans a regularly scheduled train arrived, carrying home fans to the stadium. There were still away fans making their way to the stadium when the second train arrived with home

fans. The police positioning in relation to how close the officers were to the fans varied: at the station there was much distance between the fans and police, outside the shell garage there was very little distance between the two. At the stadium entrance the police were positioned very close to the fans.

With regard to the entrance of the home fans around the rest of the stadium there was observed to be very little police presence. Outside the stadium' restaurant two standard uniformed officers were observed to be positioned. This was the only sighting of officers who were not dressed in intervention uniform nor equipped with intervention materials.

It was noticed there were no facilities or bins outside the stadium to discard of used bottles and cans etc. There was one individual sighted manually gathering the rubbish which had collected on the floor surrounding the stadium. Despite this there were bottles and other materials left to build up around the stadium area which could be used as missiles. Inside the stadium there were boxes for the fans to put used bottles and cups inside; these disposal units had no covering or lid to prevent fans removing things from the waste (potentially to be used as missiles).

The security and segregation policies around the stadium were affected by the infrastructure of the stadium and surrounding pathways. If the home fans were walking to the stadium from the direction of the bus stop there was demand for these fans to cross the path of the away fans as these were coming from the train to the stadium in order to get to their entrance.

#### *Security around the stadium after the match*

In relation to the away fans exit of the stadium; fans were met by a line of 34 intervention officers. The officers wore riot protection helmets, shields and several had rubber bullet guns. The team were informed by a police command position the officers were now wearing riot helmets for their own safety as the crowd management was expected to be more difficult after the match than before the match. There were also three officers observed close to the exit wearing fluorescent vests and handling a police dog. The officers were positioned immediately outside the stadium in this way prevented away fans going in any other direction other than towards the train station.

As the away fans moved down towards the crossroads outside the gas station there was a large police segregation operation and a clear cordoning off of the streets to prevent fans of both groups coming together. From the perspective of a fan walking towards the train station on the right hand side of the cross-road five public order fence vehicles were positioned blocking of the road. Between each police vehicle were positioned five intervention officers with full riot protection. On the left hand side at the gas station there was a line of approximately 20 intervention officers wearing full riot protection. Further down, past the gas station on the left hand side of the crossroads there were approximately 20 intervention officers in a line from the gas station to the bus stop, positioned in the same place as before the match but further away in distance from the away fans walking to the stadium. On either side of the road there was red and white cordon tape in order to guide the fans from the stadium to the train station, indicating they were not to cross the tape. It could be observed on the opposite side of the vehicles the same action of erecting red and white tape had been taken to prevent home fans moving towards the away fans. It was reported the segregation was managed specifically in this way as a consequence of intelligence from a covert source stating the away fans wanted to meet at the gas station and become confrontational with the home fans. The confrontation was to be at the initiative of the away fans.

The away fans looked surprised at the police presence and comments such as "*What's this?*" were heard as they were passing. Generally the away fans moved directly towards the train station. A small group of 10 fans were observed to gather at the red and white tape on the right side of the crossroad. Two small incidents were observed of these away fans throwing bottles and plastic cups as missiles in the direction of the police cordon line. These fans entered into verbal confrontation with accompanying gestures towards the police. This group of fans were then observed to rip down the red and white tape. Two police officers attempted to reattach the tape but the fans immediately ripped it down again. Following the tape being ripped more fans began to gather where it previously was. Small groups in the area of five and six appeared to be confused or interested as to what was happening. Some other small groups expressed frustration and left the area seemingly attempting to achieve their goals through another means. One fan reported waiting at this point because they were being prevented from returning to their car by the cordon.

Throughout the duration of the away fans exit police officers used a mega hailer to repeatedly convey the message "*Stay back*". No explanation was offered as to why the officers were positioned this way or how long it would take before the cordon was lifted and the fans would be allowed to pass over the road. The police officers, the intelligence and the operation itself stressed the importance of the away fans leaving after the match. This was thought to be the most likely time for confrontations to take place due two reasons in particular. Firstly, the fans would have already seen the match so it was expected their behaviour might be more confrontational as the prospect of being prevented from going to the match would not be there. Secondly, it was mentioned that after the match one group of fans would not be happy.

At the end of the match it was turning dark outside. Observations within the stadium control room indicated that there were issues with the visibility of the officers around the stadium. Club and police representatives watching the screens demonstrated that there were difficulties observing the location of the police officers who were positioned around the stadium. Recordings document the question "*where are the police officers?*" being asked by individuals within the control room. The visiting officers providing support to the host force from surrounding regions were dressed in a black uniform.

#### *Proper and polite intervention of the police officers*

Due to the prevailing nature of the event observations relating to the intervention of officers is limited. As mentioned there were observed to be two officers around the stadium were dressed in standard uniform, this is an interesting point as it was stressed in the briefings and operational order prior to the event the operation would be led in relation to the 3D concept.

The police officers interviewed reported to understand the concept and stated it to be a good philosophy. The officers did however comment it was thought only to work in certain situations, reporting "*The concept didn't work*" in others; in which reactive measures rather than talking had to be used.

Before the match observations were made of plain clothed officer's intervening to remove in total five away fans from the queue into the stadium. These individuals were identified as being subject to banning orders. These interventions were discrete and effective, and not aggressive in any way. Two plain clothed officers simply tapped one fan on the shoulder, they were asked to go with the officer

and led away. The fan was then searched behind a police van, out of the direct vision of the surrounding away fans. A further two fans were observed to be removed in the same manner as the first. It was observed during the body searches the interactions between the removed fans and the police were good. They were seen to be smiling and laughing with one another.

The team approached some away fans standing nearby and asked *"Did you see what happened?"* in relation to the plain clothed intervention. The away fans commented *"Yes, nothing happened. It doesn't matter if they are hooligans or not they done nothing wrong. They do nothing... Yes, that creates tension"*.

Shortly following the intervention described above 12 intervention officers in full riot protection appeared at the entrance of the away fans. All the officers moved up the steps in a line towards the main door to enter the stadium in order to remove a further two fans (also been identified as subject to banning orders) from inside the stadium. This intervention was not discrete due to the number of officers used to collect the fans from at the door from club staff. The same away fans who had previously been asked about the plain clothed intervention were approached and interviewed again, when asked *"How does this make you feel?"* the fan answered *"I don't know, it is a question of what those people have done"*. The interviewer continued *"So the last people you knew that they had done nothing wrong, but maybe these people did?"* *"Exactly. I don't know"*.

Further observations of positive relations were evidenced in interactions between fans and intervention police positioned at the entrance of the visiting fans section. Several observations were made of officers at the entrance smiling and chatting with the fans as they entered the stadium.

Supporters from both fan groups were interviewed in and around the stadium for their thoughts on the police presence at the event. Both fans groups reported understanding why the police had to be there. One away fan commented when asked *"How do you feel about the way the police are dealing with things?"*, *"The police, yes they just make their job"*. Several fans also commented the police presence was visibly high. One away fan commented *"Yes there are a lot of police here today, but it is normal"*. A home fan commented *"At every point there are police"* the fan was then asked *"Do you think many police work well to manage fans?"* to which they responded *"It's difficult to say... I think it's very difficult for the police. I think they do a good job, a very good job actually"*.

One away fan outside the stadium commented *"When there is too much police they make the atmosphere a little bit more aggressive. And there are a lot of people who when they see this many police they become aggressive. But when there is no police it would not be good"*, the review team member then asked *"So you think the police can have an influence on the atmosphere?"* to this the fan commented *"Oh yes. When they are all the way with the guns and dogs it makes us a little nervous I think"*. In relation to another the position of police presence an away fan commented *"If the police stay in the background then there is no problem... if they let us do our thing, then we let them do their thing"*.

After the match it was observed that a group of approximately 10 away fans stood by the red and white tape police line and were attempting to provoke the police officers facing them. Two officers approached the fans and began to dialogue with the fans and encourage the fans to move on to the train. These fans were spoken to three times by the pair of police officers and asked to move on to the train. After the second time whilst the two officers were speaking to the fans there was an observation of one officer on his own initiative raising his rubber bullet gun and aiming it at the fans. The team could not discern any reason for this behaviour.

#### *Co-operation of Police and Security services Stadium*

In interviews with both the stadium security manager and the coordinator of the private security both provided evidence of the good cooperation between the club and the policing agencies. It was observed in the security briefings prior to the match there were no representatives from the police. Similarly it was observed there were no representatives from the club at the police briefings. A member of club staff explained that this had no effect on exchange of information between the two, as anything relevant to the operation would have been exchanged prior to the event.

Outside the stadium there were limited observations of communication between club and police staff members. A command level representative for security was observed outside the stadium overseeing the entrance of the away fans. When interviewed this individual commented it is important for him observe the outside area so that the security members could be well informed of how they should be managing fans within the stadium.

Through the duration of the match a potential issue was identified for the security within the stadium, which is the flags and the banners the fans are permitted to bring into the stadium. The large banners and flags prevented the cameras in the control room from monitoring the actual behaviours of fans. Individuals had the opportunity to stand behind the flags or banners and throw things, meaning there would be no way to identify them. Furthermore if one of the large flags or the banners was to be lit on fire then the consequences for safety and security within the stadium potentially could be life threatening.

The club security held a briefing before the match began. The deputy safety manager for the club held the briefing, conveying information to stewards and private security. The staff were asked about their awareness of the 3D and the private security reported understanding the concept. The requests made of the private security always to give information where possible to the visitors, to try to be in communication with the fans regardless of whether they are home or away fans. This information (with the use of the key words Information, communication and assignment) was the exact message which was conveyed in the police briefings; the instructions given to the police outside the stadium and the private security inside the stadium was very similar. Both agencies were working to the same principles, strategies and tactics. The risk assessment for the match from the club and private security inside the stadium was reported to be medium risk. This was communicated to the staff at the security briefing prior to the event and at the half time briefing.

A half time briefing was held by the deputy safety manager, where representatives from all agencies were involved to evaluate the operation and to confirm strategies for after the match. It was led by the assistant safety officer. At the end of the briefing there was tension in the room as the risk assessment by the club as "medium" seemed not to be accepted by representatives of the private security organisations. One organisation felt that a high risk classification within the stadium would be more suiting to the event. The safety manager for the club acknowledged these differences in understanding and responded by requesting the security organisations involved to stay behind after the meeting. It was then communicated to these representatives that all agencies must work as one and that it was important all club agencies understood the situation in the same way. It was reinforced the risk for the event in question was considered to be only medium and not high risk.



It was suggested in the control room after the half time briefing the home fans could be held in the stadium following the event to prevent the fans mixing this was thought to be a good idea. However it was also commented that as this strategy was not discussed in the half time briefing and as such it was not a possibility.

#### *Access control and fan separation*

Before the game on the entrance of the fans there was no segregation in place to prevent fans from the two fan groups coming together. At the entrance for the away fans home fans walked around this section amongst the away fans.

Away fans were met at their entrance by approximately 15 intervention officers who were positioned at the top of a flight of stairs which the away fans must climb to access their entrance doors. The team was told in the past there had been issues with fans pulling and pushing at the fences at the entrance doors to the stadium and therefore now intervention officers were positioned at the top of the stairs to show that the officers are 'strong'. This was thought would calm the fans and prevent them pulling at the fences when waiting to enter. The away fans reported they had no problems with the officers positioned at the entrance.

The body searches following the away fans entrance into the stadium were conducted on the stairs inside the stadium, on the way up to the stadium concord. The team was told the rationale behind having fans searched on the stairs inside the stadium is due to previous experiences in the past when fans have attempted to force their entrance when the searches have taken place outside. A member of the private security agency commented "*We know that this is not a good place to search*" (as it could be dangerous for both the fans and the security searchers on the stairs and there is the potential for someone to fall). The team observed females were searched at top of the stairs and males at the bottom of the stairs, thus facilitating the opportunity to exchange forbidden objects from the females to the males and taking them into the stadium without the knowledge of the security.

The away fans arrived on time and en masse they were waiting in the rain to enter the stadium putting pressure on the security staff. Searches were taking long periods of time causing the fans to be in the rain for long periods of time. There were two observations where the fans were seen to put pressure in the line and start pushing those in front of them to get into the stadium quicker.

As mentioned earlier, two fans subject to banning orders were removed from the stadium. These fans were taken out down the stairs in which away fans were waiting and arrested in the full view of fans still waiting outside to enter the stadium.

#### *Cooperation between police forces*

Good cooperation was evidenced between the city and regional police, the forces worked as if they were one. After the event an officer from city police was observed overseeing the regional police member's behaviours and actions. This officer was a high level command. This commander reported his job was to act as a liaison officer with the regional police in order to ensure they operated behaviourally in line with the city police philosophies. The commander was responsible for ensuring the tactics and strategies were translated into correct operational practice by the supporting visiting forces. The commander reported there was an individual fulfilling a similar role themselves attached to each unit of the supporting visiting forces.

Cooperation between the host force and the away police representatives was evident in the operation, yet the team learnt risk information reported by the home and away spotters was not consistent with the one others understanding (see below). The team also noted inconsistencies between the expected behaviour of the away fans by the host force and that which was expected by members of the away fans club councillors. The host police force believed due to the historical relations between the two fan groups disorder was likely. The away club crew councillor members reported they did not expect any incidents on the day of the event, mentioning the away fans have not been involved in disorder all season. The reason given for the recent incident free behaviour of away fans was the proposal made by the away football club that on condition the fans are well behaved this year the club will lower the cost of a season ticket next year as a reward for their good behaviour.

### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

During the briefings and presentations prior to the event it was stressed tactically the operation would function in line with the 3D concept. It is understood the concept is dependant upon a three stage step of actions with corresponding uniforms for each stage, taken by the police in order to manage the developing dynamics of public order management. Stage one is 'Dialogue' with a corresponding standard community oriented uniform and an emphasis on talking with the crowd members. Stage two is 'De-escalation' requiring an increased protective uniform worn by the officers involved and an emphasis on minimising developing disorder. Stage three requires full riot control and affirmative force in dispersing the crowd and calming existent public disorder. The policing operation with regard to the uniform worn by officers managing the away fans did not comply with the requirements of the 3D concept. The concept of the operation was that of showing strength and being strong with the fans. One member of the command team commented when asked if the officers are tasked to speak to the fans "We never do that". Another member of the command team commented on hearing the review team contact and interview fans that officers never spoke with fans so he would be interested to hear their perspective of the police. The only standard uniform officers observed by the team through the duration of the event were two positioned outside the club restaurant at the stadium. The intervention uniform officers generally were not actively talking to the fans and were positioned stationary at a distance from the fans. However, on several occasions the team observed officers friendly and willing to talk to the fans as evidenced by interactions between officers and away fans at the top of the stairs at the away fans entrance. The uniform worn and general positioning of the officers did not facilitate the officer's ability to conduct 'dialogue' behaviours.

Observations inside the command room revealed there was only one radio channel in use for all agencies involved. A situation developed during the event where there was a breakdown in communication for several minutes, the system malfunctioned and there was no way of informing the officers that they should change radio channels to redeem communication.

### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

The team noted there was discrepancy between the home police force and the away club representatives understanding of the risks involved in the event in question. The host force believed the event was a high risk event, even though prior to the event there was no information indicating disorder.

At the command briefing in the morning prior to the event the intelligence section of the operation reported that there was no information. Despite this in the briefing for the regional police in the afternoon the officers were informed '*We still don't know if they (the away fans) will march from the main station to the stadium*'. The team was informed at some point in the past this had happened (not with away fans but with other away fans of a different team) therefore it was thought this may happen again.

A city police commander stated the reason for classification is that every time the away team had visited the host city in the past there had been issues. Every year the fans tried to confront one another and if they couldn't get to the other fan group they attempted to confront the police. A spotter from the away city stated there were no category C fans but there could be some category B and the risk level at the event was a medium risk. When interviewed an away club fan councillor also commented there were no expected problems, informing the team the fans have behaved very well all year. The only incidents this year the away fans had been involved in was the lighting of small flares in their own stadium. When interviewed, fans from both groups, home and away, reported they did not expect risk to develop at the event. One fan commented "*It's not in the atmosphere*".

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

#### *Security around the stadium*

From the point of view for of security around the stadium all the potential for confrontation was avoided by the police outside the stadium. In light of this disorder was prevented and the policing operation was successful. Rather than the 3D concept, the goal of effective public order management was achieved by heavy police presence. Even though the away fans were considered guests in the minds of the officers, the policing operation tactics and strategies did not facilitate treating the visiting fans like guests.

The crowd management plan of complete segregation of the two fans groups was undermined by the infrastructural conditions surrounding the stadium (in relation to the fans crossing the paths prior to the event).

The special scheduled train carrying the away fans and scheduled train carrying the home fans arrived within a few minutes of one another. As a consequence both fan groups arrived at the train station at around the same time, this also infringed upon the operational objectives of complete segregation of the fans.

Also from the view of security around the stadium due to difficulties with the visibility of officers around the stadium after the event, the dark-coloured uniforms (rather than fluorescent vests) worn by the officers made it difficult to identify the locations of the officers when the early evening became dark.

#### *Proper and polite intervention of the police officers*

In relation to proper and polite intervention of the police officers our observations indicated that when interventions were made (of arresting the fans with banning orders) the intervention was managed effectively. The first intervention observed was calm and polite, having very little effect upon the crowd. The second intervention by 12 riot control officers was targeted directly at fans being ejected from the stadium as a consequence of being subject to banning orders but was far more visible and drew attention to the police actions. The riot intervention differed from that of the plain clothed intervention. There was no communication with surrounding fans (either directly or through members of the away club councillors) as to what was happening or why to avoid potential tensions.

The team also observed one instance of incorrect police behaviour of an intervention officer aiming the rubber bullet gun in the direction of the crowd. Although the weapon was not put to use the display of weapons as the gun as tactical decision was not in line with either the 3D philosophy or instructions given during the briefing. The team felt that in conditions of stress this could potentially lead to inappropriate rubber bullet gun use. Consideration could be made to reserve the exposure of rubber bullet guns for those situations in which the risk demands the guns be distributed as a tactical option.

### *Co-operation of Police and Security services Stadium*

The cooperation and communication between the police and security services of the Stadium functioned effectively. It was commented by representatives from both sides that the relationship between the two was very good. There are clear and acknowledged mutual understandings of role and responsibility between the club and police. The wall of the stadium is a clear line for the distinction of the responsibilities of the two agencies. It was reported that preparations for the event were made by the two agencies in advance of the event. Yet police assessment of the game as high risk was not shared by the club.

It could be suggested that ground regulations consider the possibility of creating some kind of limit on the size of the flags and banners permitted to be brought into the stadium. This would ensure there were no issues with identification of fans as a consequence of being sat behind large flags or banners. This would also prevent a situation in which banners are lit on fire within the stadium, which as history illustrates can have severe consequences.

### *Access control and fan separation*

The existing system of searching fans could lead to either fans or police officers falling down the stairs. Also as the males were searched at the bottom of the stairs first and the females searched second at the top of the stairs, this could lead to a situation in which the female retains an unauthorised object while the male is searched, the object can then be handed to the male after searching thus facilitating illegal objects (e.g. pyrotechniques) into the stadium. The team would like to suggest that attempts to facilitate a quicker entrance into the stadium be considered. There could be a system were the capacity for searching is increased when measures such as a train in coming full with fans. This could involve increasing the number of turnstiles at the visiting fans entrance to facilitate quicker entrance.

The positioning and uniform of the officers monitoring the access of the away fans into the stadium could also be considered. Tactically the police were restricted in their actions by being positioned on top of the stadium steps, with their backs towards a glass window. Furthermore the equipment available to the officers was not suited to the situation. If a situation of disorder did develop use of the rubber gun weapon might be dangerous at such close range.

The safety of the officer might also come to risk as the only way to remove themselves from the area was through the queuing fans. It could be suggested that if it is necessary to have officers in this area, standard uniform officers might be more appropriate.

#### *Cooperation between police forces*

In relation to cooperation between police force good relations between the city and regional police was evidenced, they worked as they were already one force. The liaison officer from the home police force attached to each unit of visiting support forces to ensure that the visiting force were operating in a way which was consistent with the home police philosophies, this was thought to be good practice.

During the event there was cooperation with the police and spotters from the away city and there was cooperation with the other regions which appeared to work effectively. However, there were differences in information between the home and away spotters. Also, the expectation of away fan behaviour was different between the two forces..

#### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

The tactical performance for public order management did not appear to be in line with the 3D philosophy. It was stressed in the briefing prior to the operation the tactical concept was the 3D and the officers would be dressed in that with corresponded with the first D (standard uniform). There were no observations which evidence phased deployment in the operation. The intervention uniform worn by the officers could be perceived as disproportionate to the actual risk in the situation. Interviews with both the home and away fans reveal the riot helmets create an expectation of disorder if there is no apparent risk, as well as affect the atmosphere at a football match.

In relation to officer's understanding of the 3D concept answers in relation to questions surrounding 3D were indicative of an incomplete understanding of the rationale behind the concept. It is suggested efforts should be made to educate the officers further to a complete understanding of the three stage concept and the actions involved in each. The 3D concept is based upon recent theoretical understandings of crowd, consistent with effective public order management. It is suggested the operations adopt this three phase approach with home fans and away fans. The uniform and position of the intervention

officers also did not facilitate the first D. Intervention officers need not be in full view of the fans at all times, these officers could be in the background of the operation awaiting a situation to develop which desires the presence of intervention officers. If the fans come into contact with standard uniform officers before they come into contact with intervention officers this would set the tone of relations. This would allow the fans to feel more welcome.

A logistical suggestion in light of observations at the event is that the operation could be run using two active radio channels (e.g. one for command and one for the frontline officers), making it possible to switch to another channel when necessary. Logistically the maintenance of the GPS system was thought to be good practice.

### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

In the assessment of the match there are issues with the actual risk assessment method of the event. The operation ran on an understanding of risk that was influenced significantly by the past behaviour of the away fan groups behaviour (and even of the behaviour of other fan groups). This understanding of risk should be handled cautiously as it may lead to situations where the police are not policing the fans actual behaviours but the reputations of the fans. A possibility is not a probability. This becomes truer when no specific information is available. Also, there were different understandings of what risks were involved in this game between home police, away police and club (and fans for that matter). More recent behaviour of the visiting fans did not seem to be taken into account. Given that there was no information that events would be happening in the city, and in fact there was no real police operation within the city, the reasons for the choice to have a central city command room in addition to the stadium command room were not clear to the team. The extra communication needs this configuration leads to could be a risk in itself.

In analysis of observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below:

- The use of the GPS system
- The deployment of a liaison officer overseeing the actions of the regional police forces brought in for support.
- Half time briefing and debriefing
- Logistically the force are well equipped for public order management (the vehicles are an example of this)



### 3.3 A national competition match between old rivals

#### Evaluation points requested by host police force

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the following evaluation points:

1. Interaction stewards and police
2. Interaction supporters and police
3. Interaction clubs and police
4. Did the commanding officers on the tactical level in the police operation comply with the strategy outlined in the operational plan?

In addition and linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Tactical performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

#### Data gathered

##### *Interviews held*

- Stadium control room police commander
- Police commanders and command team
- Head of the plain clothes police / spotters
- Head of spotters of the home police force
- Home police force spotter
- 2 spotters of a fan group affiliated with the home fans
- 2 away police force spotters
- Platoon commander
- 5 vested officers around the stadium
- Traffic police officer
- Stadium safety officer
- Head of the special stewards unit
- 3 away fans
- 2 home fans

##### *Observations conducted*

Before the match:

- Command room at the stadium
- Control room HQ
- City centre
- The away fans arriving at the pub

- Walk from the pub to the train station with away fans
- Travelled with fans onboard the train
- Train stations
- Walk with the away fans from the train station to the stadium
- Home fans arriving at the stadium
- Away fans arriving at the stadium
- The strategic mobile units around the city

During the match:

- Away fan seating area (inside the stadium)
- Home fans risk fan area (inside the stadium)

After the match:

- Dispersal of the home fans
- 2 train stations
- The strategic mobile units around the city
- City centre - before and after the match
- Specific attention to the spotters operation; including travelling with the spotters after the match.

## **Context in which the match takes place**

### *The match*

The match is a national competition match between old rivals. The home team is positioned first in the league, the away team are eighth. The last match between the two teams was a game in the previous season. This is the first time these teams have played one another in the current season and is also the last game of the current season. Gates open at 16.00hrs and kick off was at 18.00hrs, the match was played in the dark due to the early nights of the season. There were 32,000 fans in total expected to attend the event, 8,000 fans of those expected held season ticket. Tickets would be made available to the supporters on the day of the event. The game was aired live on television.

### *Home fans*

The home team attracts fans from all over the country. The home fans also have allegiances with fans from other surrounding countries, fans from surrounding countries were expected to be present for the match. On this understanding the surrounding countries provided spotters to identify risk fans from their country who attended the event. At the time of the match there 40 home fans who were

subject to banning orders. It was estimated approximately 150 risk fans would attend this fixture, classified as 100 categories 'C' and 50 'B/C'.

### *Away fans*

2, 700 away fans in total were expected to attend the match. The away team hails from a suburb of home town. These fans were expected to arrive by train from the city centre to the stadium. As the away team also attracts fans from all over the country there was an expectation for fans to travel from further afar to attend the match.

### *Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

The away fans section of the stadium was to be demolished and modernised. The seating in the away fan section had already been removed therefore the fans in the away fan sections would be forced to stand. Furthermore, as a consequence of the renovations there were building equipment and materials in surrounding areas of the stadium.

There is a history of conflict between the two fans groups. The teams both hail from the same city making the match a local derby (named "the battle" by police). The last time the teams met the police made preventative arrests in order to minimise the level of disorder which eventually prevailed. This is the first game played in the aftermath of the first home team risk fans ever to be charged and prosecuted for planning public disorder. In the past the fans have only been fined for involvement in planned disorder. This was expected to affect fan behaviour and causing them to feel confused or unsure over what to expect as a consequence of this.

There was another event in the city centre taking place simultaneously with the football match. This was the official lighting of the Christmas tree in the city centre. This was thought to have little effect on the policing of the football event.

### *Police organisation/ operation*

In the operational order strategical objectives of the operation were as follows:

- Football matches have to be a festive occasion
- The policing operation starts as an awaiting operation
- The police show a high degree of tolerance and flexibility
- If the circumstances in connection with the match develop into public disorder the police operation will shift to a targeted operation towards the perpetrators

- An investigation towards the elements who usually commit public disorder in connection with football matches is in place.
- If riots or public disorder occurs the police will intervene accordingly.
- Perpetrators who participate in a/m activities, especially perpetrators of organised violent actions, shall be prosecuted and made responsible for their actions

The policing operation was run from the city command room. There was also a second command room in the stadium responsible for the policing within the stadium if necessary. The commander of the police operation was located at the centre command room. The policing operation began at 14.00hrs.

Operationally there were 3 platoons consisting of 35 officers in each. One platoon was tasked to be in the streets wearing standard uniform the second was tasked to be wearing riot control uniform but kept out of sight until a situation required their presence. The final platoon was mobile, having the ability to be flexible, a key component of the policing operation. There were 10 spotters present from away police force, 7 from the home police force and 2 from a country near to the home country.

Briefings for all levels of command took place 2 days prior to the event. This was to ensure all the officers involved in the operation would be able to attend the briefing. In the past the operation has run in such a way that the briefing was held on the day of the event and officers were called out early due to unforeseen circumstances and were therefore unable to attend the briefing. A commanders briefing was not held on the day of the event to update with recent information.

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

The police spotter operation started at 9.00hrs. Both home and away fans began gathering at different bars from 11.00hrs. The uniform policing operation started at 15.00hrs. At approximately 16.30hrs the away fans made their way from a bar in the city centre to the nearby train station. At the bar and on the walk to the stadium the away fans ignited pyrotechnics several times. A police contingency accompanied the fans on the train. Following arrival at the station near to the stadium there was a minor altercation between fans and police. Away fans then walked with a police bubble escort to the stadium. When the fans arrived at the stadium there was confusion over which entrance the fans should use to enter the

stadium. An altercation between away fans and stewards was observed outside the stadium. Home fans travelled to the stadium around the same time (16.30hrs).

#### *During the match*

The match kicked off at 18.00hrs. Within the stadium, both before the match began and during the match pyrotechnics were ignited in the away area. Both before and during the match pyrotechnics were also thrown onto the pitch. Away fans were segregated from the home fans by allocating a full stand to the away fans. There were no flares or pyrotechnics lit in the home section. The risk fans in both home and away sections coordinated their singing and chanting by the use of loud hailers.

#### *After the match*

Both fan groups were permitted to leave the stadium at the same time and there was no segregation of the two fan groups following the event. Several arrests were made, the team made observations of two of these arrests. For the duration of approximately 2 hours after the match ended there were minor altercations between small groups of fans in the area between the stadium and the train stations.

#### *Decisions*

The first decision observed to be made in relation to the operation was that of the officers being placed on the train to accompany the away fans from the centre to the stadium. A decision was taken to contain the away fans and escort the group from the station to the stadium. During this time a decision was taken to change the route that the fans walked in order to get the stadium. Another decision was taken around this time to move officers from the city centre to the stadium area to aid with the policing of the away fans.

Within the stadium spotters from the home police force identified fans subject to banning orders and a decision was taken to allow these fans to remain within the stadium.

When the away fans lit flares and pyrotechnics within the stadium a decision was made not to take any action upon these fans.

Throughout the duration of the match there was speculation over whether to hold the away fans in the stadium following full time or not, the decision was taken to allow the fans to leave without a hold back.

The commander of the mobile unit made a decision to put all the away fans on a train and prevent the train from making any stops in between the stadium and the town. The railway authorities were unsupportive of this decision and the

train made the scheduled stops.

A few hours after the end of the match, the police made the decision to force the last remaining away fans onto the train in order to finish the policing operation.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Interaction stewards and police*

On the immediate entrance of the away fans at the stadium there was initial confusion as to where the fans should go and what entrance they should use. On arrival of the away risk fans there was no communication between the intervention police who had escorted the fans to the stadium and the stewards. As a result the police then led the away fans to an entrance at the home fans section. There were small 4A paper size signs around the stadium indicating the routes through which the fans should enter the stadium, however the situation still developed in which the fans were led into the wrong section. The away risk fans then became agitated with the home clubs stewards and attempted to force entry through flimsy barriers to the section these fans were permitted to enter. It took a few moments for the stewards to regain control over the situation. Eventually the away fans were led or found their way to the correct entrance. Through the duration of this volatile situation there was no support observed to be provided to the stewards by the surrounding police.

In the away section on entrance there was confusion between the police and the stewards as to what was acceptable behaviour for the fans. For example in attempting to take a shortcut to their permitted entrance some away fans requested to be allowed to pass through a fence, which was denied by the police. Moments later different away fans made the same request to stewards and were allowed to pass through the fence.

Interviews prior to the event with police revealed stewards were trained in effective body searching by the police. Observations of the searches at the event revealed the body searches were substandard, which can be evidenced by the later amount of flares lit within the away fan section of the stadium. There were no police representatives observed overseeing the body searches as they took place. Furthermore observations were made of male stewards performing body searches of female supporters and vice versa.

Interviews with varying levels of police command expressed belief of a good and effective relationship between the police and stewards. Representatives of the club also commented on the close relations and cooperation between the two agencies. It was reported both parties share information in relation to the fans, although this was not observed by the team at this event. The review team were informed a number of risk fans had entered the stadium early. Within this group were a number of individuals subject to stadium banning orders who had forced entry into the stadium by arriving en masse and threatening the stewards. The spotters of the home police force informed the review team the reason the risk fans had the ability to force entry was due to the fact there was no police presence to support the stewards at this point of entry to the stadium. The team made observations within the control room at the time this incident took place and this issue was not brought to the attention of the control room.

There were no incidents observed by the review team at the home fans entrances. There was seen to be communication between the stewards and the spotters at the home fans risk area. The two were observed throughout the event to be working well together, communicating and discussing. There was also seen to be communication between the stewards and the police in the home risk fans.

On the side where away fans entered, stewards were not observed at any point to approach the uniformed police, nor were observations made of the uniformed police approaching the stewards.

In relation to the visiting stewards who accompanied the away fans there were no interactions observed between these individuals and the home stewards. The role and responsibilities of the stewards from away team seemed unclear and unstructured to the team. They were not seen to be proactive or intervene in any meaningful way. Outside the stadium prior to the match stewards stood and spoke to one another for lengthy periods of time, paying very little attention to the job. A female steward was observed engaging in inappropriate romantic behaviours with a football supporter for over 10 minutes to which there was no response or interest from the 3 or 4 apparently senior stewarding members surrounding them. Within the stadium there was no response to the lighting of pyrotechnics in the away stand.

There was no active clearing of the fans from the entrances area to the stadium, where fans gathered to stand and watch the game. This could create problems for fans entering and exiting the stadium in an emergency situation. The distribution of the stewards was the same in number at the 'family' home area as they were at the away risk fan area.

#### *Interaction supporters and police*

When away fans began arriving into the city and drinking at the bar near the train station there was a no profile approach with the only police presence being the plain clothed spotters. There was no interaction between the spotters and the fans at this point. When it became evident that the risk fans of the two teams had gathered at two separate points spotters adopted a low profile approach, characterised by them engaging and talking with the fans. Police vans were also observed to arrive at this point. Still there was no visible uniformed police presence on the streets.

A spotter from away force was hit with a beer can which was thrown by an away fan. In relation to this incident another away police force spotter, when interviewed by the team, reported they preferred to be close to the fans and walking within the crowds, in between the fans which is thought to prevent missiles being thrown at them. Despite this preference the spotter commented the home police force firmly instruct them to work further away from the fans, therefore they are obliged to do so. Uniformed presence materialised when the fans began to walk from the pub to the train station. The officers who appeared at the scene were riot control officers, not standard uniform, yellow vested officers.

Fans then moved from the bar to the railway station in the city centre. When the fans initially arrived on the platform there was no police presence. After the train had arrived and the fans began boarding the train approximately 20 intervention officers arrived on the platform and supervised the fans boarding the train. The train was held in the station for 10-15 minutes. There was no communication with the fans to explain why or when the train would leave. One announcement was made to inform the passengers that the train would not stop a scheduled stop between there and the stadium. Police then accompanied the fans on the train to the station near to the stadium. The team did not observe any interactions between the police and the fans on the train. On arrival to the station, police formed a line to prevent the fans from leaving the platform. This was followed by altercations between the fans and police which resulted in fans



pushing and several officers drawing and using their batons. Fans then began to jump the fence onto the railway tracks next to the containment area. The police lines were lifted and the fans began to move towards the stadium, escorted by riot control officers. The escort worked in a 'leap frog' manner which give the perception of many police officers when in reality it was the same officers being used. On several points along the route side roads were blocked by police vans. On arrival to the stadium there was little verbal communication observed between the police and away fans. If fans attempted to come out of the police cordon then communication materialised in a robust manor and the officers were observed pushing fans back into the cordon. There was no communication to the fans or the stewards as to how or where the fans should enter the stadium, which led to the altercations discussed in the above section.

There was minimal visibility of police around the stadium at the home fan entrances. The officers which were positioned in these sections were not seen to be engaging or interacting with fans. One vested officer at this area commented it was not their job to talk with the fans.

A spotter from the home police force stated it was the role of the spotter to engage the fans and not the role of the uniform clothed officer. The rationale behind this was the uniformed officers don't know anything about supporters and don't know how to interact with them. The spotter suggested they should be trained to methods of interaction with the crowds.

Ten motorcycle police were observed before the match parked by the main triangle next to the stadium. These officers were standing together in a group. An away fan was observed to approach the officers and ask questions. When interviewed the officer stated the fan was not facilitated because they did not believe the role of giving information to the fans was part of their job or role. Members of the public were also observed to be walking around this area with children who showed keen interest in the motorbikes to which there was no interaction between the police and these children. 20 minutes prior to the beginning of the game officers were redeployed around the stadium and there were several observations of the officers working in groups of between 6 -10 people. There was one observation of police standing in a group of 10 with their backs to the fans. Although spotters were seen to be actively contacting fans, at no point was a yellow vested officer observed to talk or engage with the fans.

During the match the spotters of the police force were observed interacting in a positive rapport with the home risk fans. There appeared to be a mutual relationship between the two, with both parties happy to engage in conversation. There were no incidents during the event which would require police intervention within the home section.

Following the match there was no police visibility or presence at the home fans section. The spotters were observed to split into small groups, but at this point there was no interaction between the spotters and any fans, risk or non risk. A police van was observed driving directly through a crowd of fans who were leaving the stadium. Six yellow vested officers then left the van and walked straight to a nearby beer tent where the officers took up a stationary position. There was seen to be no interaction between these officers and the surrounding fans.

Similarly there was no community role police officers at the away fans exit. Following the match the police deployment was in the form of riot control officers positioned in large number in a stationary manner to meet the away fans with police vans parked in the surrounding areas. The two fan groups were openly mixing on both sides of the road leading from the stadium to the train station. At this point one observation was made of fans throwing glass bottles and missiles towards fans at the other side of the road; police response to this was calm and rapid. The officers instantly came from their police van and intervened in such a way as to instantly diffuse the situation. The riot officers intervened professionally and effectively.

When the away risk fans arrived from the stadium at the train station in the city centre after the match the spotters for the away team were ready and waiting for these fans. They engaged with the fans and encouraged them to go home as the game had ended. The fans complied and the situation appeared to be well managed by the spotters of the away team.

A section of intervention police were observed walking into a bar containing away fans. These officers stood and waited outside bar, observing the spotters who were at the time interacting with the fans inside the bar. When the spotters left the area the officers then walked straight through the bar and out without any contact or interaction with the fans.

An away fan was approached and interviewed commenting the standard of policing is "*far better now*" than what it was 2 years prior. The fan commented two years go police were too highly equipped and in very larger numbers but now the fan had made the observation the current state of policing of football events is lower profile. The fan also noted, unprompted, that the officers used to always wear riot helmets and now they wore caps. The fan also mentioned the officers were "*more professional*" as everyone can see them and identify the officers.

### *Interaction clubs and police*

The strategy stressed prior to the match did not need police officers within the stadium, this was achieved. The only visible police presence was four officers in the home fans risk area and a further four officers in the away fan risk area. These officers were not obviously visible, the team were aware of their presence because they were informed by the club that the officers were positioned there.

When police officers were asked what they would do during the match they revealed they had no specific instructions for during the event. As mentioned above the stewards within the stadium functioned independently of the police. There appeared to be little coordination between the stewards and police.

The safety manager for the stadium commented the relations between the club and police were good and that cooperation was good. When the club needs information or information is relevant to the club the police contact the club to pass the information on. The club safety manager spent the duration of the match watching the CCTV screens. The command room functioned in three adjoining room's working together as one overall command area. There were many observations of individuals coming in and out of the various rooms to discuss things with one another. When the flares were lit in the away fans section the club requested for police to go and look, not to take action but to observe.

The fixture was portrayed as a high risk match not only as a consequence of the high risk fans expect to attend but as a result of the number of expected fans who would be willing to engage in disorder if others around them did so. Despite this the club left building equipment around the stadium after being asked by the police to remove these materials. It was seen that these materials could be utilised as weapons if fans chose to do so. The club also instated a flimsy fence as segregation means between the home and away fans entrances. As these fences

were so weak the fans would have been able to pick these and throw them around (as the fans did before the game).

The club released a message on the LED screens within the stadium stating that flares would not be accepted within the stadium and fines would be issued if fans used flares. Despite this many flares lit and the club took no action against these people.

All the entrances were big wide entrances with no way of preventing the fans from entering this area until they reach the waist height turnstiles. There is little to prevent them surging forward. The only means preventing the fans surging forward was the implementation of a thin, flimsy metal pole.

*Did the commanding officers on the tactical level in the police operation comply with the strategy outlined in the operational plan?*

When interviewed command level officers argued the tactical plan on the day did comply with the strategy outlined in the operational plan. The officers did adhere to the strategical ethos of a 'festive occasion' game at the same time as understanding the match as a high risk. There proved to be varying interpretations of how the strategical plan should be effectively tactically implemented. The review team did identify there was no common understanding of what a 'successful' outcome with regards to the policing operation was perceived to be. One officer commented a successful outcome would be a peaceful event, whilst managing to keep the two fan groups segregated. Another officer commented to the same question the policing would be a success if there were no arrests. The overall commander commented success would be to make several arrests, of the correct, offending individuals in order to set an example for others who might consider causing unrest.

On the street the team saw limited implementation of the 'awaiting operation' strategy principle outlined prior to the event. At the bar occupied by away fans before the match there were no uniform vest officers present. When the fans mobilised and began moving towards the nearby train station there was an immediate deployment of intervention officers to accompany the fans, although there had not been any deployment of officers in yellow vests.

The mobile units were strategically stressed to be used for rapid response. This part of the outlined strategy was achieved; when the unit was needed it was in

place and taking action promptly. When the support of the unit was demanded there was no graded withdrawal of these troops when the risk dissipated. In relation to disorder the mobile unit achieved the outlined strategy; at an operational level this unit was flexible and responsive. The mobile unit was observed to act accordingly, be swift in actions and targeted towards those perpetrating acts of disorder. In this sense the commander of the mobile unit had total control and successfully complied with the strategical objective outlines prior to the event.

The tolerance aspect of the strategic plan was specifically demonstrated in relation to the use of pyrotechnics in the city centre and within the stadium. Officers and spotters when interviewed had different interpretations of how a 'strategy of tolerance' should be interpreted. spotters of the away fans when interviewed were not aware of what the limits of 'flexibility and tolerance' should be. Spotters also generally complied and achieved the strategic objectives of the operation, particularly in the sense of investigating the elements which usually commit public disorder.

There were limited observations relating to tactics of arrests and evidence gathering. In relation to the people lighting flares the perpetrators no recordings were being made by the video teams in the areas in which evidence could have been captured of individuals lighting the flares.

In relation to the strategical changes which the police force have made to the way in which operations run all the commanders and officers when interviewed were aware of a strategical change between the time of the review and the previous year.

#### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

The review team were informed recently the covert sources within the home risk fans have been revealed making gathering inside information currently difficult for the police force.

The uniforms worn by the standard uniform and the intervention officers are very similar. Yellow vest were worn only in the immediate vicinity of the stadium. In the city there were no observations of the officers wearing yellow vests.

There is a possibility this may be due to the officer's interpretation of the operational strategy causing them to believe the vests were only necessary around the stadium area.

The blue lights were always switched on when the police vans were travelling. This could be perceived to draw attention to the police and create an atmosphere such that supporters think there is an emergency or something serious happening.

### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

The team were informed the match was high risk for the reason that every time these two teams meet (because the two are old rivals) there is fighting and disorder. There did not seem to be an analysis of the specific risks outside of this reasoning. There were other events taking place in the city centre (the official lighting of the Christmas tree in the main square, the fire brigade parade,). None of these factors were considered by any of the commanders interviewed by the team. Management of 'risk' and dynamic risk assessment for this event seemed to be limited to the management of the risk fan groups.

When a large group of at least 250 away fans walked from the pub to the train station, no special train was arranged to carry these fans to the stadium. Police seemed to be taken by surprise. Fans boarded a standard train carrying the general public (including women and children). Members of the review team travelled with the fans and the environment was for that of a football fan and not a mother and child. The conditions were very tight. Fans in the small space available in the carriage were jumping and shouting, smoking and ripping posters off the walls.

Dynamic risk assessment was evidenced in the operation when the away fans arrived at the train station. The commander of the mobile unit decided to change the route these fans would walk to get to the stadium on the basis of intelligence that home fans were gathering on the originally planned route in order to confront the away fans. The route change effectively served to segregate the two fan groups and avoid a confrontation.

After the match there was no segregation between the two fan groups. The commander of the mobile unit made a request to those responsible at the train station to hold a train near to the stadium in order to fill the train with all the

away fans. The commander also requested when the train did leave the travel agency should prevent a stop in the city centre , travelling directly to the suburb area from which the away fans hailed. This request was refused by those responsible at the train station. Pre match and more importantly post match fans were brought to / from the stadium without controls to manage their departures.

There was also evidence of risk assessment in relation to officer's uniform. Dynamic risk assessment was demonstrated by the leader of a section in relation to changing from caps to helmets in the face of a developing risk situation before the match. There was also a change between standard uniform and riot control uniform following the match.

There was a decision to close the roads around the stadium after the match had ended. There was a car park which opened onto the closed roads permitting cars to drive straight through the waves of fans who had exited the stadium and were walking on foot spilling off the pavements and onto the road. There were also police vans with blue lights and sirens driving through the crowds of fans.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

#### *Interaction stewards and police*

Whereas stewards and the spotters at the home risk area seemed to work well there was little communication between stewards and uniformed police. Before the match, there was not enough support from the police to stewards at key areas around the stadium. Police did not oversee the body searches performed by stewards. Without the presence of stewards to guide them, police was not aware of which entrance the away fans were to use when they arrived at the stadium, resulting in confusion and aggression from fans.

In summary, it was not clear to the team (a conclusion that relates more generally to the relationship between club and the police) how communication and coordination between the stewards and police was organised to effectively achieve a mutual working relationship resulting in a safe entry and exit of both fan groups. There was an absence of interaction between police and stewards from the away teams club, whose professional attitude was inadequate. The body searches of away fans lacked proficiency at the game in question, as evidenced by the number of illegal pyrotechnics which were allowed to enter the stadium.

### *Interaction supporters and police*

Apart from the work of the spotters, there was limited interaction between police and fans. Uniformed police were only observed to interact with the fans in the course of operational interventions. Officers did not appear to be motivated to engage and interact with fans or aware of the fact that dialogue and speaking to the fans can be very productive, providing information on fans intentions. Limited use was made of officers wearing yellow vests who could potentially fulfil such a function and a community-policing type of approach with regard to the thousands of non-risk fans was not in place. The concentration seemed to be on risk fans only and how these fans would access the stadium. There seemed to be much less consideration for safety issues and on minimising the impact on the wider community of the city.

The strategy which developed on the day was for managing the minority of risk fans; not managing the majority of law abiding football supporters. Although the mobile unit is a useful tactic for managing emerging disorder, the mobile strategy prevents these units from the ability to engage with the fans. After the event, the team was informed that the fact that a spotter for the away fans had been hurt by a beer can thrown by an away fan led to a change in the police strategy. Following this incident officers were primarily seen in riot control uniforms (or uniforms similar to riot control) and the initial strategic principles of 'festive occasion' and 'awaiting operation' appeared to be generally abandoned. In this way, this incident had a large impact on the way police interacted with fans for the remainder of the operation.

A safety issue was identified after the match as the fans were leaving the stadium. Police vans and public vehicles were permitted to drive through the sea of fans as they were leaving the stadium. This vehicle - pedestrian conflict could have compromised the safety of fans leaving the stadium. This safety issue may have gone unidentified because the focus of the policing operation on the risk fans.

When intervening, the team observed officers to interact in a professional manner with fans.

### *Interaction club and police*

The team noted a clear willingness to work in partnership with both club and police reporting there was a good and mutual relation. The police take responsibility for the safety of the fans outside and club take responsibility for the



safety of the fans inside the stadium. The exact nature of the working relation is unknown to the team as the briefings were held before the team's arrival (the team does not know how regularly meetings in advance of football fixtures take place between a police and club representative to discuss the events and if club representatives are present for police briefings and vice versa). However, the team feels the police and club relationship and protocols may be a point of attention, because in practice, decisions were observed to be made by both the police and club without consulting or informing the other. An important example was the situation with regard to the stadium and ongoing building activities. Prior to the match, police did not seem to be aware of all the relevant details and on the day of the match itself, a clear line of communication between the club and the police both inside and outside the stadium seemed to be lacking. The resulting confusion with regard to the entry of away fans has already been mentioned.

The team identified a number of safety issues related to the stadium, which is substandard in several ways. These relate to the external structure of the turnstiles, which are not up to modern day safety standard and the building materials and fences outside the stadium. The safety of the fans was also put into question by the flares and the nylon flags and paper which surrounded the flares. The review team expressed serious concern as these flares were lit for the potential of a life threatening fire as a consequence of the banners and posters catching fire. In all, the safety of fans, which was the responsibility of the club within the stadium, did not appear to be taken as seriously as it should, which is all the more surprising given that this is also the national stadium. The team are not aware that these issues have been identified by the police or that they have addressed these issues to the club. Safety issues inside and around the stadium can be considered a point of attention.

*Did the commanding officers on the tactical level in the police operation comply with the strategy outlined in the operational plan?*

There appeared to be a vast variance in the understanding of the strategy for this event between officers at different levels of command. The generic strategy seemed to be understood by all officers the team talked with, but the understanding of the rationale behind the strategy and the implementation of tactics to achieve the strategies varied throughout the command structure. For example the team feels the boundaries of the strategic approach of 'demonstrating tolerance and flexibility' (strategy point 3) were probably not defined clearly enough in the

minds of the officers.

The change of strategy following the incident early on in the operation where a spotter was hit with a beer can did not facilitate strategic objectives 3 and 4 (the policing operation starts as an awaiting operation; the police show a high degree of tolerance and flexibility). A shift in strategic principles from such an early point on is an expression of flexibility on the one hand. On the other, it puts the commitment to outlined strategic principles into question and potentially creates confusion.

The team understands the tactic used to escort the away risk fans to the stadium was utilised for the first time by the force at this event. It demonstrated a high degree of tolerance and flexibility in practice in the management of the risk fans and was very effective use of manpower.

There were four strategic points related to the gathering of evidence and effectively dealing with perpetrators of disorder or illegal acts (Points 4 to 7). With regard to these four strategic principles the team feels that opportunities have been missed to gather evidence of fans lighting flares within the stadium and fulfil these objectives.

Relating the strategic principles to operational planning, the team noticed several situations that seemed to be unplanned for and as a consequence were characterised by some confusion. One example is the transport of away fans from the city centre to the stadium. There were discussions on the train platform when the away fans wanted to board the train. As a result the everyday community of the city were implicated in uncomfortable situations. Another example was the building activities around the stadium and the consequences these had for the movement of fans and the police operation.

#### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

The team was impressed by the tactical response of the intervention units to actual and potential incidents. They were in the right places at the right moments, acting effectively in a professional manner.

The spotters functioned well in locating risk fans and interacting with them. Having said that, overall intelligence gathering was not stressed as part of the outlined strategy and there was little focus on intelligence for the operation. The team was made aware of the difficulty to gather inside information among

risk fans, using covert sources. However, the resulting lack of intelligence seemed to be accepted rather than that alternative means of intelligence gathering being contemplated (e.g. from bars, restaurants, bus drivers, communication and relationship building with the public).

The team noted police vans invariably travelled with the blue lights and sirens on, thus drawing attention to them and potentially creating an impression in the mind of the surrounding public that something dangerous or serious was happening.

The review team is aware there is a national review team within the host country currently looking at a national strategy for policing football. One recommendation could be that commanders and some of their team take on the quality assurance role at matches at a different stadium. This will ensure that the strategy and tactics for that fixture are achieved but are also in line with national policies.

#### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

Effective dynamic risk assessment was evidenced in the police operation as evidenced by the response to developing situations. Acknowledging this, as mentioned before, the management of 'risk' seemed to be mainly focused to the concept and management of the risk fan groups. It did not seem consideration was given to integrate a community deployment concept into the overall strategy in order to manage and facilitate the many thousands who attend football events as non risk fans.

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below.

- Rapid interventions by uniformed intervention officers; and with the right attitudes
- The use of spotters – they were in the right place at the right time
- Absence of uniformed police officers inside the stadium; this is not typical in Europe
- The willingness and want to improve the policing of public order to the best possible means of managing the crowds



### **3.4 A Champions League match with limited international cooperation**

The Champions League match was considered to be of increased risk. The ability of the Police to prepare efficiently was limited due to the lack of information supplied by the Away NFIP.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked by the host to focus on the following evaluation points:

- Cooperation between command police and club
- Interaction between police and stewards
- Briefing
- Separation and management of risk fans
- Deployment of mobile units

In addition and linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Cooperation between police forces
- Tactical performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

Following observations, the team also commented on the following points

- Command and control
- Debriefing
- Cooperation within home-city police
- Other relevant matters

#### **Data gathered**

##### *Briefings attended*

- Pre-match briefing
- UEFA meeting
- Club Safety Briefing
- Gold and Silver briefing
- Half-time briefing

### *Interviews conducted*

- Match commander (Silver)
- Intelligence officer
- Operations officer Home
- Stadium security officer
- Bronze Commander South + West
- Bus-liaison officer
- Steward Trouble-shooter
- Away match commander
- Away spotters

### *Observations made*

- Visit to the stadium and surroundings and points of interest. The tour of the stadium highlighted access and egress routes for away supporters and identified the location of the away support within the south stand
- Away training session
- Visit to command-room stadium security
- Security operations upon the arrival of the teams
- Observing the surroundings of the stadium before and after the match
- Observing stadium entrance: visitors and home
- Observing command-room stadium security
- Observing patrol with Bronze Mobile and his Public Order Tactical Advisor, patrolling the vicinity of the stadium before and after the match

In compiling this report, the following match-specific documentation was used:

- Home safety officer information sheet
- Operational order
- Football intelligence assessment
- Silver briefing
- Resources requirement (including the most recent update)
- Operation deployments

In addition, the following documentation was consulted:

- Memo on away Vs home match
- Police 2005 - 2006 season handbook
- Plans of stadium

## **Context in which the match takes place**

### *The match*

The reviewed match was the second leg of the first knockout round in the Champions League. The first leg was played in away city two weeks earlier and ended in 0-1 to the current home team. This is the first time the teams have met in a competitive fixture (a friendly match was played seven years earlier without away support). The match be sold out (expected attendance 35,000) with no tickets on sale of the day of the match. There were 1,700 tickets allocated to away fans.

During the first leg, some irregularities took place in and around the stadium in away city. According to a home city police report, home fans were searched by stewards in an aggressive manner. When challenged by the home fans about their behaviour, the stewards became more aggressive, grabbing fans and pushing them against the wall. At least one fan was punched and kicked. It was learnt during the match that approximately 1000 home fans had got into the away area, although local police had stated this was impossible. The report also mentions an incident (described as one of serious disorder) at a bar near the away stadium. Home and away fans got into a fight, upon which the local police arrived at the scene with shields and helmets. Home country police officers believed they saw local police fire baton rounds or tear gas. Apparently, local police denied this happened.

### *Home fans*

The Intelligence Assessment gives general information about home supporters. The club has a sizeable known group of risk supporters that can number between 150 to 200 persons. In the recent past, home supporters have behaved rather well.

### *Away fans*

A group of away fans is known as the Ultras. The intelligence assessment classifies them as typically right winged and notes that it is believed this group will not look for confrontation but will respond in a violent way if confronted.

### *Specific elements of this match*

The match was classified as an increased (medium) risk match. The intelligence assessment distinguished between the risk of spontaneous and planned disorder, both of which were classified as medium.

The day before the match it became known that a demonstration; directed against the management of the club, may take place near the Home stadium during the match. This demonstration would be organized by a muslim organization in response to the fact that Home-club has made plans to promote tourism to Israel.

### *Police organisation*

Police organisation followed the Gold, silver, bronze command structure, with deployment of stadium and mobile units, home-division spotters, a mounted unit, a traffic & transport unit and a CCTV unit. Resources from other divisions provide aid. All officers were instructed to wear normal uniform with yellow jackets.

### **Overview of events and main decisions**

#### *Before the match*

A number of briefings were held before the match.

The spotter teams spent the afternoon driving through heavy traffic in the centre of home city looking for away fans without finding any.

With regard to traffic control, all coaches with away fans were to park near the new stadium which was coordinated by the bus-liaison officer. The player coaches were both escorted by police motors while arriving at the stadium. Fences were put up in the street to keep the fans at a safe distance. The away coach could not reach the stadium in the planned way, because one of the streets was blocked by parked cars, although traffic measures were discussed in the briefing and the street should have been free.

When entering the stadium, away fans were guided towards a separate entrance, divided from the other fans with fences and a few police officers. The search was quick and professional, although it was noted that not all away fans were searched. A few slipped through the line of stewards. At the executive entrance, which was accessible for season ticket holders only, there was no search at all. Stewards at the entrance were pretty sure that these fans would not pass a search inside the stadium. In general, home fans arrived at the stadium very late.

#### *During the match*

During the match, almost all police officers gathered on the outside of the control room on a small platform near the pitch. From there, some were dispatched by



Bronze South Commander to manage a few small incidents.

One of the incidents concerned the away stand. Away fans blocked the exit stairs by sitting on them. Due to safety regulations, the stairs need to be free at all times, therefore one of the stewards tried to clear the stairs. This act was unappreciated by the away fans. Bronze South Commander first sent two officers to back up the steward, and kept sending officers until he was satisfied everything was under control. After the stairs were cleared, stewards stayed near the stairs.

One home fan was removed from the stadium after making 'cutthroat' gestures towards away fans. The removal showed good cooperation between stewards and police. Away fans that made the same gestures were not removed. It's unclear whether their actions weren't noticed or whether police chose not to react.

#### *After the match*

The most distinctive event after the match happened during the Ultra fans exiting of the stadium. This is discussed in 'decisive moments'. The away player coach caused some problems because the driver did not park at the agreed point, where officers were waiting to accompany the players to the coach in the absence of surrounding fans. It took Silver Commander a long time to solve this problem. In the end, the coach parked near the head entrance of the stadium, with many fans still around, and was still waiting for the players when all commanders left to the police station.

#### *Decisions*

The event passed without incidents of note. Of course, in the course of the operation, several issues arose that required decisions to be taken. The following decisions seemed to be especially relevant to the peer review Team.

#### *Possible Demonstration*

The day before the match, it became known that a possible demonstration was to take place near the home stadium during the match. This demonstration would be organized by a Muslim Organization and was aimed against the club. The reason for the demonstration was because the home club had made plans to promote tourism to Israel. When Silver Commander heard about the possible demonstration, he first gathered all information through the intelligence officer. He also spoke to his local contact, who promised that there would not be a demonstration. However, this contact also indicated it might be possible for a small group of people to spontaneously demonstrate.

Silver then decided that under no circumstances a demonstration was to take place in the four streets directly surrounding the stadium. If signs of a demonstration inside this area were known, the demonstrators would be given the choice to take their demonstration elsewhere (there was an area appointed for this purpose near the new stadium) or be they could be arrested. Linked to the possibility of a demonstration, the Silver Commander also prepared for a possible bomb threat by instructing stewards to search the stands several times. Additionally, the luggage of all people coming into the stadium, especially press representatives, would have to be searched completely and strictly. On match day, Silver Commander made sure to mention the subject in every briefing.

#### *Entry of away official*

During the match, a man appeared at one of the entrances claiming he was a member of the away delegation although he did not have a ticket. This problem in the end was solved by Silver Commander himself, because lower ranked officers were not able to create a solution. The man did turn out to be an away official and he was let into the stadium.

#### *Guidance of Ultra fans*

During the match, a group of away fans were identified as so called "*Ultras*", hardcore fans. After the match, this group of about thirty mostly young men started to walk towards the home subway station. They identified themselves by singing and showing flags. They were quickly followed by a few spotters, but it took some time before other police officers as well as mounted, caught up. By then, Bronze South Commander was also present.

About 150 m from the subway station, which was very crowded at that time, the group stood still. This created a bit of an awkward situation and it seemed that there was some uncertainty about what to do next. The intelligence officers asked one of the away spotters to find out from the fans what was going on. The fans answered that they wanted to wait until the subway station was less crowded. Next, when questioned, the fans indicated they were going towards the center of home city. After this, the intelligence officer discussed the situation with transport police. They decided to wait with the *Ultras* until the home fans would be gone and then accompany them onto the platform. During this time, there was no communication on the radio, leaving the officers at the scene in the dark. Team members overheard *Ultras* calling out "*Sieg Heil*" twice.

There was no action from police (it being unclear whether officers did not hear it, or chose not to intervene). A local resident complained to Bronze South, claiming that the Ultras behaviour was unacceptable.

After a few minutes, the Ultras started to walk towards the subway station. This seemed to surprise the police. Halfway their walk, Bronze South Commander yelled to the accompanying spotters: "*Hold the home fans and let them (the Ultras) through!*" The transport police officers at the station quickly understood this. The fences, which guided the home fans into the subway station, were immediately closed, leaving a wide passage for the Ultras.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Cooperation between command police – command club*

The cooperation between police and club at the command level seemed to function very well, as evidenced by:

- The presence and input of the stadium security officer and operations officer at police briefings (pre-match briefing and gold briefing)
- Deployment inside the stadium is determined by the stadium security officer after deliberation with Silver
- The fact that there seemed to be a clear understanding of one another's responsibilities. Arrangements were in place for the signing by both parties of a "*hand-over-responsibility*" document when the security officer should feel the necessity, (in serious cases) to ask the police to take over.
- The fact that Silver informed the general manager of home club (as well as security responsible from the UEFA and away) about the risks involved in the possible "*demonstration*" and "*bomb threat*" and the police measures in case one of these incidents would really occur.
- The close co-operation of the south commander with the stewards' supervisors. His top priority was to make them feel confident as far as their duties are concerned.
- The presence of the deputy club safety manager, at the pre-match operations meetings and also by her presence in the police control room during the match allowing for constant interface between the police commander and the club.

The Silver Commander's open style of management assisted the positive relationship between police and club. There appears to be a true partnership approach.

In general, the police and the club showed a shared interest in public order and safety. At a command level, the cooperation between police and club did not

seem to be negatively affected by the fact that the command rooms of police and stadium security were positioned in different parts of the stadium.

#### *Interaction between Police and Stewards*

From what the team was able to witness, stewards and police seemed to be cooperating very well. Very often no further commands needed to be given to police officers in order to assist stewards or make an intervention. Both the stewards on the separation between home supporters and away supporters worked very actively and so did the police officers.

This cooperation could be explained at least in part by the fact that in most of the cases at every match, the same police officers and stewards will be deployed at the same place with the same tasks. This allows them to get to know each other better and build confidence.

From the police side, 28 Constables and 5 Sergeants fall into this “fixed posts” category. In the Operational Deployments document there is guidance given to these officers as follows – *“Fixed post units have a primary role for crowd safety. It is essential that officers are fully familiar with the stand in which they are deployed; the location of all entrances and exits; the location of all medical and emergency equipment and evacuation procedures”*. In addition the following instructions are outlined: *“Fixed post officers must develop and maintain a positive working relationship with stewards and other club staff to ensure that the stadium is a safe place to visit and work. All officers must be aware of their role in an emergency situation; any officers who are not must bring this fact to the attention of a Supervisor or Bronze Commander immediately”*. The creation of these posts supported by a training programme is a positive aid to safety. The continued reinforcement of the guidance in the Operational Deployment is good practice to remind officers of their responsibilities.

Other factors contributing to the quality of the cooperation can be found in the training given to both stewards and police and the way in which stadium security manages all information related to stewards: with the aid of a computer program, personal data, training modules followed and steward specialties are recorded. The program indicates if a certain steward is present during the match or not and calculates payments etc. The interesting part about it is that the security and operations officer can always check how many stewards are present. They can wait to open certain parts of the stadium if there aren't enough

stewards. The program also has pre-defined scenarios for steward deployment in accordance with the type of match. Stewards can follow eight different training modules. According to their level of training they get different tasks inside the stadium and different payment. After their first module (basic training) they can be deployed in various parts of the stadium. Only after 1.5 to 2 years, and after having following additional training modules, will they get a fixed assignment. A lot of creativity is shown in composing the training methods (for instance: organising a treasure hunt inside the stadium in order to get to know the stadium). Some stewards follow special training to be able to deal with conflicts more accurately. These stewards then become part of the "trouble-shooters". Other stewards follow special training in how to search people.

All people the team interviewed from the steward/ stadium security side were very positive about their working relationship with police. They feel that they get enough information from police to perform their tasks adequately. They also feel that if any kind of problems occur, the police are always there to back them up. They know whom to contact in case of emergencies (control room home), but most of the time they communicate directly to the police officers (Bronzes). They indicate that this is the result of working with the same police officers most of the times; they know each other well. Steward/ steward supervisors routinely ask for (and get) police back-up prior to an intervention that is considered somewhat risky. The self-confidence of stewards is also aided by the fact that protective gear is available to them. Police officers the team interviewed were also positive about the cooperation with stewards. Some of the police officers made a distinction however, expressing total confidence in the command team for the stewards; with the confidence level lessening when referring to steward supervisors and base line stewards.

### *Briefing*

The briefing structure, starting with the pre-match day operational briefing were to the point and informative. The documentation provided to supplement the briefing at the operational meeting was comprehensive. This included the intelligence briefing document and the Silver briefing document. The Resource requirement form and operational deployments were also comprehensive. The Match day booklet, for use by all officers, contained data on gold strategy, the stadium, the resource deployment, active criminals, risk assessment, intelligence assessment and debrief forms. This is commended from the point of view of communication and information sharing. Also it encourages feedback of

whatever nature that may be which can then assist in evaluation.

The structure of the briefings was generally the same. The commander gave instructions and there was little response from the sergeants. It was very clear what was expected of everybody. The comment by Gold during the stadium briefing seemed unnecessary. Already, the sergeants were made aware of the media attention and their responsibilities. A more people-management like approach by Gold would have been to tell the sergeants that there was operational had faith in them and commanders were sure they would behave in a professional way (which they did).

At every briefing there was input from the intelligence officer, as a result of which available intelligence was at the disposal of everyone involved. A potential trap was a certain reliance on stereotypes, as in describing Ultra fans. If you tell everyone that the Ultra risk fans are right wing supporters and you make the assumption that all right wing supporters have short hair and wear bomber jackets, it shouldn't come as a surprise that no one notices the Ultra until they clearly show themselves during the match, because no one expected them to look the way they did.

The commitment from Gold was clear during the briefing, as was his insistence on a good performance by everyone. He even indicated that he would make an inspection round in the stadium to ask questions. The team were a bit surprised by his comment that "If anything goes wrong it will be someone with three stripes".

At the Club safety briefing it was interesting to note how all persons involved were asked for their input (following a prescribed checklist). During the briefing a document was being drawn up with a lot of useful information, which was distributed immediately to all participants.

#### *Separation and management of risk fans*

Before the match, there were no identifiable groups of risk fans. In the vicinity of the stadium, no measures were taken to separate home and away fans. Interestingly, there was a policy whereby groups of away supporters could be directed to specific public houses (on the road adjacent to the coach parking area) in co-operation with the Licensees.

The bus-liaison officer indicated that buses are parked separately whenever this

is possible, but that there had never been any incidents related to the buses. When the team of away arrived in the stadium by bus, a lot of police officers cordoned off the area and horses around the bus and this way it was impossible for any fans to approach.

On entry to the stadium, home and away fans were close to one another, with entrances next to one another. On the sidewalk, low fences were used to form a queue of away fans, separate from home fans. Some police officers were there to keep an eye on the queue. This seemed to be a good way to take the pressure of the entrance of the stadium and the stewards who were searching the supporters.

Inside the stadium, visiting supporters were placed right next to a number of home risk fans (with a stewarded separation zone in between them). In this particular case this did not cause any problems. There were a total of 1695 away supporters at this fixture, around 50% of which were part of organised trips. It was assessed that around 50 Ultra fans attended the match. The post match report indicates that during the match “the away supporters were very boisterous in support of their team and shouted abuse towards the home supporters. The away Ultra group managed to move themselves to the front of the stand producing banners in support of their group and generally being very loud”. Overall the behaviour of the away support was not troublesome. The degree of interface between rival supporters was within acceptable limits. In fact there was little reaction from home supporters to the away taunts. The segregation line was adequate for purpose and appropriately dressed in normal uniform.

At the end of the match, a line of police officers posed themselves between the away supporters and the pitch. Bronze South decided to remove the officers after only a few minutes (when home fans had left the stadium) to avoid confrontational behavior from either the fans or the police officers. Shortly after, the away fans decided to leave the stadium.

After the match, visiting and away fans mingled as soon as they left the stadium. This apparently hadn't caused any trouble in the past and it did not lead to any incidents on this occasion. The events involving the Ultra fans after the match (see above under *decisions*) indicate that it is a point of attention.

### *Deployment of mobile units*

As part of the police operation, mobile serials were deployed under a bronze commander (Bronze mobile) to patrol and monitor routes to and entrances into the stadium, tube and railway stations, public houses frequented by fans and other locations where their presence may be required. There were 11 mobile units containing a total of 91 officers under the supervision of Bronze mobile. Overall, due to the traffic congestion around the ground they did little other than drive slowly around. No foot patrols were undertaken. The Bronze mobile commander, rather than being at a fixed location, was also driving around in a vehicle. He was accompanied by a public order tactical advisor (a police officer trained to deal with public order issues, who are available to provide suggestions and reminders).

The opportunity to view the effectiveness of the mobile strategy was limited due to the lack of activity and incidents at this match. Some observations that could be made included the following:

- There was little direction of the officers on mobile units by mobile Bronze;
- Most communication was by way of mobile telephone rather than radio, with obvious disadvantages;
- Mobile Bronze entered the police control room at kick off in the stadium and remained there until about 5 minutes from full time rather than supervising his units outside the stadium.

From the interviews conducted it materialised that there was a strong degree of personal confidence in Bronze mobile from Silver. This was down to personal experience of working with each other. Silver command clearly valued the “eyes and ears” role of Bronze mobile on the ground attending incidents. Due to the level of confidence the Bronze commanders in general and Bronze mobile especially, are permitted to take most decisions on their own. Bronze mobile indicated he understood exactly what Silver expected of him. He saw his role as attending incidents directly and advising resources. While this level of confidence and the ability to make decisions at ground level is positive, the question is in how far this arrangement is dependent on the specific personalities involved.

### *Cooperation between police forces*

In this case it appeared that, although the police attempted to follow the recommendations of the EU handbook, the outcome was unsatisfactory. The ability of the police in home city to prepare efficiently was limited due to the lack of information supplied by away NFIP. Although as events transpired it would appear



that there may have been little information to exchange due to the absence of risk. In fact, the home city police got a large part of their information from other home country clubs and from their own experiences in matches with away country clubs.

Little information was available about the Ultra group of away club, or about numbers, travel routes and behaviour of away supporters in general. Information from the away country police apparently was hard to obtain. Some of the information that was available (e.g. about flights with which supporters were supposed to arrive) turned out to be inaccurate. Two away country police officers were deployed. None of them were spotter's, they had limited football experience (being from a Federal Unit) and could not identify risk fans. Only one spoke some English and the home city police had no interpreters available, as a result of which they always had to work together. The physical safety of the foreign police officers was ensured in that they were escorted at all times by local officers. The foreign police officers had sufficient accreditation to access all areas required. Although there was no formal accreditation they were accompanied by local officers who were authorised to gain entry to all parts of the stadium

It was helpful that the police officer acting as away match commander accompanied Silver and was with him in the control room. An officer speaking his language was available for interpretation.

The situation regarding away stewards were unclear. As a rule no visiting stewards are asked for, as it is felt that home stewards who look after the visiting supporters are always the same and are the best in assessing volatile situations. In briefings it was mentioned that 12 away stewards would be travelling with away fans. They were not to be deployed inside the ground, but they would assist the home stewards at the entry for away fans. However, the team did not observe any away stewards.

For the match of home in away city, there had also been discussion about the deployment of foreign stewards and it seems that the whole concept of the use of stewards from visiting clubs is one which requires to be addressed at a European level.

### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

The team observed several examples of the tactical principles being taken into account or applied:

- The overall approach to policing was one of “low profile”, with officers wearing normal uniform and yellow jackets and communicating with fans;
- The use of spotters to gather information and to allow for early and targeted interventions;
- In case of any large groups of supporters being found without tickets, they were to be guided towards some public houses, thus creating a win-win situation: the manager of the public house gets police supervision, police get a place to take the supporters to;
- The way in which the situation with the Ultra fans after the match was dealt with. Communication was established with these fans and their safe entry into the tube station was facilitated;
- When there was a problem with the team bus after the match police officers arrived on the spot very quickly. They created a corridor and the problem was over.

The fact that the Mobile serials moved about in vehicles rather than on foot offered limited opportunity for interaction with supporters. However, the limited level of intervention also contributed to an atmosphere amongst supporters of facilitation, rather than control. It is probable that supporters are aware of the mobile police presence and are aware that intervention will occur should it become necessary and consequently there are mutually understood and respected limits of toleration. Further evidence of this can be seen from the absence of control over the behaviour of supporters using licensed premises.

Supporters are allowed to purchase alcohol and encroach from pubs onto the street. Up to 50 persons were standing drinking outside many pubs, but there was no trouble. It may be said that supporters understand the limits of toleration in this regard and self police to a level below which police find it necessary to intervene at. Such norms would have to be established over a long period therefore it is perhaps difficult to access this behaviour on one visit. In any case, on this occasion it appeared successful. The limits to facilitation were not tested due to the overall absence of risk at this fixture.

### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

The team was able to observe several examples of dynamic risk assessment:

- A clear distinction was made between the potential for spontaneous and

planned disorder. In addition risks related to the possible demonstration and to terrorist threat were clearly distinguished, as were risks to public safety and criminality (e.g. black market tickets). One of the bronze commanders perceived a pitch invasion as the worst thing that could happen;

- Since recently weapons (knives etc.) had shown up among home risk fans, the match commander decided that every police officer should wear a stab-proof vest. However, it was mentioned clearly to everyone that other protective gear (such as helmets etc) was to be put on only upon specific command, when the situation required it;
- The possible consequences for the operation arising from the dispute between the Islamic organisation and the club were clearly assessed and appropriate measures were taken, e.g. regarding the possibility of a bomb threat, the stewards would search the stands several times and the luggage of the people coming into the stadium, especially of the media / press representatives, would be controlled / searched completely and strictly (however, contrary to this, the team noticed that the home supporters who gained access to the stadium at the West stand were hardly searched at all. When the team asked about this, the stewards told us that they knew these supporters and therefore felt no need to search them);
- A half time briefing was held to take account of changing circumstances. It led to a decision to make a change in deployment at one of the tube stations after the match;
- A message had been circulated to all police stations in home city to notify the intelligence officers in the division of any incidents in the home city police area involving away supporters in order that spotters could be deployed

Unfortunately, due to the absence of intelligence, the spotting operation had an overall lack of purpose or direction. The spotting operation was more reactive than proactive. Overall there was evidence of awareness of the concept of dynamic risk assessment. On the other hand, whilst the decision to classify the risk of spontaneous disorder as medium is self evident (especially after what happened during the first leg in away city), it was not clear on what grounds the decision to classify the risk of pre-planned disorder as medium was reached. This was particularly relevant given that there was no real intelligence indicating that there was any pre-planned disorder. This issue was explored during an interview with Silver, who indicated that there are inevitably gaps in available intelligence and that a match commander also has to rely on his own experience and knowledge to inform the categorisation of risk. While this is not just understandable but also

commendable, one should of course always be aware of the risk of self-fulfilling prophesies and acting on stereotypes. It is also relevant in what way officers are informed about risks: just telling them that there is "medium risk" for planned disorder without telling them there is actually no intelligence regarding planned disorder may well create the wrong impression. On this occasion, the police operation was low-profile and well-adjusted to the circumstances, the actual deployment and decisions being made did not contribute in any way to the potential for incidents.

### *Command and control*

During the operational meeting the roles of Gold and Silver command were outlined. Both were of Superintendent rank and Silver was the match commander. Gold was defined as having a strategic role in a critical situation, so that in case of serious incidents Silver could fully concentrate on the incident and Gold would take care of other tasks (for example the media.). Essentially Gold and Silver seemed to achieve parallel roles and not hierarchical. The extent of Gold's role was a bit unclear to the team, particularly given that event in a crisis situation, Silver retained full resource responsibility including the reserve from a central level.

There seemed to be a very informal communication structure underneath all formalities, with much communication by mobile phone. Radio communication from the control room in cases of little incidents out of the stadium was headed directly to the units out of the stadium. Because of that bronze commanders outside the stadium were in fact cut off from information, didn't know what their units did and were not commanders in their area any more. Mounted officers indicated that in a case of emergency they would communicate directly with Silver, rather than with Bronze mounted. Spotters from the central level indicated that the cooperation with the division was good; most of the time they communicated directly with Silver. Again, this way of communicating could well depend on who the Silver commander is (they work well with the current Silver he is well accepted and easy to talk to).

In general the types and numbers of people present in the police control room seemed to be fitting, except for the number of persons from the ambulance service (five).

### *Debriefing*

After the match there was no debriefing. The sergeants of the units made their comments to the tactical advisor, handed in the debriefing booklets and went home. It was only planned to have a debriefing with the bronze commander south to talk about some issues. Silver indicated that the written remarks would all be registered and monitored at the football unit and he mentioned some concrete examples where these remarks were acted upon. A consequence of this could be that good practice is not shared as widely as it could be. As an example, Bronze south's strategy of removing the police officers near the away fans very soon after the match ended, worked very well. He indicated he had very good experiences with this during earlier matches. However, this was not known to other commanders. Another Bronze South would probably take a different approach. So, this practice isn't shared. It might perhaps be an option to specifically ask for good practices in the debriefing forms.

### *Cooperation within the home-city police*

For matches like this, the division that contains the stadium cooperates with other divisions within the home-city police, the central level and the transport police, because fans will visit other areas of home city (notably the central part), the away team may stay in a hotel in another division (as was the case for this match) and officers from other divisions will be deployed.

During briefings there was no presence of transport police officers or officers from other divisions. It appears that the main form of communication is through electronic messages. A transport police officer was present in the control room during the match.

Spotters from the central level were deployed in the center of home city before the match. To our knowledge, there was no communication between division spotters and the central level to divide surveillance-areas or make other arrangements.

Home city police officers outside the division responsible for the policing of the match did not seem to have an awareness that led them to look out for or pass on information relevant to the match. When, the night before the match and on the day of the match, fans had gathered outside the away team hotel, the division responsible for the policing of the match was not consulted or even informed directly about measures taken.

### *Other issues*

The fact that there is an alcohol ban during Champions League matches causes many supporters to remain outside the stadium until the very last moment. Outside they can drink beer in the pubs, inside the stadium they can't. However, they all have to gain access to the stadium and that may take some time. Often the last supporters only get inside half an hour after kick-off with just some 8,000 supporters inside the stadium half an hour before kick-off. As home supporters are only interested in football related activities and such activities are prohibited by the Champions League organisation, it is difficult to attract visitors to the stadium at an earlier time

It appeared that problems could arise as a result of double tickets. Most of the tickets for these matches are being ordered by telephone or computer. Afterwards they are sent by mail. Sometimes people call to say they haven't received their tickets. In that case double tickets are held for them at the club and they can collect them at the stadium. In some cases however the original tickets also show up. There does not seem to be a clear policy on this matter.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

The absence of incidents at this fixture clearly had an impact on the observations which could be made. It may therefore be useful to estimate whether the policing strategy employed would have been appropriate had the risk increased. Would it be capable of escalation and de-escalation? From the data the team gathered the team feel the policing operation would have been robust enough to respond to changing circumstances. The team also felt the personal role of Silver was important. He was clearly a leader of men and a good manager able to influence, motivate and direct his staff without difficulty.

#### *Cooperation between police and club*

With regard to the evaluation points indicated by the host, the team felt that the cooperation between police and club seemed to be excellent (with the confusion related to the away official without a ticket being the only and minor blot).

#### *Interaction between police and stewards*

Looking from an international perspective, the interaction between police and stewards seemed to work quite well and stewards seemed to be adequately prepared and motivated. The whole system is of course built on a considerable police presence and involvement and it remains to be seen in how far

### *Briefings*

The briefings were clearly well prepared and informative and involved both the intelligence officer and the club safety officer. A balance was struck between paying attention to routine matters and matters specific to the operation. The team felt it was a pity this briefing structure was not matched by a complementary debriefing structure (also with a view to provide feedback to personnel). The low threshold for written remarks and the way these were actively pursued were positive.

### *Separation and management of risk fans*

The separation and management of risk fans was of course heavily dependent on available intelligence. In this respect it was unfortunate that little useful information was available about away fans.

Except inside the stadium, there was no separation between home and away fans. When risk fans were identified, they were accompanied and monitored and their safe and trouble-free departure was facilitated. The team appreciates the fact that the management of fans is influenced heavily by the fact that, over a period of several years, no incidents of any significance have occurred, but would like to point out that this in itself does not preclude the possibility of incidents occurring at some time in future.

In relation to this point, the management of risk is clearly made easier by a well structured and pro-active intelligence operation and a good cooperation between different divisions within the home city police. The team felt that in these respect some development is still possible.

### *Deployment of mobile units*

As far as the deployment of mobile units was concerned, the opportunity to view the effectiveness of the mobile strategy was limited due to the lack of activity and incidents at this match. However, if did seem there was little direction of the officers on mobile units, their task seemed to be more reactive than pro-active.

It was clear that the recommendations related to international cooperation from the EU handbook were leading for the operation. Unfortunately, this was not matched by the away police. This is an issue that should be a point of attention in an international context. How to deal with away stewards is another issue worthy of further discussion in an international context.

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below.

- Consistency in planning and the use of fixed posts officers within the stadium
- The cooperation between police and club
- The use of tactical advisors
- The clear distinction between different types of risks, and especially between for spontaneous and planned disorder
- The explicit attention for officer safety
- The explicit attention for crowd safety outside the stadium (crowd management at tube stations)
- The availability of contingency scenarios (evacuation, bomb threat, flares, pitch invasion)
- The designation of pubs for away fans (when needed)
- The “low profile” deployment of officers in normal uniform
- The fact that risk assessment was carried out on its own merits, rather than automatically categorising the match as a C match because of events during the first leg
- The fact that intelligence officers receive dedicated training



### **3.5 A Champions League match attended by migrants supporting the away team**

For this Champions League match, it was unknown how many away fans would come. Officially 1,600 tickets had been made available to away. From away country itself, probably very few away fans would come to home town. Both in home country and neighboring countries live lots of away migrants. As a result, there would be little information available about away fans coming to home town.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

Therefore, the commander expected all of his officers to be aware of the importance of information gathering on the day of the match itself and to contribute actively to this. Also, the commander expected his officers to act according to the principles of the low profile, friendly and firm approach, especially in relation to away fans, with respect for cultural differences, with the policing contributing to away fans feeling welcome.

The commander would like the evaluation to focus on the following points related to the interaction between police and fans (especially away fans):

- Are officers aware of the need for information gathering and the friendly and firm approach?
- What is their attitude towards this approach?
- Is this approach in fact expressed in the way in which officers behave? (do the police contribute to providing a hospitable environment, are cultural differences taken into account enough, do officers actively contact fans and gather information?)
- Do the away-fans feel welcome?

Even though away-country is not an EU member, the recommendations contained in the EU handbook are relevant to matches involving teams from away-country as well. Linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed:

- Cooperation between police forces
- Tactical performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

## **Data gathered**

### *Documentation consulted*

- Operational plan

### *Briefings attended*

- Commanders briefing
- General briefing match day
- Briefing for non-riot uniformed officers

### *Interviews conducted*

- Gold commander (several times)
- 20 away fans
- 25 home fans
- 25 police officers (officers belonging to normal uniform teams and riot police, mounted police, officers tasked with transporting arrested suspects, spotter, officer responsible for intake of arrestees, press officer)
- Public prosecutor

### *Observations made*

Before the match, observations were made at the railway station, city centre (bar area and marketplace), near the mosque and in the surroundings of the stadium (including the home fan bar).

During the match, observations were made inside the stadium

After the match observations focused on the surroundings of the stadium (exit of away fans, home fan bar) and the route from stadium to railway station.

## **Context in which the match takes place**

### *The match*

The reviewed match was the fourth match of the group stage in the Champions League. If the away-team don't win the game, they will not continue any further into the competition. If home win, their qualification for the next round is almost certain.

Home played away in the away town several weeks ago, this match ended in a 1-2 victory for home. Only a few hundred home-fans attended this match. There was no antagonism between home-fans and away fans on this occasion.

The last time home and away played against one another in home-country was six years ago. Because of UEFA-sanctions due to an unrelated incident, the match took place in a city 100 km from hometown and was attended by some 4,000 away fans. Incidents occurred when ticketless away fans tried to enter the stadium. Riot police intervention prevented a confrontation between home and away fans. Last year, home played in the Champions League against another club from away-country. Both home and away matches passed off without incident.

The match under review was sold out (attendance 35,500) with 1,600 tickets made available to away fans and most of these tickets being acquired by away fans from home-country, and two neighboring countries.

Police had categorised the match as high-risk (category C) because of the importance of the match for both fan groups, the number of away fans attending and the fact that home fans and away fans would be mixed in the city centre.

#### *Home fans*

Police estimates that some 50 hard core home-fans exist, with some 150 hangers-on. 61 fans have a stadium ban, 3 fans are banned from the city centre from 4 hours before until 4 hours after a match. The last time an incident occurred between police and home was in the city centre during the championship festivities (half a year earlier), when hard core fans acted aggressively towards riot police units.

Before and after matches hard core fans and hangers-on gather in "Fan Bar", a bar run by former hard-core fans. This recently (at the beginning of the season) opened and is positioned right across the main entrance to the stadium and right next to the police station (in a former part of the police station). The police have contributed to making it possible for this bar to be opened in this location. Since the opening, no problems have occurred with either police or away fans near this fan bar. However, on occasion home-fans leave the bar in small groups to seek confrontations with away fans.

Champions League matches usually lead to tension among home-fans, with hard-core fans reacting negatively towards away fans when home loses and hard-core fans acting euphorically when home wins, frequently lighting flares and fireworks. The behaviour of home-fans is influenced by consumption of alcohol and drugs. Especially hard-core fans can be anticipated to respond to

behaviour of away fans which is interpreted by them as being provocative.

Most of home fans come from the region around home town and will travel by car, several thousand will come by train.

#### *Away fans*

The last few years away did not participate in the Champions League and as a result little was known about the behaviour to be expected of fans. During the away game away fans were very vocal in the support of their team. Away fans do not contain groups that actively seek confrontation with other groups. Use of alcohol and drugs is limited.

The amount of information on away fans initially available to the police was problematic. Police home-town has actively sought information and found out that 1125 away fans will travel to home-town by bus and car, 725 and 200 from two neighbouring countries and 200 from within home-country. 150 fans will be arriving from away-country and leave directly after the match. In addition, an unknown number of away fans will have bought tickets from resellers in areas designated for home fans.

#### *Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

Away fans are increasingly dissatisfied with the results of the team and pressure on the team/ team manager/ club officials is increasing. If away does not win, it will not be possible for them to advance to the next stage in the Champions League. If home wins, they will have qualified themselves for the next stage.

In preparation for this match, intelligence did not reveal an intention of home-fans to actively seek a confrontation with away fans.

Police home-town had identified the following risks beforehand:

- Possibility of hit & run actions against away fans by hard-core home-fans
- Small-scale clashes between away and home fans before and after the match following (perceived) provocations
- Frustrations by either fan group after loss
- Presence of away fans in areas designated for home fans inside the stadium

#### *Police organisation/ operation*

The following goals were formulated for the policing operation

- Maintaining public order in the city and around the stadium

- Ensure an orderly arrival and orderly and speedy departure of away fans
- Regulation of traffic
- Support of steward organisation inside the stadium

*Policy points of departure were:*

- Absence of segregation between home fans and away fans outside the stadium
- Ban on the sale of alcohol inside the stadium
- Police has to act when criminal acts are observed, having regard for potential effects of interventions
- Hard-core fans showing their intention to enter into a group wise confrontation will be arrested as a group before a confrontation can occur
- Fans with counterfeit tickets will be arrested
- Ticket touts will be arrested

A behavioural profile for police officers was explicitly formulated in which it was among others expected of officers to behave in an unprejudiced way, service-oriented and with respect for other cultures.

The tactical concept required officers to contact fans actively, to communicate tolerance limits clearly and to act consistently with the tolerance limits in mind, using early interventions. Officers in normal uniform (with yellow jackets), experienced in policing football matches were expected to patrol in pairs and interact with fans. If the situation called for it, these officers could act in group-wise fashion. Only if this would not be sufficient, should riot police be deployed.

Police organisation was such that, under the overall command of the Gold commander, the commander city/ stadium from his position in the control room inside the stadium was in charge of all units deployed: yellow vested units, 2 platoons arrest units, riot police, mounted officers, dog handlers, traffic deployment, prisoner transport, CCTV unit, spotters and others. One of the riot platoons and one of the arrest units were provided by a neighbouring police force.

## Overview of events and main decisions

It was raining on and off through the course of the day.

### *Before the match*

The strip of bars was predominantly occupied by home fans. The market square consisted of both home and away fans. Away fans were seen outside the stadium lighting flares. The mosque was a meeting point for some away fans. It appeared the away fans made either their way to home-town by means of their own cars, or by buses. There were few observed using the trains. Fans who were approached and asked how they traveled informed observers they used cars. Gradually in the build up to the kick off of the match home fans made their way from the strip of bars in the center to the fan bar outside the stadium. There was an incident outside the fan bar approx. 19.15hrs which was followed by police riot deployment to form a cordon between the fan bar and the road in front of it. The cordon was lifted before the match began (around 20.00hrs). The away fans went to the stadium early and to accommodate them the away-fans entrance was opened earlier than scheduled at 18.30hrs. There were some confusion/arguments between the stewards and away fans due to problems with tickets and admission into the stadium. Outside the stadium, several flares were lit by away fans.

### *During the match*

The first half of the game was generally without events. During half time there was an incident involving a away fan and home fans in the highest level of seating, in the home seated area, which led to a strong reaction from the hardcore home fans. This incident was followed by two similar incidents in the VIP/ business area of the stadium.

On several occasions during the second half anti-away chanting from home hardcore fans could be heard. Also in the second half there were three instances of hand flares being lit in the visiting fan area and flung down into the area containing home fans, while they were still burning. Home fans throughout the stadium reacted very strongly towards this.

Match ended home 2 – away 0. Combined with result of other match this means home have qualified for next round. Away could still qualify for UEFA-cup.

### *After the match*

The buses for the away fans were positioned immediately at the exit of the fans and were surrounded by both riot police and stewards. The away fans were contained for 38 minutes after the match. After the stadium was emptied of home fans away fans were allowed out of the containment area, either to enter the buses or to go their own way. By this point the home fan bar was surrounded by riot police including dogs and mounted officers. Away fans not traveling by bus had to pass directly by the home fan bar in order to get into town/train station. There were police present directing the away fans to the opposite side of the road from the bar. Some vocal exchanges between home fans near the bar and passing away fans occurred, but there were no incidents. Further on down the road towards the town there were some incidents initiated by away fans. Just after midnight there was confrontation between home fans and the police. This was followed by the withdrawal of police and later still the (not observed by the team) arrests of all 83 individuals present at the bar at that time.

### *Decisions*

In the course of the operation, the following decisions seemed to be especially relevant to the Peer Review Team:

- Decision to deploy riot police in front of fan bar before the match;
- Decision to contain away fans after the match;
- Decision to deploy riot police in front of fan bar after the match

The Gold commander told the review team afterwards that these decisions were based on intelligence received around 18.00 hrs that indicated that a group of home-fans had plans to attack away fans.

The decision to arrest 83 fans falls outside the scope of this peer review.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Observations on police – fan interaction (especially away fans)*

The yellow vested police worked in small groups. They are used to working at football matches. All the `yellow vests` which were spoken too were aware of and had internalised the friendly but firm philosophy. Typical quotes were as such: "We always try to do something for them to keep things friendly". "We aren't told to behave this way, for me this is normal if I do something good for them they do something good for me, even outside the stadiums always treat people the way you want yourself to be treated, and that's how a police officer too should behave"

Some observations on the behaviour of yellow vested officers:

- There were 4 of them positioned in the strip of bars itself which were smiling and going into the bars, talking to the fans.
- When a large group of away fans walked from the market square to the stadium they were accompanied by three yellow vested officers. However, the officers did not walk among the group, but at the back and a few meters on the side (emphasising a distinction between the fans and the police that was stressed more by the fact that some riot police vans, including the video van, also rode along with the fans). When one of the fans attempted to take picture of these officers they failed to respond in any way to this, they didn't even look in the direction of the fans in what could have been a good opportunity to interact with the fans.
- A yellow vested officer confiscated a number of hand flares from a away fan and informed of the fact that under normal circumstances having these flares is punishable by arrest, they are completely illegal, but that he would not do that now and he asked the fan to pass on the message to his friends that the hand flares were not permitted. When asked, the officer said us: *"He was honest, so I let him go"* and that arresting the fan could have negative consequences if it led to reactions from surrounding fans.

There was a distinct difference between the yellow vested officers and the riot police. The riot police were not wearing yellow bibs. Apart from the deployments mentioned in the overview (fan bar before and after the match and exit of away fans), riot police were visibly deployed at the train station, market place, bar area and near the entrance to the stadium. The riot police were also predominantly in the vans and not interacting with the fans. At some points riot police were deployed outside vans:

- At the train station prior to the game there were 9 riot officers spread between the bottom of the stairs and at the exit
- Outside the stadium: several fans mentioned when asked that the riot police (in front of the stadium) were playing with their baton in a suggestive manner
- Bar area: riot police was positioned visibly but unobtrusively and relaxed next to the strip of bars and served, as they themselves said *"as eyes and ears"*

The riot police officers we spoke to were all aware of the friendly but firm policy. There was little witnessed in terms of them approaching or interacting with the fans.



From a fan perspective, away fans noticed the police deployment was low profile; they commented the police presence was higher in the neighbouring country than at this match. On the other hand, some away fans we spoke to reported that they didn't have a friendly response from yellow vested officers outside the stadium, when asking about toilets and hot drinks (as away fans went to the stadium early, they could not yet enter. There were no facilities outside the stadium).

Some away fans, talking about their general experiences following away on away matches, expect to be treated "second rate": *"If worst comes to worst, the end of the night we will be having things thrown at us, the Euros or we will be being smacked by the police whether we have done anything wrong or not."* Police deployment in home town did not change these expectations. As far as interaction in relation to (potential) incidents involving away fans, the following observations could be made:

#### *Market square*

At some point prior to the game, there were two groups of away fans doing there exchanging chant show from across the square to one another approximately 20 in total. When the away fans stopped singing and joined together a small group of 3 home fans who had gathered at the side of the square started chanting 'home-town' in a provocative way, at first the away fans ignored the chanting. After a few moments a number appeared to become agitated and turned to start shouting things back. One fan was particularly heated, a fellow group member then simply put his hand on his shoulder, lead him around gently and continued him walking away from the home fans. The home-fans continued singing in the direction of the away fans and then followed them silently for a few hundred meters. The two yellow vested officers then present in the square did not react to the interchange.

#### *Entrance of away fans*

Several away fans came to the gate with the 'wrong' tickets. They went to one gate and were refused entry, and continued to proceeded to other gates. This caused aggravation between the stewards and fans. Fans are reported to have been pulling and banging on the fence into the stadium. Yellow vested officers and riot police were in proximity of these events but were observed not intervening, but chatting among themselves and smoking. Prior to the game in the briefing it was announced the seats for which these tickets belonged would

be barred, and the holders of the tickets would be refused entry. Later, at least some of these fans were apparently permitted into the stadium (away section). It was obviously not clear immediately to away fans where the away section entrance was. There were no clear directions or markings indicating this section of the stadium.

### *Flares*

Outside the stadium, before the match there were a number of occasions in which flares were lit by away fans. Some officers convinced fans holding a burning flare to discard it, but realised after they are lit there is very little that can be done to put them out. When we approached a yellow vested officer who was present, he told us the fans had lit the flares, they were told these were not allowed and had therefore been trying to put them out. They were unsuccessful as they were difficult to put out once lit, but still described this group of fans as "*very friendly*" and presented "*No problems at all*".

No action was taken against fans lighting flares. At one point flares were being flung into a road with traffic moving through it, directly into the path of cars. We are not aware of communication between stewards and police and whether it was highlighted the importance of checking for these flares on entry to the stadium. During the second half of the match, four flares were lit in the away section of the stadium, three of which were thrown down into the home fans below. This led to worried and undignified reactions, not only in the affected section of home-fans, but throughout the stadium.

### *Inside the stadium*

Police were not visibly involved in dealing with incidents involving away fans inside the stadium (lighting of flares in away section), disputes between away and home-fans related to display of national/ away flags/ scarves in areas designated for home fans and VIP-areas. Police officers were observed assisting stewards in containing home fans that attempted to leave their area in response to these incidents.

After the game, the Gold commander indicated that police intervention in the away section was not desirable (the section is very steep) and he had indicated that stewards should leave the away section.

### *Exit of the away fans*

Contrary to what was mentioned at the briefing, after the match away were contained inside the stadium (based on the intelligence received about home fans intending to attack away fans). They were heard pulling at the fences after approximately 25min (only once).

The containment of away fans lasted until well after all home-fans had left the stadium and the area was already clear of home fans.

Virtually without any home fans in the neighbourhood (and with the fan bar being cordoned off), away were allowed out of the stadium. They exited into an area where buses were positioned, which was completely surrounded by fully equipped riot police and stewards. Away fans traveling by bus (the majority) boarded the buses. Other away fans were allowed free passage out of the encirclement to find their way into the city centre/ towards the railway station. Passing the cordoned-off fan bar, they were directed to the opposite side of the street from the bar. At a later stage away fans were redirected to an entirely different street to leave.

After they had passed the fan-bar, there was no police accompaniment for away fans. We observed a group of some 8 away fans physically attacking 2 home fans, kicking bikes and a shop-window and throwing hand-flares. After these fans had reached the railway station (where railway police was present) and some 15 min after the incident, the first police vehicles were seen to patrol the city centre and surroundings of the railway station.

### *Cooperation between police forces*

In this case it appeared that, although the police home town attempted to follow the recommendations of the handbook, the outcome was unsatisfactory. The ability of the police home town to prepare efficiently was limited due to the lack of information. Police in home town received very little information from the NFIP in away country, as most tickets were sold to fans outside of away-country. The police home town successfully took measures to gather information from neighbouring countries.

Police home town requested the away country to send two spotters to the home town. In actuality, a total of five police officers traveled from the away country to home-town: two were unannounced and traveled with the team, two were from irrelevant towns and had no knowledge of away fans, and one was from

away town but apparently had little knowledge of the away fans either. None of the police officers from away-country functioned as spotters or showed an inclination to do so. There were no away stewards.

As far as dynamic risk assessment and tactical performance are concerned, the following observations seemed relevant to the team (in addition to those mentioned above):

#### *The fan bar before the match*

There were at least two yellow vested police initially outside the bar they were promoting positive relations in terms of chatting and smiling. There was mobility in police resourcing, although as events progressed the resources became more fixed. The police were positioned on the side of the road, fans could move freely in and out of the bar. They had 3 vans, one dog, 4 horses and 6 yellow vested officers. To begin with the cordon of riot police were very close to the bar entrance, almost blocking entry and exit; although as already mentioned the cordon then moved back to allow the fans to move freely. The riot police were in full riot gear, with helmets etc.

The reason for deployment of riot police in full riot gear was not immediately obvious. In the street, among the fans, different stories circulated about what might have prompted the police response

- Bottles thrown at police
- A car had driven past with away flag hanging out and home fans had run down from the bar and tried to grab the flag from the car
- A small confrontation between away and home fans

Interview with the Gold commander the following day indicated that the police had received intelligence that the home fans intended to attack the away fans, at approximately 18.00hrs this was the reasoning behind the deployment of riot police. The cordon was removed at some point before kick off (around 20.00hrs, because they were given another assignment, according to the gold commander).

#### *The fan bar after the match*

After the match, the fan bar was not initially cordoned off by riot police. There were no yellow vested officers, only 4 mounted police officers and the video recording van. At some point after the stadium had emptied but before the away fans were allowed to leave riot police were deployed to outside the fans bar, as well as 6 dogs sealing the fan bar area off. The street was cleared by the

dog and the traffic was stopped. A diagonal cordon was put in place and there were police vans in all side streets. Away fans coming from the opposite side of the stadium were directed to the opposite side of the street from the bar. At some point after this the away fans were redirected to an entirely different street to leave. This situation lasted for approximately 1 hour. After which the incidents mentioned in the overview occurred. At 00.03hrs the fans outside the home bar were observed throwing stones towards the police.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

Overall, the police operation achieved its stated objectives. With relation to the questions asked by the host, the team came to the following conclusions.

*Are officers aware of the need for information gathering and the friendly and firm approach?*

Officers are clearly aware of this approach, although not all are aware that they have to contact the fans actively.

*What is the attitude of officers towards this approach?*

The yellow vested officers are clearly enthusiastic and motivated considering this approach as the natural thing to do. For other officers it's different. Some riot officers formulated that they felt a contradiction: how can we be friendly when asked to stay in the car? When out of the car (as was the case at the bar area and stadium entrance) there is a clear distance between riot officers and fans. At the stadium entrance before the match helmets were visible (on the side) and some officers played with their baton. Officers not dressed in yellow vests do not feel that they are part of the approach as much. For them it's more if something happens, then we go to the fans. For them the focus is on control, and to function as eyes and ears. The platoon commander deployed at the train station did not understand the strategy.

*Is this approach in fact expressed in the way in which officers behave? (do the police contribute to providing a hospitable environment, are cultural differences taken into account enough, do officers actively contact fans and gather information)*

The strategy with the yellow vested officers worked very well. The team has seen several good examples of their approach that was fully in line with the strategy. There were also some examples where they could have been more active in mixing with fans and setting clear limits. The riot police on the contrary do not

act as part of the friendly 'philosophy'. The two forms of policing (riot and yellow vested) produce contradictory perceptions of the police style. The riot police highlighted the importance of them controlling the event as opposed to what was stressed in the briefing: a friendly, positive interactive strategy. In this way, the police gave mixed messages.

*Do the away-fans feel welcome?*

The team felt that the perceptions of fans depended a lot on previous experiences in other places/ countries and that it would take a lot more than a friendly approach by police to make them feel welcome. Initiatives by others are relevant in this respect as well, and in that sense the team did not notice any hospitality actions aimed at welcoming away fans (except for flags flown at a fast food store).

In this respect, the team also wondered what the perception of local home town citizens (and not just away fans) would be.

Looking at it objectively, there was little reason for away fans to feel particularly welcomed (although fans did note that the police presence in home-town was lower than that encountered elsewhere). The risk analysis by police home-town indicated that most of the risk was posed by home fans (this was later confirmed by intelligence). In actual practice, although away fans were not seen as constituting the main risk, they were confronted with (some would say "punished" by) measures aimed at them on different occasions:

- At the railway station, they were "welcomed" by riot police;
- There was riot police presence at places where away fans were: market place, at the entrance for away fans;
- After the match away fans were detained for over half an hour;
- While exiting the stadium away fans were surrounded by riot police (we were not able to investigate this, but can imagine that the incident with flares occurring in the away section could be seen as reason for these measures by them)

The team also concluded that, at the same time, home fans could have a similar feeling of being treated unjustly or disproportionately (and some of the comments made by home-fans indicated the existence of this feeling). From their perspective, they did little or nothing to provoke riot police action to cordon off the fan bar, whereas away fans could act with impunity inside the stadium (throwing flares, provoking home fans).

The team noted several dilemmas here, the combination of which led to the measures being taken in the way they were, by cordoning off the fan bar and delaying the exit of away fans. These issues are as follows;

- Intelligence was received that police home town felt had to be acted upon to realise the goal of ensuring an orderly arrival and departure of away fans, without public order being disturbed (and specifically, without giving home-fans the possibility to collectively attack away fans). Of course it is not possible to communicate this intelligence to either home or away fans;
- The presence of a fan bar allows for police to know where problem fans will be throughout the day. At the same time, the position of the fan bar close to the entrance to the stadium at a point where thousands of fans pass, leaves very little reaction time once fans would choose to collectively seek a confrontation with other fans

With regard to evaluation points deriving from the EU handbook, the team came to the following conclusions. Police home town acted in accordance with the handbook. There was little information received from the NFIP in away country and police from away country did not fulfill the request Police home-town made. Police officers from away-country present in home-town did not fulfill any of the roles mentioned in the EU handbook.

With regard to tactical performance and risk assessment, the team came to the following conclusions. Risk assessment was clearly dynamic, matching deployment with actual risk (e.g. at the fan bar). There was clear cooperation with the club security manager. On occasion low-level active interventions could be observed. There was a lack of mobility and a rather static deployment of riot-police units. Cordons were maintained when they were serving no useful purpose anymore, reinforcing a static impression. At some points there was a lack of coordination: deployment of horses, the fact that the whole of the city was empty of police after the match, the 2<sup>nd</sup> platoon after match joining 1<sup>st</sup> platoon.

The riot police were not really part of the friendly and firm concept and mixed messages were communicated with yellow vested officers on the one hand and unnecessary show of force on the other hand (why show riot vans all over town before the match?).

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below:

- The thorough way in which the operation was prepared, with specific attention for information
- The existence of a well structured operational plan
- A clearly formulated behavioural profile for officers
- The use of the friendly-and-firm philosophy put in practice by the yellow vested officers
- The clear and well-structured briefing which led to every officer being aware of the strategy)
- The way in which dynamic risk assessment determined decisions made during the operation
- The fact that blue lights and sirens were used very sparingly
- The logistical arrangements, especially food provided to the officers



### 3.6 A Champions League match with sensitive relations between police and fans

The police had categorised the match as high-risk on the basis of the importance of the game to both fan groups and due to recent conflictual events involving fans of two home city teams which led relations between fans and the police to be sensitive since this incident.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the following evaluation points:

- Police forces deployment strategy;
- Interaction between police forces and supporters;
- Interaction between police forces and stewards;
- Interaction between stewards and supporters;
- Extremist behaviour of the supporters;
- Particular signs after which the extremist or sectarian supporters can be identified;
- Segregation of the foreign supporters during their travelling and staying in the territory of the home team country;
- The relationship between the media and the police (a representative for the NFIP indicated that the relationship between the media and the police is problematic, as a consequence of inaccurate reports, by the media, of events relating to the police and glorification of hooliganism).

In addition and linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Information management
- Cooperation between police forces
- Tactical Performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

Following observations, the team also commented on the following points

- Safety
- Command room and surveillance

## **Data gathered**

### *Documentation consulted*

- Pre match information pack provided by NFIP
- UEFA match preview information pack

### *Briefings attended*

- Briefing given by NFIP representative
- UEFA briefing
- Pre match briefing.

### *Interviews conducted*

Range of Police officers – in both outer and inner zones of the stadium

- Information commander
- Planning commander
- Match commander
- Special brigade commander
- Deputy special brigade commander
- Special brigade officers
- Commander of the police students
- Intelligence gathering
- Head of stewards
- Head of the security service
- 2 stewards
- Border police
- Media representatives

### *Observations conducted*

Before the match observations were made in the entrance to the stadium grounds, the inner zone of the stadium and the immediate entry to the stadium (both home and away entrances). During the match observations were made inside the stadium. After the match observations were focused on the surroundings of the stadium (particularly the exit of the home and away fans).

## **Context of the event**

### *The match*

The match being reviewed was the fifth match of the group stage in the Champions league. Two other teams occupied the top two places in the group, therefore the aim for both Home and away teams is to secure third place and

with it entry into the last 32 of the UEFA Cup. The home team are the better placed of the two with three points, to the Away teams none.

The match under review was played in the home city stadium, which has a seating capacity of 27,063. There were a total of 25,000 tickets supplied for the match. 2,000 tickets were made available to the visiting team; if they were not bought the tickets were to be made available to the home fans.

The police had categorised the match as high-risk on the basis of the importance of the game to both fan groups and due to recent conflictual events involving fans of two home city teams. Two months earlier these teams had played one another. An incident involving one fan group stealing a flag from another fan group resulted in intervention from the police. The conflict worsened and escalated resulting in fans that began to remove chairs from the stadium floor and throw them. Relations between fans and the police have been sensitive since this incident. Historically the police and the home city fans have had positive relations.

UEFA declared the match a high risk fixture as well in the Champions League meeting. However there was no security delegate visible.

#### *Home fans*

In addition to the event described above there is conflict within the home fan group. There are two rival home fan groups South and North. South is comprised of approximately 30 Ultra fans and is the smaller of the two. North also has internal conflict. Until recently the group was headed by a leader who has recently been imprisoned for criminal offences. Since then the group has fragmented into 6 subgroups that are now in conflict with one another in attempting to establish a new leader. The team was informed that the police participate in meetings with fan groups through key spokes persons and the club.

#### *Away fans*

Away country (a non-EU country) is without a national football information point therefore no intelligence was provided on away fans, despite being requested from the home country police, embassy and Interpol. The host indicated that for the match between home and away it was initially unknown how many away fans would travel to home city. Officially 2000 tickets were made available to away fans. Eventually details were provided from the away country embassy regarding numbers and mode of travel, stating three buses will travel to home city

containing around 150 fans. There was no information provided regarding police travelling with the fans, although on the day one officer travelled with the away country fans.

#### *Specific elements of this match*

Home fans have in the past travelled to away city and the team was told there have been some issues in the first leg (home played away in away-city a few weeks earlier, this match ended in a 4-1 victory to away). According to the NFIP, when approximately 20 home supporters started to chant during a promenade in central town away city, they were attacked by local supporters with chains and bats. As a result two home fans were led to the hospital for first aid and another one received a warning into a police station (apparently this individual became aggressive with a local citizen). A short time before kick-off, some other local fans (approximately 80) managed to enter into the stadium, in the area of the away fans where they provoked a fight with them. Following that incident (which was noted by the UEFA observer as well), after the game, the home club submitted a memorandum to UEFA against the host club.

Since then home team have been beaten twice at home on match days 2 and 3. Emotions are expected to be high. Although little intelligence was gained in preparation to the game, beginning the day prior to the game the NFIP were continually in contact with border control police. Constant tracking of 3 buses of away fans was achieved from their entry at the border.

There were few risks identified before the match. The issue of bad relations between fans and the police due to the previous conflictual incidents were emphasised. There were no predetermined goals made explicit although it is evident from the briefing and preparation priorities lie in public order and traffic management. Neither was there an emphasised behavioural profile.

#### *Police organisation/ operation*

The policing operation was decided by headquarters prior to the game and a strategy and policy meeting was held on the day before the match. The team did not attend this meeting but was told that at this meeting the roles and responsibilities were allocated, resourcing agreed and command was delegated. The command structure seemed to be role rather than rank focused, with numerous task commanders being responsible for their own divisions.

There were 1,000 police officers in operation for the match; 800 positioned outside the stadium, 200 positioned inside the stadium. Including mounted officers, dog handlers, traffic control and special brigade. There are also 350 stewards supplied by a security company and employed by the stadium. Their task is to communicate with the fans, to check tickets and play an overall security role inside the stadium. They function under the command of the police rather than that of club/stadium security coordinator.

There are also an additional 300 police and police cadets who are in their final year of training attendance at the event. They were deployed inside the stadium together with experienced colleagues with the goal to link theory with practice. They were not carrying weapons and were not supposed to involve themselves in any incidents.

Intelligence gatherers were also in operation with focus on the home fans. This is a special plain clothes unit who know home problem fans and observe them, both inside and outside the stadium

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

11.00hrs UEFA meeting took place. The UEFA meeting was attended by 22 people including representatives from the security, police, fire, and ambulance service. Topics of discussion are refereeing matters as well as safety and security issues. There was some confusion as to who was in command.

12.00hrs Pre match briefing took place with police match commander and task commanders involved in policing the event. Two presentations were given, regarding traffic control and operational structure. 17:30hrs Team arrive at the stadium to being observations. The team split into groups of 2x2, both groups with the aid of a translator began interviews. Following the completion of interviews the group began crowd observations of fans entering the stadium.

17:45hrs Gates open. There was a minor incident involving the visiting fans entry to the stadium. On arrival of the three buses carrying Away fans the area immediately surrounding the only entrance to the away section was cordoned off to ensure segregation of the home and away fans. Movement of home fans around the stadium was thereby stopped. And a number of away fans were deemed too intoxicated to enter the stadium, refusing their entry led to a minor incident where a police officer was witnessed using force to throw a fan to the floor.

### *During the match*

21:45hrs Kick off. As the game begins a hand flare is lit in the Ultra South section of the stadium.

22.13hrs As a response to the goal the away fans lit approximately 15 hand flares in the visiting section. Plain clothed officers in amongst the away fans capture footage with a video camera of those people involved in the lighting of the flares. The task commander of the special brigade then looks over the video footage and identifies fans which after the game will be removed from the crowd to receive punishment. Announcements are made three times in the remainder of the match instructing away fans to remain seated after the match as they are to be detained for 30 minutes.

There was a further minor incident in the second half which involved around 8 home fans in the south side of the stadium fighting among themselves in response to the opposition's trainer entering the pitch. There was no intervention from either stewards or police, they calmed after a few minutes.

During the duration of the game all members of the evaluation team visit the central command room within the stadium. The match ended 1 –1. This meant home qualified for the UEFA cup.

### *After the match*

Observations were made of the home fans leaving the stadium. Around the stadium there was a very low presence of Police. They were concentrated in 2 areas; directly at the main exit gate (approximately 100) and around the exit to the visiting fans section (approximately 80). There were also 2 groups of 2 Police officers situated outside the exit the Ultra South fans would leave by. The home fans had left the stadium by 00.00hrs. Away fans during this time were contained in the stadium with a cordon of officers around the section they were standing in (approximately 60 officers). They were allowed to leave the stadium at 00.10hrs. On the exit to the visiting fans section the Police deployed a control filter. The fans that lit the flares were identified on their exit by the video evidence. They were taken to the side, a photograph of them was taken and their passport details recorded, the fans were then released to make their own way to the border. The team was informed their identification data would be transmitted via Embassy in their country to the specific authorities for further investigations. Their progress back to the border was to be chartered by the Police.

The team witnessed how, when a hostile fan refused to comply, he was discreetly removed out of sight from the rest of the away fans behind a van, restrained and searched to find his passport, following which his photo was taken and passport processed. After he was released he left shouting and swearing at the Police who ignored him diffusing a potential excuse for conflict.

### *Main decision points*

In the presence of few incidents through the course of the operation the decision to wait until the game had ended before intervening to get details of those involved in lighting the hand flares seemed to be most relevant to the team.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Police forces deployment strategy*

The team had some difficulty to get a clear picture on this issue, which was partly due to differences in terminology and understanding. Apparently, the match commander set the strategy for the day on the basis of instructions given from Headquarters (before the arrival of the peer review team).

This led to an action plan, which was designed to achieve the strategic goals and led to the deployment strategy for the day. There were strategic goals relating to the safety and segregation of the fans, and to the safety of the officials and the players. The tactical plan was focused on public order control there was also concern about community residential impact. The policing action plan was split into three sections; the far, close and inner sections. The plan had been operationalised into one overall command and many subordinated commanders responsible for their own units. Everyone spoken too on the day knew their task and responsibilities well.

The team was somewhat confused about who was in command, especially in relation to the match commander and special brigade commander. In practice, the special brigade commander was totally in charge of the away fans access, egress and actions whilst in the stadium with the match commander having little to no involvement in this.

There proved to be good information gathering and communication between stewards, security and fans. The planning commander was witnessed walking around outside the stadium as a kind of quality assurance officer personally assuring the tactical plan was applied in practice.

The operation of the traffic police was successful in minimising disruption to the local community and facilitating the football fans.

*Interaction between police forces and supporters;*

There was little observation of officers attempting to construct positive relations between themselves and the fans by means of freely interacting with them. They were observed standing in large groups, talking amongst themselves. Generally speaking there were observations of positive interactions between the fans, both home and away and police when the fans approached the police. When they were in contact they were firm but not cold. One officer commented; *"If they will come to the block they will tell the supporters not to go there with a firm voice. Not too intimidating but so as to not show weakness"*

A commander commented; *"How we behave during the game we want the same behaviour from the fans. If we have smiles on our faces, we want they to smile at us, if we are well behaved we want them to be well behaved"*

The police wore jacket, trousers and leather boots. They wore a beret, and on their belts a riot helmet, baton and hand cuffs. The reason for the wearing of helmets on belts is to decrease response time when they are needed. However, with the helmets the officers look more intimidating. The special protection brigade had a higher level of uniform (pepper and CS spray, protective padding on arms and legs, and a gun in addition).

Outside the stadium the police were visible because the smaller number of people moving around, inside the stadium they were not visible at all because of the colour of their uniforms and the amount of people around them. The only visible authorities inside the stadium were the firemen and stewards (and traffic police when they came in)

There were interpreters brought in for the benefit of the away fans, they were representatives from the embassy and facilitated the announcements being made in the language of the away fans.

A number of away fans were deemed to be too intoxicated to enter the stadium, refusing their entry led to a minor incident where a police officer was witnessed using force to throw a fan to the floor. A number of away fans were angry that their friends had not been given access to the stadium. They became



conflictual and in response they were taken away from the situation until the situation had calmed. Then, instead of arresting them, they were integrated back into the crowd and allowed to go and watch the match.

Searching at the turnstiles in the home sections seemed to be proportionate. In the away section where there were only a small number of fans, although there were many officers, the deployment seemed disproportionate.

*Interaction between police forces and stewards;*

The police and the stewards appeared to work well with one another; cooperation was stressed by a police representative (Match planner): "...the police personnel, cooperating with our police colleagues and stewards", by the head steward; "Contact with the police all the time. Because the police are responsible for public order they are responsible for approving our plans" and by stewards themselves; "We have been working for many years with the police and they have been helping us very much. We have been 8 / 9 years since we have developed our working in stadiums with police and we are very pleased with the relationship."

It was witnessed at the gates that the police were responsible for body checks on entrance to the inner stadium and the stadium itself. It was observed there was a large congestion at the turnstiles and the body checks were very quick and inaccurate as a consequence.

*Interaction between stewards and supporters;*

Stewards and fans were witnessed interacting in a positive manner, similar to the approach of the police; they were assertive in their roles but friendly at the same time.

*Extremist behaviour of the supporters;*

In the second half of the game in the North section of the stand extremist fans were spread throughout the section, 9 flags in total were witnessed overturned, in the South section 7 flags were witnessed overturned, although concentrated in the hardcore area. Banners and flags were turned upside down; discussions with the police revealed these signs are indicative of discontent towards them. However no hostility was witnessed other than the fight between home fans in the south stand.

*Particular signs after which the extremist or sectarian supporters can be identified;*  
In the South side a group of fans showed no response to the game, did not join in with the behaviour of the fans round them (They did not cheer, they did not sing with the others. They didn't engage in any of the behaviours expected of a fan at a football game they simply stood). They began fighting among themselves, in close vicinity to the South group of fans. The conflict continued for around five minutes and there was no obvious intervention from either the fans or the police. The team was informed their behaviour was considered to be pseudo-conflictual, because until present there weren't any victims/injured persons among them; the explanation given for their behaviour was that they wanted to be noticed in the crowd and to look "mean".

*Segregation of the foreign supporters during their travelling and staying on the territory of the home team country*

On arrival of the three buses carrying away fans the area immediately surrounding the only entrance to the away section was cordoned off to ensure segregation of the home and away fans. This led to home fans, which were stopped to allow away fans to pass to become agitated. There was no permanent segregation line and no involvement of stewards in this. Temporary metal fences resting on seats were used.

The team was told if the tickets for the away section are not bought by the visiting fans they will be made available to the home fans. If this is the case, this entails breaching the segregation of the home and away fans, increasing risk factors.

*The relationship between the media and the police*

The team received conflicting information about the presence of an immediate point of reference on the evening of the match for the media to enquire with in regard to developing incidents. If there was, at least some media representatives were not aware of his presence. The media representatives the team talked to expressed a desire to report to accurate truth;  
*"To present to you the facts, transmit in real time", also stating "If you are a bad journalist yes you can write for one side or another but you have to write what you see. It must be neutral".*

*Exchange of police information (before, during, after)*

Before the game there was no information provided by away country police, regardless of frequent request. During the day before, and the day of the match

there was good communication between the border control police and the NFIP (to inform the police).

Generally speaking there was impressive utilisation of contacts on the home country police to gather as much intelligence as possible prior to the match. The NFIP got information from the visiting club, on numbers, the embassy regarding background and then totally relied on the Border police – excellent communication flow of intelligence, and the fact that they had police escort coaches from the border all the way to the city and then to the stadium – at no point were the visiting fans (coach) not under heavy uniform presence.

#### *Cooperation between police forces*

As mentioned there was no intelligence provided by the away- country police, who have no NFIP. There was also no cooperation with away country police. As there is no organised NFIP this is the only source of intelligence. On the day of the match it that there was an away country police officer in attendance. This was not known beforehand and he provided no intelligence as he was said to be drunk.

#### *Cooperation between police forces and stewards & employment of stewards*

There was a clear protocol of understanding between police, ambulance, fire, stewards. There was a clear understanding of roles and command structure. Everyone interviewed by the team expressed content with understanding their responsibility and confident in their roles, and the roles of others around them. As already mention indicative of good cooperation between stewards and police is the attendance of both at briefings. A steward did note that it would be beneficial to them to have more support around the ultra section of the stadium.

However, police officers do fulfil several tasks that within most EU countries are carried out by stewards (e.g. searching) and are in actual command of the stewards.

The stewards seem to be experienced and well-prepared for their task (education, training, briefing, de-briefing). The club/ stadium security coordinator is happy with the cooperation with stewards, police and others. The team was informed after each match good practices and points of attention are discussed.

### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

In relation to *facilitation* the management of traffic control and entrance to the stadium facilitated both the fans and the local residents. The operation was well thought out and applied. The police clearly were facilitating to both home and away fans during the game; allowing the fans to sing and stand on chairs.

In relation to *differentiation* there was clearly attempts ensure differentiation of the fans. This is evident in the information gatherers, who were reported to say "They are there in certain places of the stadium and can inform them, this person has done that. They will let their bosses know only if something wrong happens because their bosses know exactly where they are situated in the stadium. Their bosses can tell them look here because something is happening. Information goes both ways." The method of putting individuals who are unidentifiable by the fans into the crowd very effectively identifies problem fans and situations. Furthermore in relation to differentiation the video evidence gatherers who record the fans in the crowd was an effective means of verifying where and who should be dealt in relation to incidents which developed during the match.

The *balance* of police to the risk posed was generally well applied, with the exception of the away fans entrance and exit. There were around 180 officers involved in their exit from the stadium. This could be considered excessive in relation to risk and expenditure on personnel with relation to the number of away fans there were (400-500); more than 1 officer for every 4 fans.

Out of sight of fans, there was a water cannon on standby and special brigade officers in full riot kit.

The arrest tactic of 12 fans was managed well with a phased de-escalation of police presence to diffuse conflict. Also the way in which away fans lighting hand flares were dealt with by videoing the action, identifying the culprits and then put in a filter cordon on dispersal of away fans to isolate the offenders and deal with as discussed above was indicative of a proportionate response chosen so as not to cause hostility and endanger staff and fans.

### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

Risk management in reference to two issues observed, fireworks inside the stadium and the response to the drunken away fans. The treatment of fans that

were visiting and deemed too drunk to enter the stadium, was adapted and proportionate. Also when other away fans reacted angrily good risk management was evident. When the conditions began to resolve, and the risk factors dissipate the problem fans were integrated back into the group and not arrested, keeping relations and their friends content with the action taken; demonstrating all round good response to risk.

Operationally in accordance with the risks identified beforehand, three groups of people were under the surveillance of the special brigade with police escorts; the football teams, the officials and the away fans. Specific intelligence gatherers were also in operation with focus on the home fans.

### *Safety*

The police created a queuing system by creating and implementing barriers which ensured a steady flow of fans entering the inner zone. This deployment strategy functioned well in relation to the entrance of fans to the inner stadium. However the lighting was bad and the barriers used had metal feet which interlocked requiring the fans step over them continually which could create a health and safety hazard, resulting in injury and or crowd distress.

Not only could fans have fallen and tripped over the barriers in the dim light, there is an additional problem of the barriers potentially being used as a weapon. There were loose wires outside the stadium on the entrance to the seating area which are a safety hazard. This could be amended by ensuring they were secured to the floor.

### *Command room and surveillance*

In the command room there were representatives from all those involved, however the room was small and did not facilitate well for the workers. On the outside of the stadium there is a mobile unit that had access to CCTV footage which was not linked to the Command room. There are no CCTV cameras in the area of the hardcore fans, or on the areas through which they will exit the stadium. Several individuals who were interviewed commented on the conditions of the control room, and expressed a desire for it to be improved.

## **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

The absence of incidents at this fixture clearly had an impact on the observations which could be made. The team however agreed on the following conclusions.

### *Police forces deployment strategy*

Good practice was observed in the plain clothed intelligence officers who were familiar with the fans. They collect evidence without the supporters being able to recognise them. This puts them in a strong position for identifying offenders as they are within the crowds. However these officers do not engage with risk fans as a true spotter would, and no one seems to engage risk fans and work with them to build rapport and trust to develop intelligence.

The use of outer zone/inner zone and then stadium was fit for purpose in relation to this stadium. The needs of the local community were met, and, the needs of the fans travelling to the game were also facilitated. The deployment strategy for the access to the stadium was well thought through and implemented in practice.

The five mobile video recording units were also good in practice, obvious in the aiding of identification of those who lit the hand flares in the stadium.

The team also considered it good practice to have the planning officer act as Quality Assurance officer

### *Interaction between police forces and supporters*

The outfit worn by the police was proportioned to the risk posed, with units in full riot gear and water cannon kept out of sight. However, the visibility of helmets on the belt does send a more intimidating signal.

The police should have some sort of identifiable clothing within the Stadium. A suggestion could be a fluorescent reversible vest, which on one side was blue (for outside the stadium), and one side was yellow (for inside the stadium). A possible point for the future could be the encouragement of officers into freely interacting with the fans and constructing a positive relationship between them, as opposed to only interacting when they are approached. They can often appear intimidating when standing in large groups talking amongst themselves.

Special brigade are responsible for counter terrorism; they utilised 10 dogs which are trained to detect explosives to cover the whole stadium and surrounding areas prior to the match attempting to detect explosives and fireworks. After the stadium was checked and secured the security and stewarding for the inner of the stadium moved in, the area was then maintained by them. This provided the command team with confidence assurance about the security of the stadium, and is indicative of good practice.

#### *Interaction between police forces and stewards*

The relationship between the police and stewards was characterised by good cooperation reported by both sides. There was one suggestion made by stewards encouraging more support in the south section, they find this the post difficult post in the stadium.

Many of the tasks which the Police were performing could also be carried out by stewards (under supervision of the club security coordinator), as is usual in many European countries. The tasks which the stewards could perform are ticket control, body checking, crowd management and segregation. These tasks could be performed with appropriate training by the stewards, if supported by ground regulations (which are conditions of entry set by the club in relation to purchasing a ticket by all supporters). A breach of the regulation would result in a supporter not being permitted entry into the stadium. This would then empower the stewards to carry out the searching role. Under conditions which are considered more 'high' risk the police could assist. In this way the steward response and accountability could be enhanced and police involvement and numbers greatly reduced.

#### *Extremist behaviour of the supporters*

The team feel extra care should be taken to monitor supporters who show no engagement with the match, a group as such who were observed fighting among themselves with no intervention from either stewards or police during the game. Stewards have also suggested there should be more support for them in the South section of the stadium due to the behaviour of these fans. It was also noted that the Ultra fans are easily identifiable, with 'South boys' on their flags and a distinguishable 'mean' looking face. This could be an issue where spotter intervention might prove beneficial, leading to better communication and consultation

### *Segregation of the foreign supporters during their travelling and staying on the territory of the home*

A point of attention is the entrance to the stadium of away fans. This could have been better managed. As discussed above, there were barriers erected, preventing home fans from crossing the paths of the away; again this situation could be prevented by the implementation of a pathway. Away fans who were too drunk were pushed back onto buses this caused hold ups and the home fans to grow impatient. There could have been a path created to allow segregation and free movement of the home fans. As well as a separate coach park, permanent segregation /screening etc.

Furthermore allowing home fans to buy tickets in the away section if they are not all bought up by the match is clearly detrimental to the segregation of fans. This policy should be reconsidered.

### *Communication with the media*

The team feels it is important to create a working relationship with the media. "It is a game, and like all games there are rules". The team suggests to have an immediate contact of the police to report on developing instances as they happen in order to facilitate the media's desire to depict an accurate account of events, before their reports go to press.

To help avoid glorification of hooliganism a media strategy could be considered that includes

- De-emphasising hooliganism in the media, unless it occurs on the pitch and disrupts the match (this tactic was adopted in UK and has helped to tackle the issue)
- Local Commanders to engage the media in an open honest style pre, during and post match to work in partnership rather than distancing one another, this may help to build up trust and rapport locally, differentiating between journalists that write factually correct reports and those that don't.

### *Items from EU handbook*

It was clear that, in spite of attempts from the home country police, there was no international police cooperation due to lack of response from the a country side. The lack of intelligence had of course its influence on the police deployment, especially with regard to the number of police. In spite of this, the



team felt the officer to fan ratio was quite high and seemed not in proportion. The fact that police fulfilled many tasks that stewards could have fulfilled contributed to this as well.

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below. Regarding actual deployment, it was clear that the tactics included elements of facilitation, differentiation and balance between actual risk and type of intervention chosen. Although the observations above have given some indications that this could be developed further, this was good practice:

- Evidence of good practice is the student officers present at the game, engaging and gaining experiencing. This allows them to begin thinking about tactical plans, preparing them for their future.
- Good practice was evident with regard to the border police. The border police travelled with the away fans up to their entrance to the stadium updating intelligence, and were at all the borders until the away fans had left the country ensuring they had paid the fines. This tactic was considered by the team to be a very good lateral thought process and a good tactical tool for the match commander in diffusing incidents of conflict in the stadium
- There was little intelligence provided by the away country, despite this the monitoring and assessment of the conditions of fans provided a good and continually developing intelligence



### 3.7 A Euro 2008 qualifying match: high risk or not?

The Euro 2008 qualifying match was categorised as high risk by the host police force, in large part because of the large number of away fans. On the other hand, the away NFIP had informed their counterparts that away fans did not present a risk and had no rivalry with home fans.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the evaluation points derived from the EU Handbook. The team addressed the following:

- Information management
- Preparations
- Cooperation between police forces
- Cooperation between police forces and stewards and employment of stewards
- Tactical Performance for Public Order Management
- Dynamic Risk Assessment

Methodology used and material gathered

Data gathered

*Briefings attended*

- UEFA briefing
- Police security meeting.

*Interviews held*

- Away police
- 11 away fans
- Police commander
- Head of home team security
- Head of FA Security
- Special intervention unit
  - Deputy Head
  - 3 inspectors
  - 1 sub-inspector
  - 1 constable
- Security
- 2 home country NFIP representatives
- Representative of the Municipal police
- Representatives from Sanitation service (Including fire and ambulance)

### Observations conducted

- City centre and public underground
- Stadium surrounding area before and after the match; Specific attention was paid to the coach arrival and entry of the away fans (outside, through turnstiles and until seated) and home hardcore section, arrival of team buses and VIPs, Stadium shopping mall, home teams FA sports tent, the stadium control room (during the match).

### Context in which the match takes place

#### *The match*

The match was a Euro 2008 qualifier. Both home and away teams had played 3 matches so far, with the home team in 5<sup>th</sup> place (3 points) and the away team in 2<sup>nd</sup> place (7 points) in the group. For the home team to keep their chances to qualify for Euro 2008, they must win this match. The match was played in a stadium with a capacity of over 80,000 spectators. Kick off was at 22.00 hrs. Total attendance was 73,577 people at this match, including 5,000 away fans.

#### *Home fans*

The team were made aware of a street close to the stadium in which home hard core fans would gather before the game.

#### *Away fans*

Previous to the match the home country NFIP received information from the away country NFIP, detailing that some 4,200 tickets were sold to the away fans (including away fans living in the home country) and giving information on travel arrangements of almost 1,500 fans. This represents the largest number of supporters which have travelled to a foreign country with the away team in 10 years. Prior to the game it was suggested that there would be approx 1,000 away fans without tickets, but as events unfolded there was no evidence this was the case.

The away NFIP also informed the home counterparts that away fans do not present a risk and have no rivalry with the home fans. It was also indicated that the away teams organised supporters club had arranged (a gathering of away fans in the centre communicated by the away country FA via their website) of the home city.

### *Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

The match was classified as high risk for the following reasons:

- Expected attendance of over 70.000 spectators.
- Expected presence of radical groups.
- Large number of away fans.

In interviews the review team was told there were three additional potential risks:

- Late kick-off time, which would mean that fans would be drinking the whole day.
- Recent incidents in city with regard to squatters; the idea being that maybe those involved in this incident could involve themselves with this match.
- On the same day as the match a demonstration would take place in the centre of the host city. The context of the demonstration regarded housing issues. Prior to the event an estimation of 500 protesters were predicted by a policing representative. In actuality there were approximately 2,000 demonstrators in attendance for this event.

The team identified another potential risk which was a change to normal procedure for the entry and the seating of the away supporters.

### *Police organisation/ operation*

At the security briefing it was mentioned that the operation would involve 300 officers from the National police, 100 officers from Municipal police, 340 Security staff (the security is hired by the club), 500 auxiliary staff and 50 Red Cross staff.

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

Afternoon observations in the main square of the host city centre evidence the context between fans was friendly. In the main square on arrival at 14.35hrs there were approximately 1,000 fans. This number increased to approximately 3,000 fans by 17.00hrs. The away fans were well behaved and good natured and the environment was carnivalesque. There were fans from both groups present in the square and friendly interactions between away and home fans could be observed. Police presence in this area was low profile, there were 4 vans stationed together in one corner. Three intervention officers were observed walking through the square several times without helmets, pairs of Municipal police were also observed walking through this area.

At 15.40hrs there was an incident with a waiter pursuing some home individuals who had left an outdoor restaurant area in the square apparently without paying their bill. This provoked an interesting reaction from the away fans. When the waiter apprehended some of the fleeing individuals and made them pay the bill, to which there was cheers and applause from the home fans.

At 15.55hrs a group of 6 home fans entered the square they were very vocal towards the away fans. In response to this isolated individuals from the away fan group attempted to encourage others to join in with taunting the home fans. Their attempts failed and their actions did not generalise. The same group of home fans then became involved in a friendly game of football in the centre square with the away fans. Later, the two groups were seen sharing beers with one another.

At 16.30hrs Municipal police drove a car through the square and went straight through the friendly game of football between fans, ruining the game of football.

At 16.45hrs a waiter took the football away from the fans, preventing their game from continuing. Also around this time away fans began to climb on restaurant owned chairs. Fellow away fans responded by telling their counterparts not to behave in this way.

Intervention police were observed positively interacting with fans by means of answering questions, giving directions and allowing pictures to be taken. Festivities seemed to be all around and the environment stayed this way for the duration of the observations. The review team stayed in or around the square until 18.00hrs and then used the public underground to travel to the stadium. The environment described above was consistent on the underground. The locals who were not involved in the football festivities appeared to be comfortable and happy in the company of the football fans from both home and away countries.

#### *Stadium surroundings: prior to the match.*

From 19.00hrs onwards, the team deployed in twos too make observations of various parts of the stadium. Police presence surrounding the stadium was with helmet on the belt and a gun and baton in holster. Fans groups from both countries were observed to be interacting positively (e.g. having their photos taken with one another). Furthermore, on entrance of the two team buses both fans groups were observed clapping the opposing teams bus.

On the south side of the stadium, fans were surging onto the road and horses were being used to keep people off the road. The arrival of the fan buses was managed by the municipal police who were aided by the intervention police. An effective parking system had been implemented on a cordoned street with plenty of space allocated for the visitors to arrive and buses to park. The system prevented stress for the pedestrians as there was clear space for them too to move around outside this area.

From the contingency of officials the referees were the first to arrive. They were escorted by police. Although there was a cordon in place there was little space to allow the buses to enter the stadium. The security made space by picking up the cordon barrier and pushing it into the fans. The fans were compliant and the atmosphere relaxed as they cheered the arrival of both teams. The away team coach drove past and entered the stadium via the home hard core fans. As the away coach came into the secure zone the fans folded in behind until they reached the cordon point. It did however take the home team coach 5 minutes to pull into the main stadium due to a queue of home fans waiting outside this area. For the arrival of the home team coach the police attempted to keep fans on the sidewalk by creating a cordon of officers along the street and the mounted branch (8 horses). As the bus drove down the street fans surged forward to cheer their team causing many to flood onto the road. Several times fans had to quickly get out of the way of the horses or face being trampled.

In a street near to the stadium a large contingency of home hard core fans gathered, the team were informed prior to the game this was the hard core 'area' before the match. Flares and fire crackers were seen to be lit at least four times within this area. Although the police would not enter they were clearly visible, wearing full protection, two of the officers had the ability to use a gun with rubber bullets. A cordon consisting of 9 intervention police was created where the street ended and led to the stadium. The review team were advised against entering this street.

#### *Inside the stadium*

In the stadium there is an allocated area in section on the south side in which the local domestic home team hard core fans are typically seated. As this was the national side and not a domestic match the FA sold tickets for this section to all types of home fans, including unknowing families. Families and young children were seen to be seated amongst the hard core fans, they would not have been

aware this was the case until entrance. A representative of the NFIP of the host country stated that this should not have happened and should be a point for improvement in future *"there should have been an instruction to the football association not to sell tickets in this area. Only for special Ultra supporters"*

Away could enter at any gate from 29-31 and have an initial ticket check. Following this ticket check auxiliary staffs were searching those who entered on the stairway leading into the grounds. When they were searching one person, this allowed space for many to enter *unsearched*. Fans were observed entering with motor cycle helmets and picnic hampers. It was also noticed at this section there were no female auxiliary staff to search females entering the stadium. Fans seemed good-natured and were orderly queuing.

On entrance to the grounds the away fans were met with paramilitary looking security. These were not easily distinguishable from police and carried a baton and handcuffs. The profile of the security seemed intimidating, often being seen with scarves covering large proportions of their face and standing with arms crossed over their chest. Representatives of the Security responsible were not cooperative with members of the review team when asked questions. It was also observed that there was little or no communication between the security and both the fans or other members of staff.

Staffs at the away entrance gates were informed to tell the fans to spread across the full seating area allocated to them. The fans did not comply with this request and predominantly gathered in the centre of their seating area. In the briefing it was stated the two rows immediately above the away fans would be empty to ensure nothing could be thrown down upon them. This was not in fact the case: the seats were full of home fans and 'friendly' missiles (toilet rolls and card board boxes) were seen to be thrown down. There was no intervention or communication of tolerance limits made to these fans.

Plain clothes officers were seen to be observing the fans activity in the home Ultra section of the stadium. They were not spotting in the conventional sense of identifying risk fans, but when asked about what they were doing they were very clear about what they were looking for.

Ten minutes prior to the game finishing the turnstiles were opened to allow fans to exit the stadium. Outside the turnstiles 10-20 people waiting and when the



turnstiles were opened these people then entered the stadium without tickets. Although this was only for the last 10 minutes they congested the exits.

### *After the Match*

With regard to the retention of away fans in the stadium, there was no communication about whether or not to hold the fans back. In the briefing the UEFA delegate was informed that they would be held for 15 minutes. It was observed in the command room there was no discussion about this issue. Contrary to this at the end of the game the away fans were not held back and permitted to exit at the same time as the home fans. The police who travelled with the away teams fans were also surprised the fans were not held in the stadium. The review team were unable to establish who made the decision to change the protocol which was agreed prior to the match by allowing all the fans leave the stadium together.

The away fans entered a cordoned area to return to their coaches on exit from the stadium.

There were two issues related to crowd management following the match. Firstly, there was a parking lot next to the stadium shopping mall it was observed that when thousands of fans were spilling out of the stadium onto the surrounding roads, cars were exiting from this car park and driving straight through the roads which were awash with fans. The second issue related to crowd management was the exit of a VIP from the stadium. The vehicle in which he was leaving the stadium again drove straight through the thousands of fans who were at the same time spilling out of the stadium.

### *Decisions*

Although the review team observed few decisions being made on the day, there are a number of decision points which can be brought up in relation to observations.

In the briefing it was stated the three rows of seats either side of the allocated area for the away fans would be covered with cloth to prevent fans moving in or out of this area. The decision was made to change this procedure. One hour before the game began the cloth was removed and placed over another sector.

Elements of planning and operational issues were not in place by the day of the game. The match itself was not fully planned or organised prior to the game. This meant the officers involved in the organisation were not completely focused on the operation itself as it was happening, but were still making decisions surrounding how it should function. One commanding officer commented that during the game they would be planning for an event taking place the next working day.

Although a side issue to the assessment of the public order policing of the football event a demonstration took place in the city centre during the day. A large number of people could have presented issues which may have impacted on the policing of the football (and was identified as such) despite this the demonstration was not mentioned in the UEFA briefing. The review team were also informed that the demonstration would not be permitted to march, which the demonstrators intended to do. Despite this, the demonstrators did in fact march en masse through the city centre. Although this had consequences for traffic, the review team had no indication that the demonstration had any impact on the operation of the football event itself.

The most important decision made on the day has been identified as allowing the away fans to exit the stadium alongside of the home supporters. Although in the context of this game the decision had no repercussions, the decision to do this compromised the original operational plan. Furthermore the decision was not communicated effectively to those involved in the police operation; for example the police officers representing the away country.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *Information management*

The exchange of police information before the game was at the initiative of the away police.

As it was not a high risk game, the away countries police did not find it their objective to send spotters. Furthermore the away countries FA did not allow away country stewards travel with fans. In the EU council guidelines on international cooperation it clearly indicates that it is of benefit to provide stewards with which the fans are familiar and can communicate with, but that whether stewards are provided from the visiting side is at the discretion of the hosts.

From the observational point of view it would have been beneficial to attend the meeting with politicians held prior to the arrival of the review team. Apparently, no representatives from the visiting police force were in attendance at this meeting, although their involvement would be important in the exchange of information.

During the policing operation the away policing contingency were surprised to find there was no operational briefing. Although having no operational briefing is unusual practice this also indicates the communication between the away police and the home police on arrival was not as informative as it could have been. The visiting officers were observed to often comment 'we are unsure' and demonstrate general unfamiliarity with what was expected of them. During their time in home country the visiting police had no official liaison accompanying them. There were no interpreters present (and apparently the away countries Embassy was not approached to enquire as to whether they could provide interpreters). Although communication with the away fans during the match is necessary via public announcements, the decision was made in the security briefing that one of the away police officers should be responsible for the public announcements. Having a travelling police officer make public announcements is not standard practice. Because of this decision, a visiting officer had to be stationed in the control room for the duration of the match. This limited the use of this officer and made it impossible for them to interact with away fans, e.g. at the turnstiles through which the away fans entered.

Exchange of information within the host police network prior to the match appeared to be effective with regard to the Intervention police who were given a pre-match briefing and when questioned were well aware of their own role and responsibilities, and that of others. They appeared to be working well and in partnership with one another with clear chain of command, protocols and contingency plans. They were however the only unit to be given a pre-match briefing.

During the match in the control room there appeared to be little exchange of information between different units over the radio. Furthermore, there was little information exchanged between the two separate control rooms.

Following the match there was no debriefing for any of the officers involved.

### *Preparations*

Communication to the fans before the game was well achieved via the away countries NFIP website. The opportunity to communicate to the away fans that there was a risk area near to the stadium the fans should avoid entering was missed. One further observation in relation to communication with the away fans was the information conveyed at gate 47, indicating which turnstiles the away supporters should enter the stadium in English but not in the native language of the away country. This appeared to create confusion amongst some away supporters, as illustrated by the fact that two away fans were observed attempting to enter the stadium via the home Ultra turnstiles. It took a while before the issue was resolved (by a club representative).

### *Cooperation between police forces*

The home countries police were very open and honest about their operation and cooperative with the visiting officers.

The entrance of the away fans was overseen by one visiting officer from the away country situated at one of the turnstiles and communicating to the fans waiting to enter.

### *Cooperation between police forces and stewards & employment of stewards*

The FA made the decision to kick the game off at 22.00hrs without negotiations involving the police. From the police point of view a later kick off time means more time for the fans to drink, alcohol is often implicated in the instigation or escalation of conflict between fan groups. Therefore more drinking time is not preferable from a police perspective.

Within the stadium as mention there are two control rooms. One contains club staff to control their own staff and one for the police to control their staff. There appeared to be little cooperation between the two.

Cooperation between stewards/auxiliaries and police appeared to be complicated by issues of command and control. The police cannot directly address members of the security staff they must go through their commanders who will contact a member of the club staff to deal with their security employees. It appears that the security and

police have their own separate job descriptions, and if the task in question falls outside the prescribed tasks they fail to aid one another. The review team were informed if a member of the security staff would be seen not to perform body searches correctly, the police could not address the problem with the security themselves (due to the command structure): they can only take the details of this individual and report this post match. The persons in question will then be prevented from working in the stadium in future. There was only one command inspector from security in each of the four sections in the stadium. Due to this, when the security individual in control had to be contacted, it took a considerable amount of time for them to arrive at the point they were needed.

It was somewhat curious to note the powerful position of the club safety manager and how the security meeting was opened with police representative stating to the club "*you are experts in the Champions League*". Although this may be true, the police are the experts at ensuring public safety and order. The police match commander and head of security should be working beside one another and making decisions together, the power should be shared equally between both. The appearance of the security staff could be highly misleading to fans as they are not easily distinguishable from members of the intervention police force. Dressed similarly and carrying batons, they do not wear vests identifying them clearly as security.

#### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

The police delivered exactly what they said they were going to and provided a low profile approach from the intervention police. There were no objectives, strategic or tactical plans explicitly discussed prior to the match, and any goals were not mentioned explicitly as such.

The interaction during the UEFA meeting was unidirectional to the police, with the individual responsible at UEFA appearing to make the decisions relevant to the policing and police tactics.

During the day in the city centre and around the stadium prior to the match the intervention police were not seen to be verbally communicative with the home fans in general, with the Ultra fans in particular.

At the identified risk area near to the stadium police preferred to take up position on the entrance to the street rather than entering. Intervention officers were however observed to be very communicative with the away fans, giving advice when asked and directions.

It was observed that both team coaches arrived at the same time to the stadium. This contributed to groups of fans of both teams gathering together in areas from which they will get a good view of their team arriving. The visiting team's bus arrived via the home Ultra fans side of the stadium but this did not create any problems.

There appeared to be little communication between the escorts of the team buses and the security / police at the team coach entrance. The silver commander was observed to be overseeing the entry of the fan coaches, raising the question of who was overseeing the policing operation as a whole.

There was no segregation of fans surrounding the stadium before or after the game. This appeared to be a decision not based on the interaction between the two fans groups, but to be standardized procedure. This was contrary to what was mentioned in the briefing. The main entrance into the stadium for the away and part of the home fans was at the same point. The principals of segregation were understood in the planning stage of the operation. This is evident from the awareness of what should be done to segregate the fans by an intervention officer when questioned.

Around the stadium the command structure in relation to the intervention unit police was quite clear. All intervention police in the stadium were aware of what their task was, what the task of others around them was as well as who they must answer too.

There were home fans, when waiting for the exit of the team coaches, who were being problematic and vocal, moving and pushing the cordon barriers which had been set up. They were generally disturbing the peace for at least 10 minutes. Although the intervention police were nearby they made no effort to stop this behaviour. They simply observed, and left it to the security to step in and stop these individuals.

The exit of the fan coaches, again managed by the municipal police and aided by the intervention police, was well coordinated. The communication between police and Coach Company was also seen to be well coordinated.

There were 9 people in the police control room, of the 9 only 1 was tasked to monitor the many CCTV cameras (of which there were 107) which were presented on 18 screens, their images being recorded throughout and after the match. During the match there were no screens observing the surrounding area outside the stadium. After the game the screens maintained their focus on the seating area inside the stadium, rather than switching to monitor the outside area when the fans were exiting.

It was observed that there was little communication to or within the police control room. The means of communication were not coordinated over the radio as there seemed to be a preference of mobile phone use. There was little command structure and nor was there information transmitted into the control room through the duration of the game.

#### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

There was no explicit mention of intelligence or risk assessment in the security briefing. The demonstration was not mentioned in the security briefing although it may have had a cascading effect on the football event.

There was rationalisation and understanding of whether and what may cause risk although there was little evidence of responding to these risks. Some risks identified to the review team in interviews were not dealt with in the operational order.

The focus of risk appeared to be on the home Ultra fans. There did not seem to be a shared comprehension between police representatives and club representatives of what the risks posed on the day were. There was observed to be via the control room a lack of fluid, dynamic risk assessment.

#### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

The policing operation was appropriate and well balanced in relation to the risk posed. The late time of kick off did increase the risk of this low-risk match, as it encourages drinking for long lengths of time. Although it did not create any problems on this occasion, it would be advised against in the future.

With regard to the EU handbook, information was provided by the visiting away police at their initiative, and away country spotters were not present at match despite the request from the home police. In the absence of risk it was not felt necessary by the away police although it is advised by EU council guidelines that spotters be utilised in the context of international policing, regardless of risk analysis. No away stewards were present. It was felt the visiting away officers were not utilised in a way that would allow them to be of maximum benefit to the operation.

As a point of attention the team identified the existing control structure between the police match commander and the head of security. The team feel that the operation would benefit from them working beside one another and making decisions together, with the power being shared equally between both the police and the club. This would change relations between the police and security members working together inside the stadium.

The reviewers also noted that, to a visiting supporter the security and police were indistinguishable. The team felt security should be clearly identifiable, distinguishing them from police, particularly if they are carrying a gun or have a dog with them.

On a number of occasions the team observed the distinction between security and safety was compromised. Examples of this can be drawn from away team coach arriving via the home Ultra fans and the exit of a VIP through fan congested streets. Security and safety appeared to be conceptualised as the same thing by representatives of both the club and the police. Their training does not appear to emphasise management and understanding of crowd dynamics involved in managing safety and security. It is the responsibility of both the club and the police to ensure not only the safe entrance but the safe exit of the supporters from the stadium. Linked to this after the match the CCTV was not used to identify any issues that could arise on the exit of fans. It seemed the end of the game indicated the end of the operation in the control room, which should not be the case as club and police are still responsible for the fans.

It was unclear to the review team how much of this operation was a decision making process in relation to the low risk posed and how much of the operation was standardized procedure. One possible reason for the uncertainty behind the operational procedure was the lack of an explicit total concept. There may have



been objectives, as well as tactical and strategic planning behind the operation but these were not explicitly stated, to the review team or to those involved in the operation. The objectives appeared to be based on experience, all of those questioned were aware of their tasks and responsibilities but could not explain why they were doing these things. It is a point of attention to keep written documents recording the rationalisation of the policing operation with regards to intelligence, risk assessment, objectives, tactical and strategic planning and preparation for each and every match. These documents can be distributed to the commanders in control of main units prior to the game in question so the information to be cascaded through to lower ranks. In which case all of those involved in the operation on the day will have a clear and concise understanding of what they are doing and why and specific elements relating to the game. Cascading of information through the ranks is important for understanding roles prior to the game as well as afterwards. It is therefore also suggested there should be pre-match, half time and post-match briefings. This allows for the context of each event to be conveyed accurately to all those involved and the outcome of the police operation to be discussed in order to learn from experiences

In analysing the observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the most prominent ones are summarised below:

- There was good understanding of roles and responsibilities demonstrated in a professional manner by those questioned. The police were positioned around the stadium in appropriate places and were not at all imposing upon the relaxed nature of the event. The police were communicative and helpful to the visiting fans.
- There was impressive management of an outside unit (officers brought in from another city): this unit was well informed about their task and responsibilities.
- The organisation of the arrival and departure to the stadium by visiting fans was very clear for the visitors, with the stadium easy to find. The facilities provided for the arrival, parking and departure of the away fans coaches was impressively organised and executed by the municipal and intervention police, allowing constant movement all around the stadium. This is quite an achievement when one considers the location of the stadium and the number of away fans arriving at the stadium



### **3.8 Operation Smile.**

#### **A friendly international match prior to Euro 2008**

A friendly game between two national teams where police are making changes to the way operations have run in the past, specifically in relation to the behavioural profile of officers involved in the operation, including intervention officers: a concept was put in place in which police officers were expected to interact with fans in a friendly way and to smile (in line with 3D concept mentioned in Chapter 3.2, with the Ds standing for dialogue, de-escalation and direct action respectively).

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the following evaluation points:

- The balance maintained by the officers between an empathic and a pro-active approach
- The police officers awareness of information to distribute to supporters, as well as the officers ability to inform the fans accordingly
- The international police cooperation between the home and the away police forces
- Whether the police officers are aware of the expectations of their role and whether they understand the orders they have been given

In addition and linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Tactical Performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

#### **Data gathered**

##### *Briefings attended*

- Commanders briefing
- Spotters briefing
- UEFA briefing
- Intervention officers briefing
- Half time briefing

### *Interviews held*

- Commander
- Deputy commander
- Control room commander
- City centre platoon commander
- Away spotters
- Home spotters
- Fan
- 3 intervention police
- 2 stewards
- Transport police

### *Observations conducted*

- City areas – including train station, away fan orientated areas and main gathering areas in the host city.
- The spotters from home police force and spotters from several other regions in the country (travelled with them)
- The visiting away spotters (inside and outside the stadium)
- Commanders actions
- Supporters walk to the stadium
- 2 stadium command rooms
- Stadium surrounding area before and after the match; specifically away fans entrance and exit
- Inside the stadium (including press area, control room and away fans section)

### **Context in which the match takes place**

#### *The match*

The match was a friendly game between national teams. The match was played with a capacity of 30,000 spectators. The expected attendance for this game was 22,000 – 23,000 people. Kick off was at 20.00 hours. The away supporters had a total allowance of 3,000 tickets. 200 supporters were expected to travel from the away country and a further 1,000 away fans who inhabit within the home country are expected to attend. Total number of away fans expected was to be between 1,000 and 1,800.

### *Home fans*

Home fans were expected to come from host city and travel from the rest of the country to the host city, with 2 special trains arriving during the day of the match.

### *Away fans*

The away NFIP provided the NFIP in home country with information for the game, suggesting there was no intelligence which would support the expectation of disturbances or incidents planned by the away fans. The document also noted the supporters expected to attend the fixture would be category A supporters. Six visiting away spotters and two visiting away uniformed officers travelled with the away fans. Information regarding appropriate conduct of fans was made available from the host countries FA to the away supporters through a supporter's website.

### *Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

The match was classified as a 'low' risk match. Through interviews the following external risks were identified;

- Recent incidents in the home host city with regard to squatters. The notion was those involved in the incidents might attempt to confront the police again or could use the football match as an occasion.
- The home cities jail was more than full, which could lead to police having to deal with incidents inside the jail.
- The impact of past events upon current understanding of the inhabitants of host city and the media. The review team were made aware of the media's negative portrayal of the football supporters.

### *Police organisation/ operation*

Police made use of a concept in which expected police officers to interact with fans in a friendly way and to smile. The home police force are making changes to the way operations have run in the past, specifically in relation to the behavioural profile of all officers involved in the operation, including intervention officers.

The team were informed the operation would involve 277 officers from the host police force. This included national officers, intervention officers (40), airport police and traffic police. Stadium security and stewards employed by the club were also involved in crowd management around and inside the stadium. Inside the stadium the club safety officer had overall command.

The organisation of the police force was such that there was a static intervention unit at the stadium and a mobile unit patrolling the city centre. The six spotters who travelled from the away country played an integral role to the operation. In addition the two visiting away police officers were deployed in uniform. Host country spotters were also utilised from various areas in the country. A distinction was being made between spotters and spotters “light”.

The operation explicitly aimed to apply several principles, both with regard to fans as with regards to the home city population: empathy, permanent communication, deterrence and focused and determined intervention. In the operational order the consequences of these principles were spelled out in more detailed instructions (e.g. maintaining a visible presence supported by away officers in uniform, orienting and accompanying both home and away fans to the stadium). Part of the plan was to gather away fans in the city centre of the host city and encourage them to walk en masse to the stadium (a walk of over 3 km).

As a specific element of this match, activities were undertaken to inform local media representatives about the police operation. This included media representatives being briefed and interviewing the commander and away spotters. This approach was motivated by the fact that reporting in the press regarding large-scale police operations was considered to be dominated one-sidedly by events in the past and fears about the risks presented by football fans.

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

The day before the match observations were made of the commanders meeting at 15.30hrs. From 18.00hrs observations were made around and inside the stadium. The team were provided access to both control rooms within the stadium. The day of the match members of the team attended the UEFA meeting at 9.00hrs. At 11.00hrs members of the team attended the spotters meeting. Following this interviews were conducted in the morning. All the operational force groups involved were individually briefed initially by the overall commander and then by the group forces commanders. The team observed one of the operational groups being briefed.

From approximately 15.00hrs the review team split into two groups. One group conducted interviews and observed the command team’s actions. The second group travelled with the home spotters. At 17.30hrs the review team then

deployed in twos to make observations in various places. One pair patrolled the stadium area and two pairs patrolled the city area. Observations made on foot by the team in the city area included the train station, main gathering areas and the area between the city to the stadium. Three members of the transport police were spoken to inside the railway station. Interviews were conducted with officers throughout the city areas. Generally few away fans were present in the city area. Small groups of two or three were spread around, eating and drinking. At a gathering point surrounded by bars was the largest contingency of away fans observed in the centre, numbering approximately 20 identifiable fans.

One team travelled on public transport up to the stadium area. In context there was nothing on the way to the stadium to indicate there was an event taking place. The team then walked with the supporters of both teams alongside the motorway to the stadium.

Before the match at 16.30hrs the commander gave a press presentation outside the stadium for some 15 representatives from local media. Both the coordinator of the away spotters and the coordinator of the peer review team took part in this presentation. Afterwards, some media representatives accompanied the commander and interviewed him on several occasions.

18.30hrs Gates open.

20.30hrs Match begins.

*During the match; inside the stadium*

On entrance to the stadium the away supporters seating area was segregated from the home supporters.

21.20hrs Half time briefing takes place.

The match was generally without events. The atmosphere inside the stadium was carnivalesque with the fans of both teams joining together in cheering and performing Mexican waves.

*After the match*

After the match the exit of the fans was also without any events. Observations were made of both the home and away fans on exit. A large proportion of the away fans travelled back into the town area via the train.

### *Decisions*

The team specifically identified one decision point during their observations:

The decision to cancel the round up of the away fans in the city centre in order to escort them to the stadium, which was a consequence of intelligence updates from the home spotters conveying information about coaches which had been organised to take the away fans from hotels to the stadium.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

*The balance maintained by the police officers between an empathic and a pro-active approach*

The officers and commanders interviewed were aware of the balance between having a friendly approach and having the ability to react when needed. One member of the mobile unit stationed in the city centre commented through a translator; *"One part of their mission is to smile and walk around and keep a presence here. And the other side is they must know they are ready for intervention if things aren't all right"*. Another member of the mobile unit commented *"It's always a kind of smiling approach. It hasn't really changed from previous operations"*. The officers interviewed had internalised the friendly concept as well as being aware of the robust nature of the operation, ready to take action if necessary.

It was observed there was a low presence of officers throughout the city areas. Specifically 8 officers were observed outside the station standing in a circle beside their riot van. 2 officers were observed walking around the restaurants and bars opposite the station. Another 8 officers were observed waiting inside their van which was parked at the largest gathering of away fans in the centre. A further 2 officers were walking around this area.

Around the stadium area officers were observed communicating with fans and answering questions when they were approached. Initially in the stadium surroundings officers stood or walked around in pairs. The static unit at the stadium were clothed in standard uniform, wearing bullet-proof vests under their shirts. Outside the stadium there was no segregation and the supporters of both teams mixing openly. The context between fans was friendly. As drinking is permitted in public it was observed around the stadium area that much rubbish left laying by fans, including glass bottles. There were also several observations of broken glass lying on the floor around the stadium.



The police forces delivered a low profile visibility deployment as stressed in preparations. It was observed the mobile unit appeared to be restrained by the uniform worn (with e.g. leg protection, baton and visible handcuffs worn) in demonstrating the philosophy and they were generally not seen approaching or being approached by the away supporters. The evaluation team were informed the uniform worn by the mobile unit was lower risk uniform than was standard at football events. Other officers commented this was 'normal' uniform for football deployment. One intervention officer was observed standing aggressively with a baton across his chest and handcuff in the other chest pocket and groups of riot officers were observed sitting stationary in groups inside or at their vans. As the officers were deployed in the city centre they were arguably the first officers to come into contact with the supporters. One intervention officer reported that the only point of contact they had with the supporters was when a fan asked whether there was some demonstration, as the fan apparently wondered about the intervention officer's presence in the city.

The uniform worn by officers around the stadium was standard community policing uniform. The static unit in the stadium were observed actively communicating with fans and answering questions. One home supporter following interaction with several officers outside the stadium was approached by a member of the review team and commented without prompting "*Police officers here are very friendly*". *The police officers awareness of information to be distributed to supporters, as well as their ability to inform the fans accordingly*

Officers interviewed were aware of their role as information distributors. When asked about their role for the day one officer responded through a translator "*The task would be to give supporters who arrive information, to orient them towards the stadium and answer questions*". The 3 officers interviewed around the train station area presented the review teams with an information sheet which was distributed at their briefing. The information sheet contained information on a wide array of information including public transport, stadium information and accommodation details for those who needed somewhere to stay.

#### *The international police cooperation between the home and the away police forces*

The exchange of police information before the game appeared to be a mutual effort between the home and away countries. . The home country FA made information available to the away fans via a fan website in their own language. The away NFIP provided the home host police force information prior to the

match about the nature of their fans intentions and past history. The host NFIP requested spotters and 6 visiting officers attended the game, 4 on the street and 2 for coordination. Following this the host city police force requested 2 uniformed police both requests were met by the away country NFIP. There was no pre-visit from the away spotters or officers. The visibility of the two uniformed away officers appeared to have a large impact when working alongside their home counterpart officers. The impression was that of coordination and partnership. In briefings it was stressed that maximum use should be made of information provided by away (and home) spotters.

The away spotters commented they found the operation very open, both in general and also with regard to the away way of doing things, with the host police force willing to listen to their suggestions. According to them the presence of away spotters was not really necessary for this match, given the absence of risk presented by away fans. The away country NFIP considers 6 the minimum number of spotters they deploy. The idea to gather away fans and encourage them to walk to the stadium in a group has been used on previous occasions to good effect: for this match they considered the idea less feasible, because of the type of away fans attending and the absence of accompanying entertainment. However, they understood the considerations for trying to apply it for this match.

Interestingly, it became clear that functioning links existed with the border police to locate home supporters driving to the host city from surrounding countries.

*Whether the police officers are aware of the expectations of their role and do they understand the orders they have been given*

The commander personally briefed spotters and platoons and was very explicit about the concept. He stressed the need for a “friendly and firm” approach with communication, information, visibility and observation as important elements with the need to balance any use of forceful means.

All officers interviewed, including members of the command team were aware of their roles and responsibilities for the event. All questioned were aware of the concept as well as being aware of the robust nature of the operation. Officers fully understood their roles, several stated that their role was similar to what it had been in the past.

One intervention officer was asked his thoughts on the approach, responding *"It's nice; if you are smiling things will get better so it's a good philosophy"*.

Despite not being explicitly related to this event two officers were questioned about their awareness of the '3D' concept. It was found that they were not aware of the concept but when it was explained to them the officers then commented through a translator *"it's not written down but it is exactly what they do"*. Therefore despite being strictly unaware of the 'D3' terminology the officers appear again to have internalised the philosophy.

When interviewed the commander commented on his own role for the day, *"The idea is to be a little bit out and not completely involved"*. The commander then went on to manage the strategical and tactical plan for the event, individual briefings of each platoon, intelligence updates, half time briefing and media relations. A member of the command team commented they have the autonomy to act if needed but ideally must contact the commander first. On the day of the event it was observed that no intelligence delivered to the commander was filtered down to the deputy in charge.

In all, the community and intervention officers demonstrated an internalised friendly but firm approach in line with the tactical objectives. In addition the host police officers, others interacted with fans as well. Public transport police have recently replaced security on trains and in stations in the host country. The federal transport police were dressed similarly to the national police they did not carry a gun and they do not have the authority to arrest, only to detain. Six transport officers were seen patrolling one platform they were making no contact with the supporters as they arrived. When questioned they were unaware of the concept. It was thought there would be 250 fans arriving on two trains from regions surrounding the host city. Although several supporters arrived, the number expected failed to appear. When interviewed a command member of the transport police stated the organisation had not been involved in the planning for the event in question. Following the match the commander reported to the review team several deviations by the transport police from what was expected of them. An example was the use of dogs by the transport police in the train station, which acted in contrary to the strategy of the day.

There appeared to be a well functioning partnership between police and the stadium/ club. Members of stadium security worked alongside members of the

police in the central stadium command room. The commander and club safety officer were both aware of their organisations responsibilities inside and outside the stadium. There was no proactive policing inside the stadium. If the police must act within the stadium there should be an official handover of responsibility from the club to the police. Although the police report they have the ability to request responsibility and take action within the stadium if they feel there is demand for their role in the stadium. The stadium staff were dressed in distinctive yellow vests, stewards in red vests and security were dressed in black. The staffs hired by the club were easily identifiable as non-police. The fans first passed through an initial ticket check, before a second ticket check and body search. The searching by security on entrance for both the home and away fans was very thorough. Due the thorough body checks pressure was put on the initial ticket check stewards by means fans building up to enter. Once the game had began the stadium stewards found it difficult to prevent the away fans from standing in the stairway and congesting the exits. Some of the stewards continued to insist on them seating, others simply gave up.

#### *Tactical performance for public order management and risk assessment*

There was an explicit tactical, strategical and behavioural profile developed for the operation. It was observed the tactical and strategical options were not explicitly documented, for example in the operational order. The command and control structure did not follow the common bronze, silver, gold command structure. Although this had no effect on this operation the commander *de facto* took on the roles of gold and silver, and further additional responsibilities.

Strategically the objective of integrating both fans groups was achieved in the centre and on the concord. Away and home fans were however segregated inside the stadium. In the duration of time spent with the spotters it was observed there were information updates, including from contacts in other organisations. This illustrates the importance of a well networked and experienced spotter. It was noted contact via mobile phone was a frequent resource of information gathering.

As far as host country spotters were concerned, a distinction existed between a spotter and a spotter light. A spotter fulfils the role and logistical components of spotting as a full time job. A spotter light is less competent due to limits their role (only for fan recognition) and the fact they fulfil the role part time alongside their regular job. Due to the nature of the spotting job spotter lights

are significantly disadvantaged in their objectives by their lack of opportunity to really get to know the job. One spotter interviewed emphasised that networking and having time to know the role is vital to the success of a spotter.

Although there was no explicit mention of dynamic risk assessment or documents of the concept for example in the operational order, the operation was clearly sensitive to the emerging dynamics of risk. The operation was affected by information updates from various sources feeding into the operation throughout the day of the match. Home and away spotters played an integral role in intelligence gathering and the use of visiting spotters from other regions of the country also appeared to function effectively. Although the team also noted information which constituted notions of risk prior to the event did not appear to be strictly intelligence founded, e.g. in relation to the possible presence of home fans with stadium bans or possible actions by squatters. The visible deployment of officers in (partial) intervention uniform in the city centre also was not in line with the risk posed by the fans.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

Overall, the police operation achieved its stated objectives and cooperation between the home and away police forces functioned in line with the EU handbook. As far as the review points requested by the host are concerned, the team came to the following conclusions.

#### **Balance between empathic and pro-active approach**

Both community and intervention officers interviewed had internalised their role as friendly but were also prepared to act if needed. From an observational point of view, despite internalising the philosophy, uniform worn by the intervention officers seemed to prevent these officers from fully engaging in a the mentality required. However, to the fans, the visible deployment of the intervention officers could be seen as disproportionate to the actual risks. The team were aware of resource issues and the risk of problems related to the jail and/ or squatters confronting the police manifesting themselves on the day of the match (issues that did materialise a week afterwards).

*The police officers awareness of information to be distributed to supporters, as well as their ability to inform the fans accordingly*

All the police officers spoken with had an awareness of their role to distribute information, as well as their ability to inform the fans accordingly. The communication strategies of distributing officer information sheets was an effective means of

providing officers with the information they could use to inform fans. In relation to the levels of active communication the officers were not generally observed to approach the fans. Interactions between the supporters and police were initiated by the fans asking questions.

#### *The international police cooperation*

The operation adhered to EU handbook guidelines. Both forces demonstrated good cooperation and effective utilisation of spotters and intelligence gathering. The involvement of the spotters from surrounding regions in the home country and the border police is also demonstrative of the management of police cooperation for this game. The away spotters (including the 2 visiting away officers in uniform) were fully integrated into the operation, playing a key role in achieving the strategic objectives of the day.

#### *Police officers awareness of their role and understanding of orders*

Exchange of police information during the game was well managed with each operational group being individually briefed to ensure that everyone knew what was expected of them. Both group leaders and officers indeed appeared to know exactly what was expected of them and their roles and the philosophy. Everyone interviewed was aware of their role, with a clear chain of command, protocols and contingency plans. Intelligence updates during the event did not go through the central command post and failed to be delivered to key command positions. However, this awareness and understanding did not fully translate into practice.

With regard to tactical performance and risk assessment, the team noted that communication with the fans prior to the event was achieved via a website. Although useful, this is only effective for communication with individuals who check the internet website. There was no information on rules of conduct etc handed out to fans linked to their acquisition of tickets. This combined with limited active communication to fans on the ground.

The team also noted that not everyone involved in the operation (e.g. transport police) was aware of their role. A point for the future would be the integration of everyone involved into the planning and implementation of the policing operation.

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below:

- The concept. It was not just the concept itself that the team considered good practice, with its friendly and firm approach, but also the careful way in which this concept was communicated, as the concept involved a change relative to the way operations were run in the past
- The notion of media management and the planning approach not only towards the media but also to address the worries held by the public is good practice. This practice is also in line with the EU council handbook guidelines.
- The way in which roles were assigned based on experience and competence rather than rank (and the team feels this can be applied further)
- The wearing of vests underneath the t-shirt, as a way to emphasise the low-profile approach





### 3.9 Using the 3D-philosophy. Looking forwards to Euro 2008

A friendly international match considered to be high-risk in which the so-called 3D philosophy or concept was tested. As indicated in Chapter 3.2, the philosophy is understood to be a graded approach to increasing levels of disorder, with the Ds standing for dialogue, de-escalation and direct action respectively. The increasing levels of D corresponds behavioural approaches adopted by the officers involved in managing the situation. The outward appearance of officers also plays a role in communication of the police approach.

#### **Evaluation points requested by host police force**

The evaluation team was asked to focus on the following evaluation points:

- The work of the task force and the executive staff
- The work of the operation controllers on the ground / how the single task force sections work together?
- The work of the different commands of the single units (leading in the mission, briefing).
- Interaction between the police officers and the fans in the city and in the stadium.
- Appearance of the police, competency of the intervention (3D philosophy).
- Was the government order implemented?
- The work of the private security company and the cooperation with the police.
- The work of the spotters.

In addition and linked to the EU handbook, the following points were addressed as well:

- Information management
- Preparations
- Cooperation between police forces
- Cooperation between police forces and stewards and employment of stewards
- Tactical Performance for public order management
- Dynamic risk assessment

#### **Data gathered**

##### *Briefings attended*

- Spotters briefing
- UEFA Meeting
- Special forces' briefing

- Intervention police briefing
- Commanders briefing
- Control room staff briefing
- Half time briefing stadium

#### *Interviews conducted*

- Police commander and command team
- Operational chief
- Brigadier deputy
- Chief of staff
- Commander of the Intervention police
- Commander of the special forces police
- 2 company commanders of the Intervention police
- 2 police commanders for the stadium
- 6 standard uniform officers
- Head of the home countries NFIP
- Away countries FA
- Away police delegation; silver commander, intelligence, 4 police officers, 4 spotters
- UEFA Security delegate
- Club Stadium manager
- Club Security manager
- 2 home club Stewards
- Representative from the away Fan association
- 10 away fans
- 11 home fans
- 2 fans (not host countries) which are affiliated with home fan group
- Red cross within the stadium
- Journalist

The majority of officers working at the event were not informed about the peer review and the role of the review team. Therefore there was a widespread lack of understanding of the peer reviewers' presence which led to officers refusing to be interviewed or speak to members of the review team. The police officers who did oblige to talk with team members sought permission in advance.

### *Observations conducted*

- Stadium control room (before and after the event)
- City control room (morning and day)
- City Centre – including away fan zone and home and away fan hotspot bars
- Transport tram to hotspots
- Stadium surrounding areas
- Turnstiles at stadium (Specific attention to entrance of home and away fans)
- Inside the stadium (Entrance and exit of the home and away fans, interactions between fans and police, seating area of the away fans)
- Stewarding searches and interactions with fans on entrance
- Stewarding within the stadium
- Traffic around the stadium after the event
- Hotspot Bars in the city after the event

### **Context in which the match takes place**

#### *The match*

The match was a friendly international match. The tickets for the event were sold out with the stadium being filled to capacity of 45,000 spectators. 39,000 home fans were expected to attend the event. There were 4,600 tickets made available to the visiting fans, which was the number expected to attend the match. Kick off for the game was at 21.00hrs, with gates opening at 19.00hrs. The game was considered by the police, club and UEFA to be a high risk fixture.

#### *Home fans*

Home fans are expected to be residents of the host city as well as travelling from several other cities in the country to view the match. An expected 390 to 490 home risk fans will attend the event. The possibility of risk fans from different regions in the home country joining forces to challenge the away fans was considered in police preparations, although the fans are thought to be more likely to fight one another. It was reported these groups would be ready to confront the police as this has happened in the past. It was stressed from all level of preparations and police command that any provocations on the day were expected to be at the instigation of the home fans and not the away fans.

### *Away fans*

Prior to the event there was little information of away fans intentions. The away fans were not considered to be the instigator of any disorder which may develop, but as a group were expected to respond to provocations. Officers at all levels of command report historically having good experiences with away fans when they have visited the home country, in the past. The police intelligence document states a maximum expectation of 100 away risk fans to attend the fixture. It was made explicit in the intelligence document that drunken away fans were not to be considered risk fans. 3,000 of the away fans were expected to stay overnight on the day of the event, staying in the host city or surrounding areas.

### *Specific elements of this match (recent events, specific risks)*

It is relevant to note the weather: temperature on the day of and the day before the event was below minus and it was snowing. As a consequence on the day many fans, home and away, chose to stay off the streets and stay warm indoors. Furthermore the difficult weather conditions were reported to have created difficulties for away fans, often travelling from surrounding regions or airports.

Two demonstrations were to take place in the city centre on the same day as the football game although this was thought to have no effect on the police operation for the football game. Also to take place on the same day was a playful, friendly football game taking place in the city centre involving journalists.

A recent incident involving the death of a football supporter in a country neighbouring the host country was suggested to have a possible effect upon the behaviour of fans at the event in question. The reason for this is several domestic football teams in the host city are affiliated with the fans of the football team which lost a fan accidentally at the hands of a member of the police, therefore it was posited action against police could reflect action related to this recent event.

### *Police organisation/ operation*

There were 950 officers involved in the policing operation in total, including 300 city intervention police and 100 to 120 special force riot officers. The operation functioned through 12 organisational divisions. Strategical staffs were present waiting only for an event to happen which demanded their application and operational staff were active and processing the event in the control room,

taking responsibility for tactical decisions. Overall control of the operation is in the control room the overall command is not present at the event. Many agencies were involved in executing the policing operation including liaison officers from the visiting police force, the army and local authorities, blue light organisations, ambulance and fire). Geographically there were three bronzes one at the stadium and one responsible for the city areas and demonstrations and a further mobile bronze.

There was a simulation exercise run from the control room which involved a 'visit' from a VIP. Therefore the organisation was not only running the actual policing operation but preparing for the potential actuality of high profile VIPs attending the stadium in the future.

## **Overview of events and main decisions**

### *Before the match*

The review team attended briefings in the morning. Observations were made in the control room at the police HQ and interviews conducted. The two teams then went into the city centre and made observations of hot spots and pubs whilst holding interviews with both fans and police. There were few fans on the street due to the weather.

A strategic team meeting was held in the police HQ prior to the event in order to decide positioning and remaining interviews to be conducted. The team were advised during this time of recent intelligence and developing understanding of the operation by a command level officer. The team then divided into three teams and travelled to the stadium to begin observations and interviews there.

19.00hrs the gates open. Observations around the stadium focused on the entrance of both home and away fans. Interviews were also conducted with fan groups, officers and stewards. Approximately 30 minutes before kick off a minor incident took place the entrance area for the visiting fans, when 10 home fans provoked away fans by throwing missiles.

There was an issue with the turnstiles which led to fans waiting in very long queues to enter the stadium, particularly the home fans. The queues were backed up into the commercial and merchandise areas causing large concentrations of people in small areas.

### *During the match*

21.00hrs the game kicks off. By 21.04hrs all fans had entered the stadium. During the match no issues arose.

### *After the match*

23.00hrs the home and away fans were permitted to leave the stadium simultaneously at the end of the game. The home fans were required to directly pass through the pathway of the away fans as they exited the stadium, the fans were therefore not segregated following the event. The fans evacuated the stadium and surrounding areas promptly and without incident.

### *Decisions*

A decision was taken prior to the event to simulate a VIP attendee at the event for the purpose of training the staff and units in preparation for the Euro 2008 competition next year.

A command level police representative stated an objective of the operation was to segregate the two fan groups both in the city centre and around the stadium. There was no strict segregation around the stadium either before or after the event, fans were permitted to join one another freely. Therefore a decision was taken to allow the fans to mix, particularly around the stadium area.

Information was conveyed to the team during the half time briefing which stated the away fans were to be held within the stadium for 15 minutes following the end of the game. There was an announcement made by the club to the fans at 86 minutes (4 minutes before the match was to end) informing them of this decision and to remain seated after the event. At some point during the next 4 minutes a decision was taken to allow the away fans to leave the stadium without being held back. There was no club security to prevent the away fans from leaving the stadium therefore the fans exited the stadium along with the home fans. It is unknown why the decision to place a hold back on the fans was taken initially, accounting for the friendly context and nature of the event. Furthermore it is unknown who made and for what reason the last minute decision to remove the holdback was made.

A decision was taken to change the uniform worn by officers through the duration of the match. Prior to the event officer's wore only leg protection, after the event all officers wore full protection.

### **Observations related to evaluation points**

#### *The work of the task force and the executive staff*

Observations of the task force and the executive staff within the command room at the police headquarters in the city revealed the control room to be modern and functioning very efficiently. The command and control team were very professional in attitudes and worked effectively together. The large control room was highly equipped and was capable of facilitating all members of the command team, as well as other partners and agencies involved in the event. For example the visiting police representative who were observed to be present within the control room were given a large space in which to work, allowing them to be accessible and involved. The multitude of large TV screens and computers capable of accessing CCTV throughout the city and at the stadium allowed the command team to easily navigate between the two, overseeing the match and the demonstrations in the city simultaneously.

Observations in the control room throughout the police operation demonstrate the information coming into the control room via radio was exchanged and shared effectively throughout the operation. This ensured sub-commanders had an up to the minute understanding of the operation as a whole. The city police units work in groups of 6 or 7 officers. Interviews prior to the match reveal the individual units have one radio per group. This is not the case for the special units, in which all officers are distributed their own radio. The Special forces units are also distributed one radio per officer. Additionally Special forces officers have access to their own radio frequency as well as the city police frequency in order to have a concise overview of the whole operation. The commander of the city police unit was observed to have a different ear piece in each ear, changing the concentration from one ear to the other. The first radio channel tracked updates for the Special forces unit and the other was the spotters' radio frequency. When interviewed the commander revealed the Special forces unit were only to listen to the information on the channel for spotters and not to respond unless instructed.

The documents produced for the match in question adequately conveyed the reality of the event. Documents were distributed in home countries language and contained updated and recent information. The intelligence document produced for the event was particularly good. This booklet contained all information which could be relevant to the event including travel and accommodation arrangements for both fan groups. The histories of the fan

group and expectations of fan behaviour were also included. There were instructions for the appropriate understandings of officers involved in the operation, for example the document stressed that drunken visiting fans were just that and not to be considered risk fans.

*The work of the operation controllers on the ground / the work of the different commands of the single units (leading in the mission, briefing)*

Interviews revealed there were clear command and control structure and explicit expectations of the responsibilities of commanders. When interviewed the commander of the operation, the commander of the city crowd control unit and the commander of the Special forces unit clearly expressed the special forces unit can only take action from the instruction of the central command room following a request from the city crowd control unit. It was observed during the operation the Special forces unit had their own division of plain clothed officers tasked to identify potential risks. An interview with the city operational commander revealed there was a lack of awareness surrounding these officers and the role undertaken by these individuals in the operation. These officers were not present at the city police spotters briefing prior to the match.

At approximately 20:25hrs discussions with the commander of the Special forces unit units revealed the home countries spotters had identified a group of home risk fans moving towards the stadium. At 20:37hrs the minor incident referred to previously (overview of events) took place at the entrance area for the visiting away fans. A group of approximately 10 home fans entered the area immediately surrounding the stadium next to where the away fans were queuing to enter. Two of the home fans became very vocal. At this point there were visiting police officers in standard uniform and 6 visible city crowd standard uniform police. The group of 10 home fans then became involved in attempting to provoke the home fans who were queuing to enter the stadium as they walked down the row of fans. There was little response initially although after approximately 4 minutes of taunting the officers present at this time created a line between the home fans and the queuing away fans. The officers made no attempt to encourage the home supporters to move away from the area or to disperse these fans. The home fans then threw several missiles in the direction of the away fans. Until this point there had been very little response from the away fans. The away became more vocal and several fans were seen gesturing to the home. Again there was no attempt to communicate with the home fans or move them away from the area. 40 city crowd control officers were then deployed to the area



creating a larger cordon between the two fan groups. The Special forces unit, spotters and dog handlers also became present at this point. No actions were taken towards any fans. After continued provocations in which both home and away were now engaging, several away fans removed themselves from the queue and attempted to confront the home fans. There was a small scuffle involving fans of both groups, to which officers acted promptly. Following this there was a period of mulling time where all the officers present stayed in the area. One of the home spotters identified a fan who was involved in the initial provocations. This individual had their details recorded but it is unknown what action was taken against this person and if he was permitted to watch the match. There were observed to be at least 3 bronzes (sub-commanders) present at this developing situation. None of them seemed to be taking control of the situation. There appeared to be a slight ambiguity over where the forces should be and were expected to do at this point. Observations of this deployment gave the impression the Special forces officers have the ability to self deploy if they see fit.

The spotters briefing attended accurately conveyed the same information as delivered in the intelligence report. The intelligence report was distributed to the team and assumption is the commanders received this document. Generally speaking all briefings covered the same issues. During all briefings the style of conveying the information was similar. The person responsible for giving the briefing would stand up in front of their audience and talk. There were no documents or visual aids to ensure the information being cascaded was the same information. Command team were left to interpret what is being conveyed to them in the briefings and relay this to their staff. Comparing the special forces briefing and the city police briefing there were different understandings of what risks were involved in the event. The special forces interpretation of intelligence was that the home fans were the primary risk, despite this the special forces officers were informed the "*home cat C's are away Cat C++*" at their briefing. This was not the understanding of the rest of the police command team or the intelligence for the event.

#### *How do the single task force sections work together?*

There appeared to be three general task force sections: there were standard uniform officers, city control units and the Special forces units. As stressed the commanders and sub-commanders when interviewed each had a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities as a unit. Officers also had geographical accountability for their roles around the stadium. At approximately

19.30 hrs units of city police were brought to the stadium for support. Interviews reveal the Special forces units are a specialised intervention unit which are called upon only when necessary. Interviews with both commanders of the city police and Special forces units made clear the city crowd control unit were primarily the responsible agency in the city and stadium. The Special forces unit was to be responsible only in situations of serious disorder or extreme circumstances. At the stadium Special forces officers appeared to be patrolling around the stadium. The Special forces officers were also observed to be present at the minor incident prior to the event. The team are unsure why these officers were deployed to manage minor provocations.

When spotters indicated home risk fans were seen moving towards away fans queuing to enter the stadium, the commanders of the single units were made aware of this movement over the radio. In both the Special forces and spotters briefings the importance of information exchange was stressed. The intelligence was in place early enough for the review team, police and special force command team to be made aware of the potential risk prior to the incident developing. When the risk fans did arrive at the stadium there was no extra police presence deployed to the area in which the risk was identified. The fans were observed to be permitted by the city standard uniform officers present to continue shouting and gesturing to one another allowing the dynamics conducive to disorder to develop. It then appeared there was a call for backup officers to which minutes later many officers from different single units arrived at the scene. The forces did not seem to take any determined actions and issues of command and control were observable. Fans were still being permitted to taunt one another. It seemed there was no single commander taking control, neither the commander of the stadium, the commander of the city police or the Special forces. It appeared at this point there was little communication between the individuals who were responsible for making the decisions.

#### *Interaction between the police officers and the fans in the city and in the stadium*

During the briefings prior to the match there were no explicit instructions for the officers to interact or make contact with the fans. There was no behavioural profile outlined or emphasised to the officers prior to the event.

In the city centre the largest contingency of police presence was positioned near the away fan zone. There were approximately 15 vans, each containing 7 officer's position in a straight line along the road less than 50 meters from the

fan embassy. Upon observation and interview of the officers most could be seen sleeping or playing cards inside the vans or standing outside their van smoking in full police uniform. There were also observed to be isolated observations of single vans containing a unit of city police officers parked around the centre at hot spots. There was little fan activity and the officers in the city were not observed to be engaging the community in any way. There were no officers, home or away, observed at the fan zone area. Interviews with the Gold commander following these observations reveal the officers were permitted to stay warm and inside the vans unless there was a need for them to be outside.

At the stadium the policing presence encountered was different to that in the city centre. Police vans were parked and visible the visiting fans section. The vans were now empty and officers were positioned all around the stadium. Before the match there was considerable variation in the way officers around the stadium looked. Some wore leg protection, some wore body protection, sometimes officers wore both. Some wore their protection on top of their uniform; some wore their protection underneath their uniform. Most had riot helmets worn on their waist. The distinctive distinguishing feature between the city standard uniform officers and the city riot control was the two blue stripes on the leg of the uniform worn by riot control officers. Officers were observed predominantly standing together in groups of 4-5 too groups as large as 15. Home fans were observed to approach the officers to ask for directions regarding entrances to the stadium however the interactions were at the initiative of the fans and very limited. Perceptually the officers did not appear to be very approachable.

Although the review team members were not 'fans' at the event it seems relevant to mention that on several occasions in the city and at the stadium officers were approached by team members and asked very general questions such as 'what's going on?' or 'why are you here?' and were refused an answer. The officers approached were not particularly informative or helpful when approached; several refused to answer the questions posed to them. After the match had finished both groups of fans were permitted to leave the stadium simultaneously. Generally speaking the police presence at the gates in which home fans were to exit was low. The exit used by the away fans there were approximately 60 officers (including dog handlers) positioned wearing full riot protection, including their helmets. The officers were positioned in a stationary manner. Officers formed one line on either side of the away fans exiting the stadium, acting to guide the fans away from the stadium. There was

a break on either side of the police cordons in order to allow home fans to cross the cordon horizontally. One home police officer was observed making conversation with away fans and giving advice at this point.

There was also an observation of an away fan asking a home police officer where he could catch the bus. The home officer refrained from giving the information to the fan. The fan then approached a visiting police officer who approached the same home police officer the fan had approached initially. The away officer got the answer and passed the information on to the fan.

Home country officers were observed working together around the stadium area with visiting police officers. The away officers wore standard community uniform with no protection. Before and after the match both home and away fans approached these officers, asking to have their picture taken. One of the officers was seen swapping his bobby hat with a child for a novelty ski hat and posing for pictures. The police officers attracted a lot of attention as they walked around in small groups of 2 and 3.

When interviewed several junior officers on the ground chose to share with the review team how long they had been working for (14 -16 hours). The officers interviewed commented they were not happy with this situation.

*Appearance of the police, comparativeness of the intervention (3D philosophy)*

This vision of the 3D is not what was evidenced in practice at the event. At no point during any of the briefings prior to the policing operation beginning was the 3D philosophy emphasised. Nor was there any emphasis on contact, or reinforcing of the behavioural expectations of the officers by the commanders.

Before the game in the city there was no evidence of the 1<sup>st</sup> D as the officers were waiting in vans, and there was little possibility for fans to contact them or vice versa. There were no standard uniform officers engaging the fans therefore the first contact fans had with officers was vast amounts waiting in the vans. The only point at which officers were observed to come out of their vans was to smoke cigarettes. This did not convey a sense of approachability.

At the stadium the officers did not behave in line with the 3D phased approach. Standard uniform officers were not observed around the stadium at all (whereas there were observations of officers wearing balaclavas underneath riot helmets)

and the only instance in which interaction was observed with an home fan was at the initiative of this fan to attain information on correct entrances to the stadium. There was no observational evidence of commanders attempting to enforce or demonstrate the 3D philosophy to their officers on the streets around the stadium. For example officers were not observed to be instructed to approach fans or split into more approachable groups.

The use of the away police officers was in line with the 3D concept, working in small groups and standard uniform, enjoying the company of the fans, posing for pictures and generally building relations.

#### *Was the government order implemented?*

Due to the nature of the event conclusions relating to the involvement of the government are limited. As far as the review team were made aware the government have no role or involvement at the event currently in question. The Brigadier of the policing operation was a political representative; this individual decided the strategic goals for the match. The strategic goals stated were total segregation of the fans, in the city and at the stadium. At the stadium there was no segregation of the two fan groups despite it being reported prior to the event measures would be in place to do so.

#### *The work of the private security company and the cooperation with the police*

Interviews with varying levels of police command expressed a belief of a good and effective relationship between the police and private security companies. Representatives from the club also commented on the working relations. The staff work together for domestic matches regularly and therefore are accustomed to working with one another. Interviews with members of the private security company reveal these staffs too have the 3D concept integrated into their training.

Before the match significant queues built up and led from the turnstiles to the location of the food and merchandise stalls at the surrounding stadium area. This issue appeared to be caused by an insufficient number of turnstiles for fans to enter the stadium en masse therefore slowing entrance and allowing the queues to build. Police officers were observed to oversee the stewards although there was no attempt to support the stewards trying to manage the crowds. Police officers were interviewed as to why they were not providing aid to the club staff. They indicated it was not their responsibility but the stewards to deal with this issue.

Stewards observed appeared to be working professionally. At the away fans entrance observed interacting with the home fans. The body searches on entrance to the stadium were observed to be thorough. The weather was very cold and fans were wearing big jackets and many layers which made it even more important for the searches to be thoroughly executed, which they were. It was also observed both the home and away fans were searched and treated in the same manner on entrance to the stadium.

It was agreed prior to the match at a pre-match visit there would be segregation between the home and away fans inside the stadium. The club safety officer agreed that stewards should be in the segregation line between the home and away fan groups. However when the fans entered the stadium and the match began this request was not adhered to. The visiting contingency requested the club to place a cordon between the fans midway through the first half of the game.

#### *The work of the spotters*

The spotters interviewed around the stadium had been doing their job for many years and as such knew their roles and performed their jobs very effectively at the match. The spotters had their own radio frequency which allowed up to the minute and developing information to be shared with the home and away officers. The role of the spotters was only to track, identify and observe the home risk fans behaviour. There was no communication with the fans, or interaction in any way to gather information.

Before the home risk fans arrived at the away fans prior to the match spotters identified the possibility of increasing risk and made the operational command aware of the increasing risk. Following the minor altercations the spotters identified one of the home risk fans involved in the provocation of the away fans before the match began. This allowed the city police to detain the individual and appropriately deal with him.

#### *Information management*

The away intelligence team made contact with the police in host prior to travelling over for the match. The home contingency report the welcome was excellent and all the necessary requirements discussed at this meeting were delivered without hesitation by the host police force.

At the pre-match visit there was a memorandum produced and signed by both home and away representatives in advance of the event. This document recorded the agreed uses for visiting police officers at the match in question.

The intelligence documents made available to the visiting police were written in the host countries language which the visiting group could not read. The local home commanders were also provided copies of the away team's intelligence assessments.

During the match the exchange of police information appeared to be mutual and function well. The visiting police officers were well integrated into the operation and were provided with radios and mobile phones. This was thought by the away to be excellent foundations for the exchange of information to be made.

Following the event information provided by both the police representatives and separately by spotters was reportedly fed back to NFIPs.

### *Preparations*

In preparation for the match there was a pre-match meeting involving the away police travelling to the host country. The leader of the fan group and fan zone was also present at these initial discussions to act as a mediator between the away fans and the police.

### *Cooperation between police forces*

Visiting representatives came from the away country in the form of spotters and uniformed officers for the event. Protocols were agreed in advance at a pre-visit regarding the effective use of these officers. The facilitation and utilisation of officers at the match was very effective and in line with the agreed protocols. Liaison officers were provided to the spotters of the away contingency. The away police commented this was the best facilitation of communication through liaison they have experienced. Away officers were reported to be positioned at the airport. There were no away officers observed to be present at the away fan zone in the city centre.

The four visiting plain clothed spotters were not wearing the EU advised vests. In accordance with the EU handbook identification vests should be provided for identification for the benefit of both the visiting fans and the safety of the spotters.

*Cooperation between police forces and stewards & employment of stewards*  
For conclusions relating to this evaluation point; see *'The work of the private security company and the cooperation with the police'*.

#### *Tactical Performance for public order management*

Tactically the operation achieved the overall objective of managing the crowd dynamics and minimising public disorder. Tactically an objective of the operation was to act in line with the 3D concept (see; *'Appearance of the police, comparativeness of the intervention 3D philosophy'*).

There was one observed incident of tactical deployment at the event in question, which has already been described. As indicated, as the incident developed there was an element of misunderstanding and lack of tactical awareness of how to deal with that situation due to a lack of command and control at the scene.

#### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

The perspective of the FA was that the fixture was considered a high risk due to the large number of people who would attend the event, as the stadium was sold out. The city police also considered the fixture to be a high risk as they held prior intelligence retrieved from internet sources to suggest home fans would attempt to confront away fans. It was expected any provocations would come from the home side, although it was also believed if provoked the away would respond with intent to cause disorder. In both the Special forces unit and spotters briefings the intelligence delivered to the officers stressed an understanding of risk expected to originate with the home risk fans. It was evidenced from the briefings, observations, behaviours and the uniform worn by the officers that the operation reflected a high risk nature. In the preparation phases and during the duration of the match there was a major focus on the risk fans.

In the city areas before the game there were a very high number of police vans and officers located at the away fan zone. This translated into a similar approach for managing risk at the stadium. Within the stadium there were around 30 officers positioned behind the away fan seated section. This was the only visible police presence within the stadium. After the match ended away fans, on leaving the stadium, were met by between 60 -80 officers, including dog handlers. These officers were stationary and positioned in lines. In the city and the stadium there was a visible concentration of police presence surrounding fans.



In direct relation to the dynamic response to risk the police were visible outside the stadium. However, it was disappointing that the home risk group were capable of approaching and provoking away fans. There appeared to be no risk related deployment at this point. Furthermore when officers were positioned between the home and away fans, there was no action to attempt to move the home fans away from the situation. They were permitted to continue to shout and gesture at the away fans, increasing the likelihood of disorder until away fans eventually removed themselves from the queue and attempted to confront the home fans. Only at this point proactive management of the fan groups was observed.

### **Conclusions, including good practice and points of attention**

#### *The work of the task force and the executive staff*

In conclusion observations of the task force and the executive staff within the command room at the police headquarters in the city revealed the control room to be modern and to function very efficiently and professionally. The project team had a large influence on the whole operation. The strategical instructions were clearly expressed and there was clear understanding at all levels for the way in which these strategies were to be achieved. The president showed a very good understanding of the command and control structure which was reiterated by other command members in interviews. The overall coordination within the control room and command level staff was impressive. All staff interviewed knew their structure of the command and control from their position and responsibilities, as well and the overall strategy.

#### *The work of the operation controllers on the ground / the work of the different commands of the single units (leading in the mission, briefing)*

The different operation controllers were in command of their officers and gave clear briefings to their officers. At all the briefings attended by the review team there were no visual aids, hand outs or power point presentations which could have been helpful to aid uniformity of understanding and to enforce specific elements of the operation. In relation to the incident observed, it is not known whether intelligence was not passed down below the subcommand level (indicating a breakdown of communication), or whether there was no anticipation of the risk developing to an incident (indicating a lack of tactical deployment in relation to the intelligence available). There appeared at this point to be little communication between the junior officers or the command level officers of the separate task force units.

Extensive interviews with members of the specials forces unit demonstrate the organisation is very professional, highly competent and acutely aware of dynamics of crowd control. Therefore in the appropriate situation there is no question that the unit would be capable of adequately managing it, however with regard to the policing operation in question there was no clarity of the Special forces role within the command structure. There is no evidence of where the unit is positioned with regard to command. On the one hand it appeared the unit was integrated completely into the organisation and the team was informed the Special forces unit can only take action from the instruction of the central command room following a request from the city crowd control unit. However observations through the day gave the impression the Special forces officers have the ability to self deploy if they see fit, although the team cannot conclude this for certain. What can be concluded is the role of the Special forces unit was not only that of major disorder or critical situations. The use of the Special forces officers appeared to be similar to that of the city police crowd control. At the stadium Special forces officers appeared to be patrolling around the stadium. The Special forces officers were also present at the minor incident prior to the event. The team are unsure why these officers were deployed to manage minor provocations. Whether these officers were deployed by the command room or self deployed it is advised consideration be taken for when is best to involve the unit.

#### *How do the single task force sections work together?*

In theory there was a clear command and control structure and expectations of the roles and responsibilities of commanders and officers. In practice on the ground there seemed to be ambiguities in understanding for these responsibilities. E.g. the Special forces unit utilised a specialised plain clothed unit. These officers were not present at the city spotters briefing prior to the match and the overall commander of the operation did not know the officer's role within the operation. With regard specifically to the city police working on the ground it is unknown whether the commander for the stadium had control of all the forces in the stadium surrounding areas. There was obvious geographical responsibility but there were many resources which came from the city areas to provide extra support with command figures and during the only incident the team observed which required coordination of the different units there seemed to be no single commander taking control, (not the geographical commanders of the stadium, nor the city police or the special forces commander).

The team therefore suggests maybe commanders of the forces could participate in simulation table top exercises in which officers could run through potential scenarios and actions in response to these scenarios would help to clarify roles at critical junctures.

*Interaction between the police officers and the fans in the city and in the stadium*

The weather on the day of the evaluation restricted the ability of the review team to draw any generalised and firm conclusions on the interaction between the police and fans in the city. Due to the weather officers were permitted to stay warm, positioned in vans. The use of high visibility presence at strategic locations is an effective tactical means for managing police presence. No interactions were observed in the city between officers and fans. However the visual appearance of many vans strategically placed with officers waiting inside, coming out of the vans only for cigarettes did not create the impression the officers were approachable and there to interact but could have been construed by the fans as a more distant (and potentially antagonistic). It is suggested officers do not smoke in full view of the public whilst in uniform.

At the fan zone in the city there was no police presence, home or away. The team felt this was a missed opportunity to communicate with the fans and create an impression of the officers working together. If officers were together at the fan zone they would have had the ability to interact with the fans and answer questions, despite the weather. This was also a potential point at which the good and effective relations between the home and visiting fans could be stressed. This form of relation building was witnessed at the stadium, where home and away officers worked together.

At the stadium the interaction between the home police and fans of both countries was restricted by the visual appearance of the officers in high profile control uniforms and there were limited observations of officers openly engaging with any supporters. The officers approached were not particularly informative or helpful.

The officers were not instructed to act in specific ways or approach and interact with fans before the match.

### *Appearance of the police, comparativeness of the intervention (3D philosophy)*

In the city there was no evidence of dialogue and at the stadium area officers were wearing protective padding and could have given the impression of being 'riot police'. The officers did not engage fans, developing the 1st D and as such the concept was lost as a result. The philosophy seems currently a theoretical approach and the challenge is how to tactically implement the philosophy in practice. In order for this to happen it is important commanders give the officers the tactics in order to deliver the 3D philosophy and explain the philosophy and the rationale behind it to their officers. In order to ensure officers understand and are acting in line with the 3D approach a quality assurance officer could be of benefit.

### *Was the government order implemented?*

Due to the nature of the event conclusions relating to the involvement of the government are limited. As far as the review team were made aware aside from the strategic segregation objective determined by the commander and the government had no further rule or involvement at the match in question. The objective of segregation was achieved prior to the match due to the fans staying in the pubs as a consequence of the cold and snowy weather. The objective of segregation was not achieved between the two fans groups after the match.

### *The work of the private security company and the cooperation with the police*

The relations between the private security and the police were reported by both to function effectively. This relationship can of course only function effectively if both sides fulfil their responsibilities.

One issue which is the responsibility of the club and private security is the length of the queues as fans were waiting to enter the stadium. The numbers of turnstiles were limited and as a result the search and entry process was slow. This could lead to supporter frustration and potentially disorder if not rectified. The fans built up on and this put pressure on the staff at the entrance. The method of queuing implemented brings supporters directly away from the entry point and therefore restricts access around the stadium forcing people wider and wider.

Segregation between home and away supporters within the stadium was also a responsibility of the club. At the beginning of the match this segregation was not in place, creating potential for problems in this area.

### *The work of the spotters*

The spotters were clear on the command and control structures surrounding them. The spotters were acutely aware of who the risk fans were, located them and appeared to be in the right place at the right time. The work of the spotters were seen to be professional and very competent; this is evidenced in interviews and by the spotters exemplifying their experience by identifying an offending home risk fan who was involved in instigating the provocations prior to the match beginning. The spotters also appeared to provide regular and informative information into the policing operation.

As the role of the spotters was only to track, identify and observe risk fans behaviour without any communication or interaction with fans, they acted according to the *criminal intelligence model* (watching and waiting for the fans to misbehave) rather than a *community oriented approach*. (In a community oriented approach spotters actively approach and chat with the fans in order to gain information and build relations between the police and fans for possible understandings between the two).

### *Exchange of police information (before, during, after)*

In general, there was a clear and effective exchange of police information. At the pre-match visit there was a memorandum produced and signed by both home and away representatives in advance of the event and there was a clear understating of what the roles of the officers were to be and what both agencies should expect from one another far in advance of the match itself.

The away contingency were provided the intelligence documents in the language of the host, without a translation. This restricted their possibility to work on the operation to the best of their understanding and ability. The away team were not given the follow up intelligence assessment in either language. It could be suggested in order for all to learn from the experiences this document is distributed to the visiting force.

### *Preparations*

A pre match visit took place which is in line with the EU handbook. Present at this meet was an away fan zone representative, this is thought to be good practice and create the perception of the fans and the police working together.

For the match itself the only briefing team attended by the visiting officers was the 09.00hrs briefing on the day of the event. This briefing did not outline the strategy or policing style for the operation. There was no further formal intelligence briefing for the spotting/ uniform teams. There were also no visual aids at any of the briefings such as maps of the city or depictions of the way in which officers were expected to look, which has been recommended.

#### *Cooperation between police forces*

The cooperation between police forces was very good at the event in question. The host police force provided liaison officers in order to guide and help with queries the visiting team may have had. It was the same officers working with both command and intelligence teams for the duration and this is thought to be good practice. The away contingency referred to the treatment with regard to the liaison as the most efficient they had experienced.

Additionally the host police provided mobile telephones to the visiting delegation (command, uniform and intelligence teams) this can also be considered good practice. This much reduces the cost of using mobile phones and encourages the officers to keep in touch with one another and the command room.

The plain clothed away spotters could be given identification vests as advised by the EU handbook. The vests could have national flags upon them in order to aid identification for the fans in case they have a query as well as ensuring the safety of the officer if a situation of conflict is to develop.

#### *Tactical Performance for Public Order Management*

This section is covered extensively by the evaluation points requested by the host, see conclusions above.

#### *Dynamic Risk Assessment*

The operation was considered a high risk event. However, from a dynamic risk assessment perspective the intelligence suggested the risk of pre-planned disorder was low and the risk of spontaneous disorder was a medium.

Although home fans had been identified as posing the main risk, the highest presence of police officers focused on away fans. There was an explicit operational focus on the small number of risk fans rather than on the thousands of fans coming to enjoy the game.

There was no active management of the developing risks at the away section preventing the situation taking place for the length of time it did.

The description of the risk fans made use of the A, B and C categorisation system. This descriptive terminology is no longer in line with that of the EU handbook. In a recent revision it is found to be more informative and accurate to use the expressions risk and non risk fans, usually in conjunction with the number of fans being referred to and the exact nature of the risk they pose.

In analysing their observations, the team took note of several **good practices**. Without trying to be complete, the ones that seem especially relevant to other police forces are summarised below.

- The efficiency and high technological standard of the control room
- The cooperation with the NFIP and PICC
- Competency of the spotters
- The use of liaison officers for visiting forces





# Chapter 4 Overview of the outcome of the peer reviews

The idea of the peer review evaluation process was that it would be beneficial to both requesting police forces and participating reviewers and that more general lessons could be drawn as well, contributing to organisational learning by facilitating the identification of good practices, the exchange of experiences and the continuous development of professional norms. In this chapter, the outcome of the peer reviews will be addressed by looking at the types of evaluation questions that were put to the peer review teams, to good practices and to points of attention identified by the teams and to the actual use that has been made of the peer review reports. In addition to being based on an analysis of the peer review reports, this chapter is based on a meeting held in April 2008 for which all peer reviewers and hosts were invited to discuss the experiences gained during the peer reviews. The meeting was also attended by representatives from the so-called think-tank.

## Evaluation points

The reviews in the previous chapter make clear the review teams were asked to address a wide variety of evaluation points. The list of questions makes interesting reading in itself and is an indication of the types of issues that are relevant in public order management. A few questions focused on fans: are there particular signs after which extremist or sectarian supporters can be identified, do fans feel welcome? Some more questions related specifically to the security in and around the stadium and the cooperation between police and club/ stadium security or stewards, pointing to the fact that this was sometimes a cause for concern.

Quite a few questions dealt with the performance of police officers, how they understand their role and responsibility, how they interact with fans, if they are aware of their role as distributor and gatherer of information, how they maintain a balance between an empathic and a pro-active approach and how they intervene (correct and determined, friendly and firm?). The main issue conveyed by these types of questions seemed to be whether or not the actual behaviour of officers matched what was expected of them, e.g. in providing a hospitable environment, taking cultural differences into account, actively contacting fans and gathering information?

A number of questions related specifically to strategy and tactics and the work of commanding officers (including the way in which they briefed their officers). Under this heading fall questions about the police deployment strategy and the deployment of specific units (and the way in which different units work together), the realisation of the strategy, the implementation of tactical means to deliver the strategic intentions, the overall integrity of the policing operation and how well it met its objectives and the separation and management of risk fans. The main issues conveyed by these types of questions seemed to be whether or not strategy and tactics were effective and were appropriate for the event/ the situation.

## Good practices

In the course of their observations, the teams noted several (what they identified as) *good practices*. For the future, these items could be a topic of discussion, especially with regard to the criteria that can be used to determine whether or not a practice can be considered “good” and in how far others can take advantage of the experiences gained. Many of the practices identified as good were particularly good examples of the implementation of recommendations already contained in the EU handbook, such as: a well functioning NFIP, good international cooperation, good utilization of spotters and information, good cooperation between police and club and a good functioning stewarding system. There were also examples of careful and elaborate preparation of and planning for the operation, good cooperation with agencies external to the police and effective management of media for benefit of police and local community. The team also witnessed examples of use of dynamic risk assessment, existence of a balance between police profile and actual situational risk and tactical deployments in line with a friendly and firm, community oriented policing approach, also in situations of increased risk.

In addition, the teams also other identified other good practices, such as specific attention for crowd safety and for officer safety, consistent use of well-structured briefings (with the use of visual aids), half-time briefings and debriefings, positioning of officers in the operation being determined by their experience rather than their rank, use of a GPS system to monitor the movements of all units in the operation, and wearing of protective vests underneath rather than above clothing.

With regards to interactions with fans the teams noted examples of positive facilitation of and communication with of fans, including language courses for officers and conveying of the key information to fans via websites before their arrival in a foreign city. Also, police involvement in preventive activities aimed at fans was seen as good practice. Formulation of a clear behavioral profile that was clearly communicated to officers was also noted as a good practice.

As far as dynamic risk assessments were concerned, teams pointed to the following good examples:

- The clear distinction between different types of risks, and especially between spontaneous and planned disorder
- The availability of different types of contingency scenarios related to risks (e.g. for evacuation, bomb threat, flares, pitch invasion)
- A clear identification of hot spots based on previous experiences and complaints by the public and flexible deployment in relation to these hot spots
- The fact that intelligence officers had received dedicated training

Regarding tactical deployment for public order management the teams drew attention to the following good practices:

- Rapid intervention and degrading when necessary
- Use of the planning officer as a quality assurance officer
- Use of dedicated tactical advisors
- Use of a liaison officer working with units from visiting/ neighbouring forces providing assistance
- Explicit use of police officers with specific experience for specific functions or at specific posts

In Austria and Switzerland a strategy/ philosophy called the 3D-concept (dialogue – de-escalation – drastic action) was identified as “good practice”, in line with the friendly and firm approach advocated in the EU handbook. However, the way in which the concept was implemented was on several occasions identified as a “point of attention” (see below) and because of this, it will be elaborated upon in the next chapter on theory, practice and education.

## Points of attention

In the course of their observations, the teams also noted several what they identified as points of attention. Many of these points of attention were specific to the specific operation or the specific police force, but there were also points which may have a wider relevance for external forces also. Most common points of attention identified by the teams were linked to non-compliance with the recommendations in the EU handbook, especially with regard to information exchange, lack of dynamic risk assessment and a tactical performance that is not matched to the situation at hand. Of particular notice in this respect is that of course frequently international matches take place involving teams from non-EU member-states. These usually have nothing comparable to a National Football Information Point (although Switzerland is an exception) and are not aware of the contents of the EU handbook (although many are signatories to the European convention on spectator violence <sup>5</sup>). As a result of the many languages existing within Europe, communication between home and away police forces and between police and fans is often limited. Other than that, the most common points of attention relate to the following:

- A failure of the operation/ officers to implement the chosen strategy (either because of a failure to make clear to officers what is expected of them or because of the lack of understanding of officers about what their role is or their competence to act accordingly)
- A lack of balance between police officer uniform and behaviour on the one hand and actual risk on the other
- A lack of interaction and communication between police officers and fans
- Imperfections in the cooperation between police and partners (either police or non-police partners such as transport police, club, stewards etc.)

The challenge for the future will be to enhance exchange and implementation of *good practices* identified, to exchange and address points of attention. In the meeting held in April 2008 with hosts and reviewers, the wider relevance of the above points of attention was stressed and especially the often noted lack of dynamic risk assessment was identified as a cause for concern.

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5 In full: the European convention on spectator violence and misbehaviour at sports events and in particular at football matches

In addition to the points of attention mentioned above, others were identified that reflected differences in perspectives between forces that could be an interesting topic of discussion about the pros and cons of different approaches. They could be elaborated upon in future meetings, discussions and training sessions and be subject of future research. The following topics were identified by the teams:

- The use of spotters: some forces choose to deploy spotters in uniform, other use plainclothes spotters
- The task of spotters: some forces choose to deploy spotters who actively interact with fans, whereas other forces do not want/ expect their spotters to interact directly or openly with fans
- The use of stewards from away teams: on some occasions stewards accompanied away fans during transport. Sometimes they assisted home stewards at the entrance to the stadium or in the stands on other occasions they were not allowed/ expected to work in this way
- The division of tasks between police and stewards: there were clear differences between forces regarding what police do and what the task of club-stewards with regard to segregation of fans. Inside stadiums, there is always segregation of home and away fans. Outside the stadium (either in the direct vicinity of the stadium or in the city centre) some forces choose to keep home and away fans separate, others deliberately choose to mix them
- International police cooperation: there are sometimes quite distinct differences in the way in which the recommendations of the EU-handbook are being dealt with, e.g. relating to the sending of spotters and the exchange of information
- The use of intelligence: some forces adopt a consistent intelligence-led approach, for other forces the relation between intelligence and decision-making is less clear
- The treatment of fans: in some forces a consistent friendly and firm approach is adopted, in other forces treatment of fans is less consistent, with mixed "messages" being communicated to fans. In some operations, officers failed to see their role as that of contacting and interacting with fans.

## Usefulness of the peer reviews

During the pilot and at the April 2008 reviewers and hosts expressed their positive experiences through involvement with the reviews.

**Hosts** indicated that they were very happy and satisfied with the system and that points were detected that needed correction. They appreciated the exchange of ideas and experiences and the focus on being better in the future. Especially the discrepancies that were noted by the teams between what was expected of the operation/ of officers and actual behaviour was helpful. Several hosts indicated that the report served as a catalyst for change (and noted that in the past, things first had to go wrong before change happened):

*Please be informed that I consider this document very useful. (...) Following the peer review mission activities, and after reading the report that you sent to me, I extracted and also established a set of conclusions, which will be sent to all territorial structures, in order to improve their activities in this field of public order management for sport events, relation with the media, the football clubs and other authorities. I also should mention that the Public Relations Service will set a new more adequate approach with the media for a better response to this hooliganism phenomenon. Therewith, we decided to implement a new pilot system on maintaining public order, during the first two rounds of the National Football Championship.*

*Finally, I would like to say one more time, that I considered this Peer Review very important and useful and I hope that in the future I will have the opportunity to be an evaluation team member for another state that will request this kind of mission.*

Use has been made of the reports in one or more of the following manners:

- the report was sent to and discussed with commanders/ units involved in the operation;
- the report was used for internal reflection within the force;
- The report was used in discussions with partners.

Points of attention were reflected upon, as well as the beneficial elements of the review, and why these issues were positive. For some hosts the reports served as a useful, independent confirmation of what was known and what needed to be addressed. Sometimes the review team was "used" to put a topic on the agenda.

Hosts also indicated also that not just the content of the peer reviews was useful and helpful, but also the peer review process: having independent experts hold up a mirror. Especially for Euro 2008 host cities the peer review reports served as an important check on their preparations: “are we on track for the Euro?” In Switzerland this led to a meeting in February 2008 for commanders from the four Swiss host cities, organised by the national Euro 2008 police coordinator and the first author. At the meeting the identified points of attention that could be relevant for the policing during the tournament were discussed. The main topics of discussion included:

- Implementation of the 3D concept
- Relation between risk assessment and tactical deployment
- Cooperation between host cities and police forces providing support
- Uniformity in approach between different host cities
- Role of and cooperation with stadium security
- Communication with fans

At the ensuing press-conference, representatives from the four host cities indicated how they had addressed or were going to address the findings of the peer review teams<sup>6</sup>.

**Reviewers** talked about a win-win situation and an excellent opportunity to circulate good practises:

*“I hope they have learned from me but I also learned from the host city. It is very important.”*

*“Every time I go, I learn something new that I can adopt in my system. The reviews enable me to make a network for friends. Breaks barriers down, makes ‘daily life’ easier”*

*For me it was a great experience and it was very valuable for my work in future in international football matches. Thanks for the possibility to have joined this team.*

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6 [http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/front/Swiss\\_pass\\_Euro\\_2008\\_security\\_audit.html?siteSect=105&sid=8760711&rss=true&ty=st](http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/front/Swiss_pass_Euro_2008_security_audit.html?siteSect=105&sid=8760711&rss=true&ty=st); <http://football.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/feedstory/0,-7321323,00.html>; <http://football.uk.reuters.com/euro2008/news/L19073341.php>

Among others, reviewers mentioned experiencing interesting differences in legislation between the different countries and sharing commonalities in how to police fans.

As far as the methodology was concerned, reviewers indicated that it was hard work, interviewing people, listening, taking notes, but that it was good to go into the field and not to be at the desk, that it was important to speak to the people (officers, stewards, fans, citizens) in the street, to see the whole operation. The ability to approach all people and penetrate the whole system was appreciated: *"This is very difficult in the normal job"*.

Many reviewers experienced it was difficult to first observe, and then make conclusions: *"You need training in order to do that. You also see your commanders in a different way"*

Reviewers were positive about the reception they received from hosts and about the openness they experienced and the willingness to change, learn and improve.

Hosts and reviewers agreed that the main **success factor** of the peer review teams is the peer aspect and the informal, open and utilisation-focused way in which the reviews are conducted, aimed at learning from the bottom up and not as an inspection. The element of exchange and the way in which the reviews hold up a mirror, identify good practices and provide encouragement to work with these appeared to be a critical factor of appreciation. The mix between practice and theory was considered to be important as well.

Hosts and reviewers identified lack of information as the main **barrier** to a widespread use of the peer review system. In addition *"it is not usual to be inspected by other police forces"* and *"there are too many borders in the heads of policemen"*, although it is felt that the line of resistance is more in the heads of bosses, not in normal officers.



Hosts and reviewers indicated that the peer review system should be used more often and had a number of **suggestions** to stimulate a more widespread use.

These included:

- Implement peer reviews at a national level as well
- Incorporate (as suggested earlier) peer reviews as the practical part of the to-be-developed training at EU level for commanders
- Cascade information about peer reviews through NFIPs
- Involve commanders first as member of a peer review before asking them to be host
- Involve the peer review team in the host debriefing process
- Link up with other initiatives within Europe (including CEPOL) so that experiences can be shared more fully in a more coordinated way
- Encourage and facilitate peer reviews in countries that organise championships



# Chapter 5 Public order management: theory, practice and education

## Introduction

Different police forces differ in the way they maintain public order and the intervention methods they use: the approach is sometimes more preventive and proactive, on other occasions more repressive and reactive, a distinction that is often phrased in terms of either 'soft' or 'hard' policing (della Porta & Reiter, 1998 give an overview for the policing of protest). These differences in policing styles are based on practical police experience rather than on the results of systematic research into public order policing and its effects. In as far as police training and tactics are based on research they are usually based on outdated and discredited theories. At the same time, a lot of studies in public order policing have limited practical relevance. They are either highly theoretical or methodologically limited in several ways. Most studies on the maintenance of public order occur after the event has taken place and field research is very rare. In addition, as Stott & Reicher (1998a, 1998b) indicate, existing studies often disregard the police perspective and ignore the fact that public order events are intergroup processes and as such a consequence of developing interactions. At present, there is therefore limited systematic knowledge as regards the effects of different policing styles on the occurrence or escalation of public disorder.

Adang (1991, 1998) concluded on the basis of systematic ethological observations of 225 riot situations in the Netherlands that, contrary to popular belief and traditional crowd theories, people in crowds do not form a homogenous mass with individuals all more or less behaving in the same way (see also McPhail, 1991). There is also no evidence that people in crowds have a higher probability of using violence than in everyday circumstances or that people in crowds show a higher tendency to perform so-called emotional or irrational behaviour. Traditional crowd theory explains behaviour entirely in terms of processes internal to the crowd itself and assumes that the pathology of a few agitators induces an acute pathology in crowd members (see Stott & Reicher, 1998a). The results of Adang (1991, 1998) pointed to the importance of intergroup processes and suggested that it is possible and in fact advantageous to police crowds (both football crowds and other types of crowds) with a friendly but firm approach, based on communication and negotiation on the one hand (in this sense the approach could be called 'soft') and early intervention against transgressions on the other hand (in this sense the approach could be called 'hard').

## Euro 2000

In June 2000, the European football championships (Euro 2000) were held in the Netherlands and Belgium, neighbouring countries with different types of police organisations and different police cultures. On the basis of practical experiences and previous research (Adang, 1998) a "Police behavioural profile Euro 2000" was drawn up to bring about an equal influence on the behaviour of visitors, to bring clarity and to promote a positive image of the authorities and the police services. The behavioural profile stressed that the primary approach should be preventive and proactive. At the core of this profile was the idea that a friendly but firm approach would be most suitable. Friendly in the sense that fans were to be treated as guests, firm in the sense that clear behavioural limits were to be maintained. This would involve the use of small surveillance units in regular uniform, who were to be easily approachable and were expected to actively contact fans. Decentralised intervention units (with their specific tools such as riot police vehicles, dogs, water carts) were kept out of visibility for as long as possible. According to the behavioural profile, the ideal Euro 2000 police officer would meet a number of criteria, such as contributing to a festive course of events by his actions, recognising potentially violent situations and not being afraid to intervene severely yet justly and in time.

During Euro 2000 data on the interaction between police and the public were collected in several ways (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). An international monitoring team consisting of four experienced police officers visited all eight host cities at least once. Data were also gathered from foreign police officers (spotters) taking part in the police operations. In each of the eight host cities, an observation team of at least four observers (both students and police officers) conducted systematic and structured observations on match days, attended briefings and held ad hoc interviews with police officers, stewards and fans. The emphasis of observations outside the stadium in host cities was put on the interaction between the police and the public. Observations were recorded instantly on a portable audio recorder.

Analysis of the data indicated that tactical concepts actually used did not consistently conform to the basic concept in all of the eight host cities. Two different policing styles could be distinguished: high profile public order policing with a relatively large police presence (three cities) and low profile public order policing with fewer numbers of visible police (the other five cities). Cities that

adopted the “low profile” approach had on average 10 visible police officers per 100 fans in the streets (at locations where fans gathered in large numbers). That is still a considerable number of officers, compared to every day policing practices and to the norm for the number of stewards inside a stadium (1 steward for every 100 fans). In high profile cities three times as many officers were visible and a clear difference existed between the two policing styles. The difference was clear both from the systematic observations of the observation teams per host city and from the qualitative observations of foreign spotters (who were active in more than one host city each) and the international monitoring team (which visited each of the eight host cities and was in the best position to make comparisons). The difference was also noted by the fans (Long 2000).

Police conduct in cities with low profile policing was more in line with the “behavioural profile”. The largest differences were visible for the following items: police officers in “low profile” cities were more easily approachable by fans, contributed more to the festive nature of the event, showed more respect for different cultures and nationalities, fulfilled a more preventive role, treated visitors more as guests and switched more flexibly between different approaches when necessary. Both in cities with high and low profile policing, police officers acted impartially and without prejudice and, remarkably enough, there was no significant difference between the strictness with which police officers acted in cities with high and low-profile policing (indicating that low profile policing is not equal to “soft” policing or not adhering to tolerance limits).

Characteristic of the “low profile” approach were a substantial, but limited number of police officers in daily uniform, patrolling in pairs or small groups, interacting with fans. These interactions were friendly, but transgressions by fans were responded to quickly. A report by the English Football Supporters Association (Long, 2000) contains the following statement about the “low profile” approach: “The policing was excellent, and fans enjoyed a warm welcome from the authorities. The police were calm, polite, efficient and friendly. There was a large police presence in each town, but this was never intimidating or threatening in any way. The police were on the streets in large numbers, in normal police clothing and on foot. They made an effort to talk to fans, often laughing and joking, and their presence helped to reassure fans”.

In the low profile approach, police deployment seemed to be based more on intelligence and on information provided by spotters’ teams. In the “high

profile" approach more than three times as many officers were visible in the streets. These officers were more often dressed in riot gear and accompanied by their riot vehicles; they formed larger groups, which made it less easy to approach them. It is important to note that the distinction made here is more subtle than the distinction between 'tolerant' and 'repressive' (della Porta & Reiter, 1998) or paramilitary versus non-paramilitary styles of public order maintenance (Jefferson, 1994). In both "high profile" and "low profile" approaches, a clear command and control structure was in place and use could be made of intervention units with riot gear.

As clear as the distinction between high and low profile policing was, it was not absolute. Both in cities with a high and in cities with a low profile approach, elements of the other approach could be discerned regularly. In all host cities, police officers acted without prejudice and impartially. Both in cities with a high and in cities with a low profile approach, a lot of initiatives were taken to welcome fans, to inform them, to direct them to the city centres and stadiums. Fan co-ordinators, fan-embassies, city stewards, entertainment all contributed to a hospitality approach and police behaviour complemented this. There were no differences in the "strictness" with which officers acted in high and low profile cities. However, in the "low profile" approach there was a tendency for officers to define their actions more individually than in "high profile" cities, which could be disadvantageous. The international monitoring team also issued a warning: although the low-key, communicative, service-oriented approach works very well, it might be difficult to change if the situation calls for it.

Contrary to the expectations of many, there were only a limited number of mostly minor and short incidents in the host cities during Euro 2000. In light of this and the overall festive and safe nature of the event, police deployment and behaviour might be said to have had the expected effect. Remarkably, the large numbers of police present in the "high profile" cities did not correlate with a smaller number of incidents in those cities. One would expect more incidents around "increased risk" matches it was not as simple as that: relatively speaking, incidents were most frequent in "high profile" cities on days *without* increased risk! A closer inspection of the data revealed that this higher figure could be attributed to incidents in just one of the three "high profile" cities. Qualitative observations suggest that in this city (as opposed to others) collective police action in the form of stopping fans or removing them was frequently taken prior to (rather than as a response to) incidents.

There was thus no simple correlation between the approach or profile adopted and the number of incidents. However, it was clear from the data that a larger number of officers does not necessarily lead to fewer incidents. If they do not respond to transgressions or are not present at risk-locations, the influence of a large number of officers may be limited. In view of the number of officers deployed (especially in the “high profile” cities) it was amazing that on several occasions, no officers at all were present on certain locations in spite of the presence of potential troublemakers there. On the other hand, a “high profile” presence in itself does not cause or provoke incidents. Only if a “high profile” presence is accompanied by more aggressive policing methods may the likelihood of violent incidents occurring be raised. This seemed to be the case in one of the host cities. This was also the only city in which a command and control structure was in use that differed from the ones used in the other cities and in which the bi-national risk analyses were not used.

Before Euro 2000, the police behavioural profile met with criticism from some officers. In their view, the behavioural profile stated the obvious and simply described daily officer behaviour. To them, the emphasis on the behavioural profile was an insult: it implied that they had to be told how to do their job properly, because the way they used to do it was supposedly wrong. The fact that, generally speaking, police behaviour was often along the lines of the behavioural profile indicates that, for many officers, this profile probably did not deviate dramatically from what they did daily. However, the results of this study indicate that neither in “low profile” nor in “high profile” cities, officer behaviour corresponded exactly to the behavioural profile. Not surprisingly, this indicates that, for a change in attitude to occur, more is needed than one day of training. Applying the police behavioural profile involves more than every officer wearing the same uniform correctly. In addition, defining a behavioural profile may be regarded as an example of clear leadership: by adopting and promoting a behavioural profile commanding officers give a clear indication how they want their officers to behave.

Of course, police behaviour is only one of many relevant factors influencing the development and escalation of public order incidents. Another important factor influencing public order and safety surrounding football matches is the motivations of individuals that become involved (Adang, 1998). In this respect, for most countries, fans following the national team usually pose less of a threat to public order than fans following club teams. This in itself limits the number

of potential troublemakers coming to an event such as Euro 2000. Further help came from the fact that the national teams with the most violent following were out of the tournament after the first round. In addition, through the international police co-operation effort, many potential troublemakers did not make it to the Netherlands or Belgium at all, because they were persuaded to stay at home or because they were stopped at the border. These circumstances made a friendly but firm hospitality-oriented approach more feasible.

Generally speaking, the conclusion can be drawn that the police deployment contributed to the safe and festive nature of the event. The official evaluation commissioned by the Dutch government arrived at the same conclusion (COT, 2000). There were only a limited number of mostly minor and short incidents in the host cities. There was a clear distinction between two types of police deployment: "high profile policing", with large numbers of police, partly in riot gear and relatively more "low profile policing", which was more in line with the "behavioural profile developed before the start of the tournament. Based on the data gathered, several elements of "good practice" could be distinguished. These include the following:

- development of a clear behavioural profile;
- communication and training to implement the behavioural profile;
- continued attention for the behavioural profile during briefings and debriefings, also in the period leading up to the event;
- actively contacting fans (obtaining information, building a relationship);
- making police presence strongly dependent on information gathering and risk analysis;
- police officers patrolling in pairs or small groups;
- police officers being clearly visible, standing out in the crowd;
- clearly communicating tolerance limits and acting on them;
- short and clear command lines

A working group on football disorder (2001) in the United Kingdom concluded in a report submitted to Parliament that the "low profile" type of policing provides a model that should be encouraged throughout Europe. The working group stated that the imaginative and focused policing tactics used have been universally praised, not least by the fans themselves. The UK working group on football disorder also recommended that further research be commissioned into the impact of policing and other public safety tactics on supporter behaviour.



It is important to emphasise that the “friendly but firm” policing style is not a ‘laissez-faire’ approach: it involves officers actively responding at an early stage to relatively minor infractions of the preset tolerance limits. The results show that it is possible to maintain public order effectively (and efficiently, considering less officers are needed) in this way without creating a siege situation or without disrupting the activities of people (in this case, fans) concerned. A key element in the “friendly but firm” approach is the presence of police officers in pairs or small groups, who are accessible to and even actively contact fans. Information about intentions may be obtained, information may be exchanged more easily, the anonymity of fans is reduced and a temporary relationship may be built. At the same time, tolerance limits are clearly communicated and acted upon at an early stage, thus reducing the need to resort to tactics of collective confrontation.

In this way the police is better able to differentiate between people involved and the development of an in-group/ out-group antagonism between people gathering (in this case visitors and fans) and the police may be avoided. From a psychological perspective Stott & Reicher (e.g. 1998a) indicate that when an initially heterogeneous crowd has come to be treated as a homogeneous whole by the police, this has led crowd members to reconceptualise themselves as members of a common category, thus setting up a cycle of tension and escalating conflict. It is this well-known in-group/ out-group mechanism that plays such a large role in the occurrence and escalation of incidents of collective violence (Adang, 1999).

## Principles for crowd policing

The behavioural profile developed for Euro 2000 fits very well with four principles for crowd policing as formulated by Reicher et al. (2004). Theoretical starting point for these principles is the elaborated social identity model (ESIM), which states that *collective* 'disorder' is made possible through the shared psychological salience of a common social identity among crowd participants (Reicher, 1984, 1987). The defining dimensions of this identity serve to explain the normative limits of collective action, (what people do) and the extent of participation (who does and does not join in) during a crowd event. This 'social identity' analysis argues that the dynamics of intergroup interaction are integral to the psychology of widespread 'disorder'.

To help prevent widespread disorder, Reicher et al. (2004) identify four key principles for crowd policing: education, facilitation, communication, and differentiation, which they clarify as follows.

*Educate:* As groups act on the basis of social identities, and as crowds are characteristically made up of several groups, it is of great practical importance to educate oneself about the social identities of the various groups in a crowd: their values and standards, their aims and goals, their sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups, their history of interaction with these groups and anything (dates, places, objects, forms of action) which have particular symbolic significance.

Intelligence should not only be focused on violent individuals and their plans, but also on understanding of the social identities of the groups which gather, to know what their aims are; whether and how to support them; the forms of police action that might antagonise them and make them more sympathetic to violent element in the crowd. The same effort that is put into identifying violent individuals should be put into obtaining an understanding of group identity. Equally, similar priority should be put on both factors in intelligence briefings.

*Facilitate:* Rather than stopping people from doing what they would, and thereby frustrating them, an emphasis on facilitation needs to be paramount at all stages of the police operation. In planning for an event one needs to identify the legitimate aims of crowd members in order to consider how best to organise policing so as to enable them to be met. If there is some reason why they cannot

be met it is essential not simply to give a negative response but to be creative in finding alternative ways in meeting (and being seen to meet) the underlying aims. If the danger of violence or the actual occurrence of violence forces the police to impose limits on the crowd, it is especially important to make clear why it has been necessary to impose these limits and to provide alternative means by which legitimate aims can be met. This is why *communication* is important (see below)

Especially when violence breaks out, the temptation to control and to clamp down may become stronger. It is at this point that a clear indication that the police are supporting collective aims and that violence endangers them can make the difference between escalation and de-escalation. Of course, for this to happen, it is necessary not only the police are trying to facilitate crowd aims but that the crowd see them as doing so. Again, this points to the importance of communication

*Communicate*: One of the paradoxes of crowd policing is that it becomes increasingly important to communicate with the crowd where one seeks to avoid a potentially conflictual relationship but in situations where relationships are potentially conflictual, crowd members are least likely to trust what the police have to say. Especially where there is a long history of conflict then the very attempt to tell crowd members how policing is designed to facilitate them may be seen as dishonest and increase hostility. It is therefore also important how communication takes place. It is best to use people who are trusted and respected by groups within the crowd – preferably as ‘one of us’. Of course it may be impossible to find figures who are accepted by all groups in the crowd, however it is critical that they are not ‘self-appointed’ or chosen for their links to the authorities but rather seen as representative by significant sections within the crowd (once again, cultural knowledge about the groups in the crowd is critical for this). To be really effective, these communicators or mediators should be available and active at points of incipient violence right from the start (or even before the event). It is a telling observation on the balance between repressive and facilitative strategies of crowd policing that there exist large reserves of armoured vehicles, baton rounds and so on which are hardly ever used, while far less attention is being paid to communication technologies. Big screens and mobile communication systems could be more useful in many crowd events than water cannon.

*Differentiate:* It is important to be aware of different identities of groups gathering and of different ways of acting and of reacting. It is even more important to act on that awareness and not to treat all crowd members as the same. One basic distinction that should be made is to distinguish between people on the basis of what they actually do, rather than on the basis of the category to which they (supposedly or not) belong. It is precisely when some crowd members start to be hostile that it becomes important to treat crowd members in a friendly way. It is precisely in order to stop the violence of the few that one must be permissive towards the many. This is difficult, because people tend to treat other groups as homogenous such that if some amongst them act negatively everybody is viewed negatively. It is also difficult because the costs to the individual police officer (making up the front line) of treating someone with trust when they are actually hostile are greater than the costs of treating them with hostility when they are actually trustworthy. To be able to differentiate, more differentiated tactics need to be developed than are usually employed and differentiation is a consideration which should be built into every tactical or strategic decision, into training, planning, equipping and operating in crowds.

One of the central factors in making tactical choices is the perceived appropriateness by fan groups of police deployments during events. Fans themselves are acutely aware of the levels of risk they pose to 'public order' and often these fan based assessments accurately reflect the 'actual' levels of 'risk' and the overall levels of observed 'disorder'. Correspondingly there is an almost direct association between the emergence of 'risk', the conditions of widespread conflict and fans' perception concerning the 'appropriateness' of public order policing. Consequently, the most effective way of policing public order is to maintain a 'balance' between the perceived levels of risk and the nature of policing deployment. If balance is achieved, there is an emergent 'self policing' culture among fans whereby there is a marginalisation and isolation of 'hooligan' elements, a lack of support for (and even active suppression of) 'anti-social' activity among the fans and a generalised avoidance of conflict. If balance is not achieved there are also corresponding consequences: a perception of the inappropriateness of police action and increased support for 'anti-social' activity and the emergence of uniform and generalised aggression / conflict.

In public order management, a dynamic model for dynamic risk assessment should be used, based on the following principles (cf. Stott & Adang, 2003):

- Take account of the fact that risk is highly dependent on situations and circumstances, subject to change and varying along a continuum of probability;
- Identify the circumstances and behaviours that may contribute to incidents (not just “profiling” and categorising problem fans!);
- Clearly distinguish between risks for specific types of incidents, such as public order problems, public safety problems, criminality in relation to mass events and terrorism.

The model should specify “increased risk” whenever it is identified and summarise and assess information on the following points (cf. Borum et al., 1999)

- a. Indications of whether or not individuals/ groups are making plans/ show a readiness to be involved in incidents;
- b. Identify recent events, the current situation and characteristics of the football match and the location where the match is to take place that may increase or decrease the risks involved and how these factors interact;
- c. Identify situations (e.g. loss of the match, provocations by other fans, police measures) that have contributed to the initiation of incidents in the past or that have led individuals/ groups to respond in more extreme ways;
- d. Identify behaviour by individuals/ groups that is indicative of initiation of/ involvement in incidents.

It is of great practical importance to know and assess the social identities of the various (sub)groups of fans, their values and standards, aims and goals, their sense of what is right and proper, their stereotypes and expectations of other groups, their history of interaction with these groups and anything (dates, places, objects, forms of action) that has particular symbolic significance. This assessment is crucial for tactical decisions to be made to help decrease rather than increase the likelihood of incidents.

## Euro 2004

These principles were subsequently utilised by the Portuguese national police PSP in their preparations for the 2004 European football championships held in Portugal (Euro 2004). A strategic approach was adopted that conformed with the “low profile” approach. At the request of the PSP and funded by the Economic Social Research Council (ESRC) an independent study into fan behaviour and public order policing during Euro 2004 was conducted in cooperation between the University of Liverpool and the Police Academy of the Netherlands (Adang & Stott, 2004; Stott & Adang, 2005; Stott et al., 2007). The research addressed three specific issues. First to understanding the psychological processes and intergroup dynamics underlying both the presence and absence of ‘disorder’ in the context of international football. Secondly, to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies and tactics used to prevent crowd disorder. The third was developing the relationship between science and practice in the realm of public order policing by providing an empirically based approach to the safety and security planning of future international football tournaments.

The results indicate that:

1. If police was visibly present the proportion of visible officers was on average 4 officers per 100 fans, both in normal and increased risk situations. This figure is somewhat lower than but comparable to the Euro 2000 visible presence in low profile, normal risk situations (on average 6 officers per 100 fans). There is no distinction between low and high profile policing during Euro 2004, whereas there was a clear distinction during Euro 2000 in this respect. Note should be taken of the fact that in Portugal, extensive use was made of plainclothes police officers, who were deployed wherever fans gathered in large numbers.
2. If police was present, this was not in the form of full riot police. During Euro 2000 riot police in full riot gear was present in approximately 15% of samples, with a significantly higher riot police presence in high profile situations and whenever risk analyses indicated increased risk. During Euro 2004, there was no significant difference between low and increased risk situations with regard to visibility of riot police. Note should be taken of the fact that observers indicated that riot police units were in fact present in the neighbourhood of locations where fans gathered: however they were positioned in such a way that they were not directly or easily visible to fans.

3. During Euro 2004, there were almost no incidents recorded during the structured observations (both in an absolute sense and compared to Euro 2000).

Whereas Euro 2000 was considered a success by the organising countries because of the low frequency of incidents and because the much anticipated 'mother of all hooligan wars' did not materialise, Euro 2004 was characterised by an almost total absence of incidents. As was the case during Euro 2000 as well, apart from a few (attempted) pitch invasions by individuals, no incidents occurred inside stadiums. Analysis of the data obtained in this independent evaluation allowed to address the important issue of the cause of the low frequency of incidents within Portugal. The fact that especially Germany and the UK prevented known troublemakers from travelling to Portugal certainly was a factor. However, both the observations as interviews with foreign police teams indicated that individuals known as 'hooligans' or characterizing themselves as such were in fact present in Portugal. Observations of the rare and limited incidents that did occur as well as potential incidents that had all the ingredients for escalation, but did not in fact escalate, allows to state that, in spite of low visible police presence, most of these incidents were responded to quickly. The absence of major incidents was therefore not just a matter of chance. Quick and targeted low-profile police interventions prevented escalation. In this way, clear behavioural limits were set. Police strategy and tactics contributed to an atmosphere where fans identified as football or Euro2004 fans first (rather than just as fans of their respective national teams), non-violent behaviour was the norm and fans opposing violence became empowered. As a consequence, several examples of self-policing among fans could be observed.

This argument is strengthened by incidents that did occur in the Algarve (in Albufeira), where police tactics differed. Initially, behavioural limits were not set and the police response to beginning incidents did not differentiate between troublemakers and bystanders. Here, those willing to use violence were empowered. The conclusion of the research (Adang & Stott, 2004; Stott & Adang, 2005; Stott et al., 2007) was that the police strategy and tactics (the low profile approach, where behavioural limits are set friendly and firmly) was successful and contributed to the existence of a common football/'Euro 2004' identity among fans and the empowerment of non-violence and self-policing among fans. Of course other factors, such as hospitality and fan behaviour also contributed to this.

## Conclusion

The experiences of Euro 2000 and Euro 2004 illustrate how theory, practice and education can mutually benefit from one another. Strategy and tactics were informed by available knowledge and this knowledge was also used in preparing officers for the tournament. This same knowledge was put to good use in Germany for the World Cup 2006 and in Austria and Switzerland for the Euro 2008 football championships. It also led to the inclusion into the EU handbook of appendices on dynamic risk assessment and police tactical performance for public order management in line with the principles outlined above.



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# About the authors

Since 2004, **dr. Otto M.J. Adang** is Chair, Public order management, Police Academy of the Netherlands, Visiting professor, School of Psychology, University of Liverpool and (since 2006) visiting professor at the Swedish National Police Academy. Since 1998, he heads the research programma “Managing Dangerous Situations”, which focuses on interactions between the police and the public in potentially violent or dangerous situations. He has published extensively on issues dealing with public order management, football hooliganism and police use of force. Otto has been teaching at several seminars and courses organised by the European Police College (CEPOL) and the Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC). He has done research across Europe and been consulting police forces in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Northern Ireland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For more information see: [www.policestudies.net](http://www.policestudies.net)

In 2006 **Elaine Brown** was awarded M.A. Psychology (2:1 with Honours) by the University of St Andrews in Scotland, where she studied under the supervision of Prof. Steve Reicher. She is currently undertaking her research PhD at Liverpool University under the supervision of Dr. Clifford Stott and Prof. Otto Adang. Elaine’s PhD examines police perspectives of risk in the context of international football matches and the way in which understandings can impact upon strategical and tactical deployment. Her PhD will also seek to develop principles of understanding and managing risk on which ‘good practice’ techniques of crowd policing can be based.









Oude Apeldoornseweg 41-45  
7333 NR Apeldoorn  
Postbus 834  
7301 BB Apeldoorn

T (055) 539 20 00  
F (055) 539 26 25  
E [info@politieacademie.nl](mailto:info@politieacademie.nl)  
[www.politieacademie.nl](http://www.politieacademie.nl)



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